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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Levi Strauss paid nearly $4 billion in cash to its shareholders.
Unusual in size, the freeze-out fit a standard profile-it gave cash and li-
quidity to most shareholders while allowing the Haas family to obtain 100%
ownership of the firm. At the deal's center was a problem raised in every
corporate conflict transaction,2 including management buyouts ("MBOs")
and parent/subsidiary freeze-outs: How should minority shares be valued?
If the share value is set too high, then a transaction will not make sense for
continuing shareholders; if it is set too low, then it will not make sense for
I See Levi Strauss Assocs. Inc., Schedule 13E-3 (Feb. 14, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/
Archivesledgar/data/778977/0000950130-96-000512.txt> (visited Feb. 23, 1999) [hereinafter
Levi Strauss, Schedule 13E-3]; Levi Strauss Assocs., Inc. Schedule 13E-3 Amendment (Mar.
13, 1996) <http:lwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data1778977/0000950130-96-000831.txt>
(visited Feb. 23, 1999).
2 A "conflict transaction" is a transaction approved by fiduciaries who have a special in-
terest in the transaction and thus are said to "stand on both sides" of the transaction. See Wil-
liams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996) (stating in dictum that these transactions re-
quire the approval of an independent body in order to be protected from shareholder
challenges). Management buyouts ("MBOs") put the ongoing management in a direct conflict
with the public shareholders because every dollar paid to the shareholders reduces the man-
agement's potential profit See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Puzzles and Parables: Defin-
ing Good Faith in the MBO Context, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15, 15 (1990) (advocating a
judicial inquiry using objective and subjective criteria to examine the good faith of MBOs);
Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 730 (1985) (assessing the
merits of MBOs). Parent/subsidiary freeze-outs involve a similar conflict between the parent
company and other shareholders of the subsidiary. See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407
A.2d 1032, 1037 (Del. 1979) (affirming a denial of a motion to dismiss a shareholders' suit
alleging the breach of a fiduciary duty in a "short-form" merger), overruled by Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restate-
ment of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1354 (1978) (advocating a rule providing
that a parent owes a fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders of its subsidiaries, and pro-
posing "that this duty would not be met unless a corporate purpose for the merger [between
the two], other than mere elimination of the minority-held stock, were supported by the evi-
dence").
A "freeze-out" is a transaction in which public shareholders of Finn A are given cash or
securities of some other firm in exchange for their stock of Firm A, permitting a controlling
shareholder (or management) to gain 100% ownership of Firm A. Freeze-outs often follow a
tender offer in which a third party obtains control. See 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H.
STEmnBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREE EOuTs § 9.01, at 9-3 (1988). Commentators also use
the term "fireeze-out" in a different manner, to refer to the tactics used by controlling share-
holders to disadvantage minority shareholders, for example, by refusing to pay dividends. See
generally F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (1961).
Billion dollar conflict transactions have become a common feature of the corporate land-
scape. In addition to the Levi Strauss buyout, recent examples include the $2.2 billion con-
trolled merger of Union Bank and BankCal in 1996 and the $1.2 billion freeze-outs of QVC
and National Gypsum in 1995. See Levi Strauss, Schedule 13E-3, supra note 1; National
Gypsum Co., Proxy Statement (Aug. 21, 1995); QVC Programming Holdings, Inc., Offer to
Purchase (Aug. 11, 1994).
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continuing shareholders; if it is set too low, then it will not make sense for
the shareholders being cashed out. As a rule, huge deals produce huge
value disputes, and the Levi Strauss freeze-out proved no exception. Levi
Strauss's investment bankers began with an estimated open market value of
$189 per share. Bankers for dissident shareholders estimated values nearly
double that amount, representing a potential value gap of nearly $2 billion.3
Value disputes often concern facts particular to the target firm-such as
its earnings potential or its hidden assets and liabilities. The biggest poten-
tial issue in the Levi Strauss value dispute, however, arises each time the
minority shares were valued: Should the value be "discounted" to reflect
the noncontrolling status of the minority shares? Or, should the value in-
stead equal a pro rata share of the firm's total value?
Minority discounts-which can range as high as 35% or more--have a
dramatic impact on the price paid in a conflict transaction. If Levi Strauss
had included a discount of 35% in fixing the price paid to the shareholders
in its recapitalization, the total payout would have been reduced by nearly
$1.5 billion. In a copycat financial world strongly influenced by trends and
fashions, 5 in which even the marginal excess returns on investment can at-
3 Initially, the controlling shareholders offered $250 per share, a 40% premium over the
company's public market valuation. In February 1996, the company raised its offer to $265
per share, in part to reflect increases in overall stock prices since the commencement of the
bid. Dillon, Read & Co., an independent financial advisor retained by a special committee of
independent directors to represent the unaffiliated shareholders, found that the $265 offer
price was within the range of fairness. In early March, the dissident block announced that it
might seek a judicial determination of the "fair value" of their shares in an appraisal proceed-
ing under Delaware law. In the end, none of the Levi Strauss shareholders pursued appraisal
rights and, after the death of a principal dissident shareholder, the dissident block decided to
tender into the company's offer. See Levi Strauss, Schedule 13E-3, supra note 1.
4 See Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (upholding
a combined minority and marketability discount of 35%), afid, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1984); cf BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION 240-49 (1993) (collecting empiri-
cal data supporting minority discounts ranging from 25% to 45% and marketability discounts
ranging from 25% to 60%); SHANNON P. PRATr ET AL., VALUING A BusINEss 316-25, 334-
63 (3d ed. 1996) (same); Laurn G. Boothman, Valuing a Business in a Litigation Context,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 1994, at 5 ("Numerous studies... support [the marketability] discounts of
a wide range, from 0 percent to a high of approximately 80 percent.").
5 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 537-38 (1986) (arguing that people mistake
noise for information and trade on the basis of that noise, causing "unanticipated shifts in the
entire pattern of tastes and technologies across sectors"); Oliver J. Blanchard & Mark W.
Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets, in CRISES IN THE ECONOMIc
AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 295, 295 (Paul Wachtel ed., 1982) ("[C]rowd psychology be-
comes an important determinant of prices."); Bruce N. Lehrnann, Fads, Martingales, and
Market Efficiency, 105 Q.J. EcON. 1, 25 (1990) ("Mhe suggestion that predictable variation
in security returns arises ... from security price overreaction to speculative fads or the cogni-
tive misperceptions of investors in an inefficient market is currently enjoying a resurgence not
seen in two decades."); Robert J. Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 56 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) ("[Tihere is
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tract substantial capital, the law on discounts has a dramatic impact not only
on the price paid in conflict transactions, but on the extent to which such
transactions are pursued at all.
Part I of this Article shows that the law governing minority discounts is
surprisingly unpredictable and obscure in spite of the importance of minor-
ity discounts.6 Even within Delaware, the leading corporate jurisdiction,7 a
survey of the fair value cases on discounts shows that although the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has rejected minority discounts in theory, Delaware
chancery courts have applied them erratically in practice.8
Part II argues that although the law of "fair value" widely is thought to
be a binding, mandatory element of corporate law, it is not.9 Companies
and investors need not subject themselves to the currently unclear and un-
predictable law regarding discounts. As with nearly all rules of corporate
law, firms and investors may contract around the law regarding discounts (a
fact that has led Bernard Black to ask whether corporate law should be
evidence that fashions, fads, or bubbles do importantly influence prices of speculative as-
sets.").
6 Corporate statutes do not address discounts directly. For a long time, the states have
been split on the propriety of discounts, and in approximately 20 states, no published decision
addresses discounts. Disclosure regarding discounts is nearly nonexistent, and practitioners
and commentators are frequently unaware of their potential importance. See infra text ac-
comanying notes 173-90.
Corporations organized under Delaware law constitute nearly 60% of the Fortune 500
companies, and one-half of the 30 companies included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
See generally LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (Prentice Hall
Legal & Fin. Servs. 1993). Courts in other jurisdictions frequently rely on Delaware corpo-
rate law. See Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e
discuss Delaware case law as well, because of Delaware's position as a leader in the field of
corporate law.').
8 See infra text accompanying notes 48-120 (discussing Delaware's pro rata value doc-
tin~e. infra text accompanying notes 123-40 (demonstrating that current Delaware rules
on minority discounts are nonbinding). A note on terminology: Legal rules may be divided
into (1) mandatory rules, which by their terms apply whether or not the private parties elect to
be covered and (2) default rules, which by their terms permit the private parties to "opt out" of
the rules. Mandatory rules may be further divided into (a) avoidable rules, which by their
terms do not permit "opting out," but which may be avoided (or "contracted around") by the
private parties through some (legal) action (or contract) and (b) binding rules, which are im-
possible or too costly to avoid. Binding rules, finally, may be divided into (i) effective rules,
which are practically enforceable and in fact enforced and (ii) hortatory rules, which are ei-
ther unenforceable or unenforced in practice, where enforcement may be, in part, a function of
(illegal) acts of evasion by the private parties. The mandatory/default distinction is usually
formal and categorical, whereas the avoidable/binding and effective/hortatory distinctions are
usually practical and gradual; a rule may be more or less avoidable or binding, or more or less
effective, depending on the costs associated with its avoidance, evasion, and/or enforcement.
For convenience, however, I use "nonbinding" and "avoidable" as synonyms, and I often treat
them as categorical.
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characterized as "trivial"). Companies can contract around background cor-
porate law regarding fair value determinations by adopting fair price charter
provisions, entering into buy/sell agreements, or issuing redeemable stock.
Together, the legal facts reviewed in Parts I and II present an economic
puzzle. Ideal rules of corporate law should be consistent. A rule barring
discounts might be expected to increase the ex ante share value because in-
vestors would pay to eliminate the risk of conflict transactions at discounted
prices. Conversely, one could imagine that a rule permitting discounts
might increase the ex ante share value by facilitating control transactions.
Yet, with few exceptions, issuing firms generally have not used their ability
to contract for either rule. 10 In fact, firms rarely contract around unclear
rules of corporate law. In the great majority of instances, firms passively
accept the default rules of corporate law, even when those rules are as in-
consistent and unclear as Delaware law on discounts.
Part III considers three possible answers to this puzzle, applying con-
cepts from economic theory: transaction costs, network and innovation ex-
ternalities, and overpayment by investors." Each suggested answer remains
tentative and only points the way for future empirical research, but together
these answers suggest that avoidable rules of corporate law may be far from
trivial, even when they are nonmandatory or nonbinding.
Whatever the answer to the discount puzzle, a consistent rule on dis-
counts would benefit both investors and firms and improve efficiency. Part
IV attempts to provide such a rule.12 Although good theoretical arguments
can be made for either rule, a rule that excludes discounts is the better can-
didate for improving social welfare, as well as the private welfare of inves-
tors and the largest number of firms. My conclusion is supported by evi-
dence of actual bargains and theoretical approaches for choosing default
contract rules that take account of the asymmetric information confronting
firms and investors in the securities markets. A rule against discounts also
is more likely to reduce transaction costs. Part IV concludes by arguing that
discount law should remain nonbinding in the context of initial public of-
ferings.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 141-44 (discussing the fact that firms generally
have not contracted around discount law).
I See infra notes 145-93 (discussing possible answers to this puzzle).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 195-294 (describing what discount law should be).
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I. DELAWARE DIscouNT LAW IS UNCLEAR
A. Appraisal and Entire Fairness
Conflict transactions continue to have wide-ranging effects on the con-
trol of public companies in the United States.13 Valuing minority shares is
at the heart of every conflict transaction. Frequently, the minority share-
holders have no choice as to whether they will participate in a given conflict
transaction, such as where the transaction is sponsored by a controlling
shareholder and no voluntary steps are taken to condition the transaction on
approval by the minority shareholders or the independent directors. As a
result, the price paid in a conflict transaction often will be neither the result
of a true ann's-length negotiation nor otherwise reflect the subjective value
placed on the shares by the minority shareholders.14 Minority share value is
set or negotiated by transaction participants in the shadow of corporate law
that provides for two relevant judicial proceedings:15  (1) appraisal pro-
ceedings under section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL") 16 and (2) "entire fairness" cases, in which courts assess whether
13 See HOULHIAN LOKEY HOWARD & ZUKIN, MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997 (1997) [here-
inafter MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997] (collecting data on mergers and acquisitions involving
U.S. companies, including data on MBOs and freeze-outs).
14 Frequently, firms pursuing conflict transactions will set up a special committee of dis-
interested directors charged with negotiating on behalf of the noncontrolling shareholders.
See I LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.07[2], at 9-89. Such "synthetic" negotia-
tions, however, often fail to impress Delaware courts. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communica-
tion Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (criticizing the special committee process).
Also, skeptics doubt whether even the best-intentioned special committee can substitute for a
true market check. See Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 730, 784 (arguing that only a "rule of
open bidding would allow the marketplace to determine the fairness issues ... effectively").
In any event, special committees can only negotiate against background law that establishes
an amount to which the minority shareholders are entitled in ajudicial proceeding.
is Stock must also be valued in other corporate contexts (including statutorily or judi-
cially ordered buyouts) as a remedy for the alleged oppression of the minority shareholders,
see, e.g., In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 176, 177 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing the legislative
intent in determining that a holder of 50% of a close corporation may exercise a buyout privi-
lege accorded to shareholders), and the fashioning of a judicial remedy in cases where "entire
fairness" has not been shown, see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 5642, 1985 WL 11546, at *9
(Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985) (ordering that the stockholders should be compensated even though
no precise damages could be calculated). "Fair value" also must be determined outside of
corporate law, in tax valuations, loan applications, bankruptcy valuations, property settle-
ments in divorce cases, and takings cases. See PRATT ET AL., supra note 4, at 28 (listing other
purposes for valuation, and suggesting standards of value for each); William P. Lyons &
Martin J. Whitman, Valuing Closely Held Corporations and Publicly Traded Securities with
Limited Marketability: Approaches to Allowable Discounts from Gross Values, 33 Bus.
LAW. 2213, 2213-14 (1978) (discussing "fair value" in a tax valuation context).
16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991) (concerning appraisal rights). Throughout
this Article, title 8 of the Delaware Code is sometimes referred to as the "Delaware General
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the shareholders are treated fairly in conflict transactions 17 such as MBOs
and freeze-outs.
Nearly all MBOs and freeze-outs involve either a cash merger, a short-
form merger, or both, and appraisal rights are triggered in Delaware by all
short-form mergers and all cash or part-cash mergers.19 Appraisal pro-
ceedings were not created to address conflict transactions, 20 nor are they
limited to conflict transactions. 21 Commentators are in general agreement,
however, that the most defensible rationale for the continuation of the ap-
Corporation Law" or "DGCL." DGCL section 262 is similar to the appraisal provisions
adopted in other states. See 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 13.30-31 (1984 & Supp.
1997) (analyzing appraisal statutes).
I See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-12 (Del. 1983) (holding that the
freeze-out did not meet "any reasonable test of fairness"); supra note 2 (defining conflict
transactions).
is A "short-form merger" is a parent-subsidiary merger on which the subsidiary share-
holders are not entitled to vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (detailing the law on merg-
ers of parent corporations and their subsidiaries).
See id. § 262(b). Some, but not all, stock mergers trigger appraisal rights. DGCL sec-
tion 262 contains a "market exception" pursuant to which a long-form merger by a public
company generally does not trigger appraisal rights unless the stockholders receive in the
merger anything other than stock of a public company (and cash in lieu of fractional shares).
See id. Finally, a company may voluntarily give the shareholders appraisal rights even when
they are not otherwise required, as was done in connection with Fleet Financial Group, Inc.'s
acquisition of Fleet Mortgage Group in 1995. See Fleet Financial Group, Inc., Offer to Pur-
chase (Jan. 30, 1995), at 51.
20 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYsIs 78 (1976) (concluding that the appraisal right arose out of a need to reconcile ten-
sions between the majority shareholders' rights "to make drastic changes in the enterprise to
meet new conditions as they arise, with the need to protect the minority against being invol-
untarily dragged along into a drastically restructured enterprise in which it has no confi-
dence"); Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32
HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 79, 92-93 (1995) (positing three possible origins of the appraisal pro-
ceeding, none of which concern conflict transactions).
21 DGCL section 262 is both over- and underinclusive from the perspective of policing
conflict transactions--that is, DGCL section 262 is triggered by some nonconflict transactions
and is not triggered by some conflict transactions. For example, a long-form stock merger in
which the acquiror is a controlling stockholder of the target or is under common control of the
management of the target will constitute a conflict transaction and yet not trigger appraisal
rights. Conversely, appraisal rights are triggered under DGCL section 262 by some transac-
tions that are not conflict transactions, such as arm's-length long-form cash mergers. Conflict
transactions that do not trigger appraisal rights appear, however, to be relatively infrequent.
See data from Securities Data Co., Inc. (showing that of 38 parent/subsidiary transactions, in-
cluding partial and full acquisitions, announced during 1995, only seven involved stock con-
sideration) (on file with author). More commonly, nonconflict transactions that trigger ap-
praisal rights usually do not produce litigation, in part because fiduciaries in nonconflict
transactions are not likely to agree to a merger price that represents less than fair value. See
MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997, supra note 13, at 36-38 (noting that 100 arn's-length, cash ac-
quisitions of public companies occurred in 1995 out of a total of 355, and that 85 involved
tender offers, leaving 15 presumably effected by cash mergers).
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praisal remedy is that it polices such transactions, 22 and the appraisal rem-
edy now is invoked most often in that context.
23
Not only do conflict transactions frequently give rise to contested ap-
praisal proceedings, but Delaware case law holds that such transactions are
not entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule.24 Instead,
freeze-outs, MBOs, and other conflict transactions are closely scrutinized by
the courts under an exacting judicially developed "entire fairness" test.25
That test requires the transaction proponent to demonstrate affirmatively
that the transaction both is the product of "fair dealing" and reflects a "fair
price."
26
Corporate law thus provides shareholders with two different methods of
obtaining judicial oversight of the price paid in a conflict transaction. The
22 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 145 (1991) (arguing that in policing such transactions, ap-
praisals "increase the welfare of all shareholders"); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity and
Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1995) ("[The [ap-
praisal] remedy serves as a check against opportunism by a majority shareholder in mergers
and other transactions in which the majority forces minority shareholders out of the business
and requires them to accept cash for their shares.'); cf. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22(b), at 638 (providing appraisal
rights for nonconflict transactions, but defining "fair value" as a price approved by the board
of directors in all transactions other than conflict transactions).
23 Of the appraisal cases during the years 1984 to 1994, "more than eighty percent in-
volved cash-outs; only six arose in transactions between independent corporations in which
shareholders had the opportunity to continue." Thompson, supra note 22, at 25-26.
24 Generally speaking, the business judgment rule protects directors making business de-
cisions from being second-guessed by a court. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 360 (Del. 1994) (discussing how the rule "operates to preclude a court from imposing
itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation"). See generally DENNIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS 7-8 (4th ed. 1993) (explaining that the business judgment rule "provides directors
the broad discretion they need in formulating dynamic and effective company policy without
fear ofjudicial second-guessing").
25 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) ("When a major-
ity shareholder stands on both sides of a transaction, the requirement of fairness is 'unflinch-
ing' in its demand that the controlling stockholder establish the entire fairness of the under-
taking sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts."). Entire fairness litigation
also almost always arises out of conflict transactions. In Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated for the first time that the burden of proving "entire fairness" may arise where fi-
duciaries have breached their duties of care. See Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 367-71 (finding
that the board of directors breached their duty of care). Aside from Technicolor, however, all
other reported Delaware decisions applying the "entire fairness" standard involve conflict
transactions. See EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 141.2, at 79-190 (1994) (discussing, prior
to the Technicolor decision, "entire fairness" solely in terms of conflict transactions).
26 Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 361 ("Under the entire fairness standard ... the defendant
directors must establish to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both
fair dealing and fair price." (citing Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993))).
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case law arising out of these two types of judicial proceedings is the back-
ground against which value disputes between minority shareholders and
sponsors of conflict transactions are resolved. It is to this case law that par-
ticipants in the Levi Strauss transaction turned in deciding whether minority
shareholders were to be paid a discounted price of $2.5 billion or an undis-
counted price of $4 billion.
B. Fair Value and Fair Price
Appraisal statutes entitle shareholders to a cash amount determined by
reference to the "fair value" of the stock. "Fair value" is determined by a
court, and is not defined in statutes.z7 Beginning in 1983 with Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., Delaware courts have developed an open-ended definition of
"fair value" that requires the appraising court to consider "tech-
niques ... generally considered accepted in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court, subject only to [the court's] interpretation of
[DGCL section 262].
"28 Fair value may thus include consideration of the
asset, market, and earnings values; future prospects; and any other element
affecting "intrinsic value. 2 9
Since Weinberger, Delaware courts have considered various valuation
methodologies proposed by the parties and their experts. Neither the Dela-
ware legislature nor the Delaware courts have shaped or restricted valuation
generally; methodological choices are made by the fact-finder on a case-by-
27 DGCL section 262(h) simply reads:
mhe Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount
determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take
into account all relevant factors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 13.01
(1997) (leaving "fair value" defined as simply "the value of the shares immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action" at issue, excluding changes in value "in anticipation of'
an appraisal trigger "unless exclusion would be inequitable"). Thirty-eight states have
adopted these definitions. See id
28 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,713 (Del. 1983).
29 Id. "'[Miarket value, asset value, dividends, earnings prospects, the nature of the en-
terprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained ... and which
throw any light onffuture prospects of the merged corporation ... must be considered ....
Id. (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)).
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case basis. 3° With the prominent exception of discounts and control premi-
ums,3 1 everything is permitted, nothing forbidden.
32
In entire fairness cases, corporate fiduciaries are required to show that
the terms of a proposed conflict transaction include a "fair price," and
Delaware courts look to appraisal cases for guidance in deciding whether a
given price is fair, even when a merger does not trigger appraisal rights.
Delaware courts have stated that "fair value" in an appraisal proceeding will
be a "fair price" in an entire fairness case.33 That is not to say that a price
30 See In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del. 1992) ("The appraisal quest at the
Court of Chancery level admits of a broad latitude."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 ("At the
appellate level,... we impart a 'high level of deference' to that court's findings." (quoting-
Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991))).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 48-122 (discussing Delaware's approach to dis-
counts and control premiums).
32 Or nearly nothing. Delaware courts have recognized that book value, which is based
on historical accounting methods, is not a meaningful measure of fair value, which is focused
on current and nonspeculative, prospective value. See Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co.,
C.A. No. 10307, 1996 WL 159626, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Book value is not a
meaningful measure of a corporation's intrinsic or fair value."); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34 (Del. Ch. 1971) (noting that "book value is largely ig-
nored by the investor as a guide to fair value," and that "market price ... is... the most sig-
nificant element to be taken into consideration in reaching a judgment on the overall fairness
of a corporate merger"). Delaware courts have also established that exclusive reliance on
market value is incorrect, see Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 457 (Del. Ch. 1934) (con-
eluding that a determination of value "founded solely on market quotations to the exclusion of
all other relevant evidence" is an insufficient calculation), and that market prices should not
be used where the prices were not established in an active, liquid, and efficient market, see
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 221 (Del. 1975) (al-
lowing a valuation based on an industry price-earnings ratio in the absence of a valid market
price).
33 See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991) ("If a par-
ticular merger price would not be 'entirely fair' in an equitable action claiming breach of fidu-
ciary duty, no different result should obtain in an appraisal, where the issue is whether that
identical merger price constitutes 'fair value."' (quoting Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc.,
C.A. No. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989))); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Har-
nett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) ("The fairness concept has been said to implicate two
considerations: fair dealing and fair price."); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840,
845 (Del. 1987) (stating that in an entire fairness case, the concept of fair price "flow[s] from"
the requirements of DGCL section 262); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-14 (noting without ap-
proval or disapproval that the Chancery Court below held fair value and fair price to be the
same); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., C.A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *9-10 & nn.14-17 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) (citing DGCL section 262 and appraisal cases and applying the pro rata
value doctrine in determining whether the deal price constituted a "fair price"), rev'd on other
grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); see also Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of
Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 13
(1994) (noting the equivalence of fair value and fair price); Leonard Chazen, Fairnessfirom a
Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is 'Third-Party Sale Value'the
Appropriate Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1444 (1981) (noting the equivalence of fair
value and fair price in pre-Weinberger cases).
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approved as "fair" in a given conflict transaction will always precisely equal
fair value as determined in a related appraisal,34 but nothing in the Delaware
case law suggests that "fair price" and "fair value" should diverge on the
question of discounts or premiums.
C. Minority Discounts
In both appraisal proceedings and entire fairness cases, determining
"fair value" necessarily involves the question whether or not to apply a
"discount." As will be seen in Part I.D, the case law on discounts reflects
the confusion that stems from the use of undefined or inconsistent terminol-
ogy. A brief discussion of what "discounts" are will be helpful before re-
viewing and analyzing that case law.
1. Legal Discounts and Financial Discounts
Discounts have roles in both financial markets and judicial proceedings.
In financial markets, otherwise identical stock will change hands at different
prices depending on whether the stock is part of a control block.3 5 Minority
discounts are reflected in nearly all stock market prices, since such prices
generally reflect the average marginal trading prices for small amounts of
stock that do not convey control.36 In addition, courts must decide whether
34 In fact, they will diverge for several reasons: (1) where a fiduciary seeks to avoid "en-
tire fairness" review by appointing a committee of independent directors to negotiate on be-
half of the minority shareholders, the committee is commanded by Delaware law to seek the
"best price" reasonably obtainable, so long as that price is also a fair price, see In re First
Boston, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10338, 1990 WL 201388 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13,
1990) (implying that the "best" deal price may exceed the minimum required to constitute
"fair price" or "fair value"); (2) a back-end merger price in a two-step takeover is frequently
set to equal the first-step tender offer price in order to avoid SEC Rule 13e-3 or as a result of
negotiations, see, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., Supplement to Offer to
Purchase, at 2 (June 13, 1995); and (3) fiduciaries may also choose to pay more than fair value
for a number of reasons, whether from obligations arising out of nonlegal norms (as may often
happen in the context of family- or employee-owned firms), to minimize the risk of litigation
or criticism, to enhance the fiduciaries' reputations, or in exchange for some other extra-
transactional benefit.
35 In addition to minority discounts, commentators have noted other types of discounts
relevant to fair value determinations. Most prominent is a type of discount variously called a
"marketability discount," a "nonmarketability discount," and an "illiquidity discount." See,
e.g., PRATT ET AL., supra note 4, at 331-65 (discussing the concept of, and empirical evidence
for, marketability discounts in financial markets). This type of discount reflects the fact that
buyers are willing to pay more for stock that is more freely salable than for otherwise identical
stock that is less freely salable.
36 See id. at 304-05 (stating that publicly traded minority share prices reflect an implicit
minority discount and that most merger and acquisition transaction data and adjusted net asset
values reflect implicit control premiums); see also Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holder-
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or not valuations should be adjusted (for a given legal purpose) to reflect the
characteristics of the shares, or the holders of the shares, being valued. In
general terms, a minority discount for legal purposes is an adjustment
downward from some reference value, reflecting (at least in part) risks asso-
ciated with a minority position in a corporation.37 Reference values may be
any of a number of other values, depending on the context.38 Frequently,
discounts are expressed as a percentage of a reference value, and courts
have upheld discounts from 5% to as high as 35%.39
Courts and commentators sometimes seem confused about whether they
are using the term "discount" in a legal sense or in a financial sense, and
courts sometimes appear (without explanation or even awareness) to impose
(legal) discounts solely because of the existence of discounts in the financial
markets. 40 Although there may be reasons to choose a particular legal dis-
ness, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 371, 372 (1989)
(noting that large share blocks trade at a substantial premium to minority shares).
37 See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Pro-
posed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 6
(1977) ("[L]egal limits on the majority's conduct are generous, and the right of the excluded
faction to obtain relief is dependent on its ability to prove that the limits have been over-
stepped."); Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held Corporations,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 65, 82-83, 102-03 (1993) (noting that minority shareholders are subject
to the risks that the corporation will (1) retain dividends even where this does not maximize
the share value and (2) pay "hidden cash flow" benefits to the majority shareholders, through
excessive compensation or other forms).
38 Reference values include comparable company market value, market value, asset
value, liquidation value, replacement value, and earnings or going concern value. Different
courts have found each of these reference values to be relevant in calculating fair value, and
these reference values can vary widely. See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 387
N.E.2d 1145, 1148 n.3 (Mass. 1979) (considering per-share values ranging from $26.50 to
$103.16); Taines v. Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, 474 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (Sup. Ct.
1983) (considering the total amount of reported business valuations, ranging from $71,000 to
$20.7 million); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1453, 1469 (1966) (collecting values derived by appraisals using various methodologies
in reported Delaware cases from 1947 through 1965, and noting that in one case, per-share
values ranged from nearly $12 to over $46).
39 See Stanton v. Republic Bank, 581 N.E.2d 678, 681-83 (I11. 991) (upholding a minor-
ity discount of 5% and a marketability discount of 5%, for a total discount of 10%); Perlman
v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (upholding combined minority
and marketability discount of 35%), afFd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); see also, e.g.,
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 239-67 (collecting empirical studies supporting discounts ranging
from 25% to 80%); PRATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 316-21, 334-63 (collecting empirical data
supporting minority discounts that ranged from 25% to 45% and marketability discounts that
ranged from 25% to 60%); Boothman, supra note 4, at 6 ("Numerous studies ... support
[marketability] discounts of a wide range, from 0 percent to a high of approximately 80 per-
cent.").
40 See, e.g., Perlman, 568 F. Supp. at 230-32 (upholding a minority discount on the
ground that a minority stake, in fact, trades at a discount in the market, reflecting a lack of
control); see also CORNELL, supra note 4, at 239-67 (tying explicitly the normative legitimacy
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count on the basis of financial discounts, the two concepts are nonetheless
distinct.4 1 To illustrate this, note that if lawmakers universally were to in-
clude discounts in fair value determinations, then discounts in the financial
markets would likely increase as a result, because minority shares would be
subject to freeze-outs at fair values reflecting a legal discount. If, however,
lawmakers universally were to exclude discounts in fair value determina-
tions, then discounts in the financial markets would likely decrease (or re-
main the same) but would continue to exist. Control shares would continue
to carry different-and overwhelmingly superior-practical and legal rights
42and powers than minority shares. Among other things, control shares
convey the right to decide when to engage in a freeze-out, which is a deci-
sion minority shareholders are powerless to effect.43 Minority shares also
lack the ability to force a sale of the firm. The legal question regarding
whether or not discounts are permissible in fair value determinations is only
one of many ways that the value of minority shares in the financial markets
might diverge from the value of control shares. The existence of financial
discounts is thus independent of the existence of legal discounts.
2. Explicit Discounts and Implicit Discounts
A legal discount can be explicit or implicit. An explicit discount is
straightforward. A court might, for example, determine "fair value" by first
deriving a reference value by balancing various values (the "Delaware block
method," for example, requires weighting asset value, market value, and
earnings value"), and then reducing the reference value by some percentage
of including control premiums and minority discounts in appraisal proceedings to their exis-
tence in financial markets); cf. Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 805 (Del.
1992) ("'mhe full value of the corporate assets to the corporation is not the same as the value
of those assets to the common stockholder because of the factor of discount. To fail to recog-
nize this conclusion... is to fail to face the economic facts and to commit error."' (quoting
Tri-Continental v. Bettye, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. 1950))).
41 See, e.g., Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167, 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (noting
that the normative legal validity of a discount was not linked to the descriptive fact of dis-
counts in the financial markets).
42 See supra text accompanying note 37; infra text accompanying notes 71-83.
43 See 1 LIPTON & STEInMERGER, supra note 2, §§ 9.01-.08. Recent work by Lucian
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan suggests that such a right is worth more than intuition might sug-
gest. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, The "Lemon's Effect" in Corporate Freeze-
Outs, at 5 (Jan. 1998) (unpublished working paper, on file with author) ("mhe pre-freeze out
market price of minority shares will be substantially below the expected 'intrinsic' value of
the minority shares absent a freeze-out.").
44 Although the Delaware block method was critiqued in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 713-15 (Del. 1983), and is generally no longer used in Delaware, it continues to be
used in other states and remains permissible even in Delaware. See, e.g., Richardson v.
Palmer Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1984) (defending and using the Delaware block
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(for example, thirty percent), which is the discount. An explicit discount
occurs in what is sometimes referred to as a "second-stage" valuation,45 the
first stage being the determination of the reference value and the second
stage being the explicit application of the discount.
An implicit legal discount occurs when the two valuation stages are per-
formed in a single step. For example, a court might determine "fair value"
on the basis of actual trading prices for the shares of companies that are
comparable to the company being valued. If, as is typically the case, those
trading prices already reflect a financial discount,46 then the fair value pro-
duced by the valuation will include an implicit legal discount. In this way,
financial discounts quietly can produce legal discounts. To detect the pres-
ence of an implicit discount, it is necessary to analyze the valuation meth-
odology being employed in order to determine whether the methodology
uses values that already reflect discounts in some way.
47
method); Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173, 178 (Mass. 1985) (approving of the "Dela-
ware block" method of stock valuation).
45 See, e.g., Robert B. Heglar, Note, Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J.
258, 266 (arguing against the use of second-stage adjustments for minority discounts); Chris-
topher Vaeth, Propriety ofApplying Minority Discount to Value of Shares Purchased by Cor-
poration or Its Shareholders from Minority Shareholders, 13 A.L.R. 5TH 840, 849, 855
(1995) (discussing cases that address discounting the value of minority shares).
See PRATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 304-05 (stating that publicly traded minority share
prices reflect an implicit minority discount and that most merger and acquisition transaction
data and adjusted net asset values reflect control premiums); Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris,
603 A.2d 796, 804-07 (Del. 1992) (same); infra note 59 (discussing the Harris case).
Where a company is the subject of takeover speculation, the minority share market
prices may rise in anticipation of a sale reflecting a control premium. For companies with no
controlling shareholder, the market prices will be bid up to a level reflecting an estimate of the
risk that the sale will not occur and the expected time value to closing. For companies with
controlling shareholders, market prices will also reflect the risk that an acquiror will purchase
control directly from the controlling shareholder, as well as the possibility that the new con-
trolling shareholder will deal more or less fairly with the minority shareholders as compared
to the current controlling shareholder. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient
Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 961-64 (1994) (exploring certain control-
shifting transactions where the controlling interest in a corporation is sold from one share-
holder party to another).
47 Courts and commentators speak of the "intrinsic," "fundamental," or "true" value of
stock. To the extent that such terms purport to refer to a determinable or Platonic value unre-
lated to a given set of choices about the measure of value in a given legal context, such terms
are misleading at best. Assessing value involves judgments about methodologies, uncertain
financial events, and the business prospects of the issuing firm. These are judgments about
which even reasonable people will disagree. Assessing value also requires legal judgments.
"Market value," as often used, may seem to provide an empirical basis for "real" value, but it,
too, reflects judgments that lawmakers have made and continue to make about the corpora-
tion. Financial markets also reflect the costs and effectiveness of the mechanisms for policing
such judgments. Corporate law, for example, contains numerous vague principles which con-
tinue to develop, and people can be surprised by such developments, which implies that peo-
ple can be expected to have different views as to the value of stock based on their assessments
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D. Pro Rata Value
Delaware law purports to reject minority discounts under the so-called
pro rata value doctrine, which looks to become the leading judicial ration-
ale for rejecting discounts in and out of Delaware.48 In Delaware, the pro
rata value doctrine was laid down in the 1989 appraisal case of Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett.49
In Cavalier Oil, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "application of a
discount to a minority shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the
company be viewed as a 'going concem."'50 Affirming the Vice Chancellor
in Cavalier Oil, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "the objective of a
section 262 appraisal is 'to value the corporation itself, as distinguished
from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a par-
ticular shareholder."' 5 1 Accordingly, the court held that the fair value of a
share of stock is equal to a pro rata or "proportionate interest" in the value
of the entire corporation as a "going concem," 52 and that no minority dis-
of the likelihood of such developments. Notice, for example, the shocked tones of the com-
mentary following the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See, e.g.,
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW.
1437, 1455 (1985) (describing Van Gorkom as "one of the worst decisions in the history of
corporate law"); Leo Herzel et al., 'Smith' Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs, LEGAL
TIMES WASH., May 13, 1985, at 14 (describing the result as "dumbfounding"); see also
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENius OF AMERiCAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (collecting event
studies of the impact of corporate law developments on stock market prices).
48 See infra Appendix A (collecting minority discount cases).
49 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
50 Id. at 1145.
51 Id. at 1144 (quoting Vice Chancellor Jacobs's Chancery Court opinion).
52 Id. The Cavalier Oil court claimed that it was following settled law, reasoning that
because it was long established in Delaware that an appraisal properly involved determining
the value of the corporation as a "going concern," an appraising court was barred from valuing
particular shares in and ofthemselves. See id. at 1144-45 (citing Tri-Continental v. Battye, 74
A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). The rule requiring fair value to be determined on the basis of the
value of the corporation as a "going concern" (first enunciated in Tri-Continental), however,
arose in response to an entirely different argument. In Tri-Continental, the dissenting share-
holder argued (and the trial court agreed) that the corporation should be valued by considering
net asset (or liquidation) value, rather than solely considering its value as an ongoing business.
See Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 75-76 (rejecting an argument that the appraised value should
equal net asset value on the ground that the shares must reflect "economic reality" and that the
"intrinsic value of [a] share in a going concern" reflects a discount from the net asset value).
The Tri-Continental case, then, set forth the basis on which the corporation should be val-
ued-on an ongoing basis, not an asset-by-asset basis. See id. Once the value of the corpora-
tion is determined, however, nothing in Tri-Continental prevents a court from finding that
some shares of a corporation were worth more than other shares. The issue in Cavalier Oil
was not raised in Tri-Continental, nor did Tri-Continental compel the holding in Cavalier Oil.
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counts should be applied in valuing particular shares to adjust the pro rata
value to reflect the value of minority shares.53
The Delaware pro rata value doctrine has a certain surface procedural
appeal-by shifting fair value analysis away from the shares being valued
and to the company that issued the shares, it appears to sidestep many diffi-
cult questions, such as those raised by discounts and premiums. Because it
imposes a mandatory, blanket rule against discounts, the doctrine has the
apparent merit of eliminating arguments about the size of an appropriate
discount and the circumstances in which discounts should apply-because
all discounts are forbidden, such arguments are moot. Not only is the doc-
trine inconsistent with the language of DGCL section 262, 54 but, Delaware
courts have given the doctrine little or no policy foundation beyond superfi-
cial tidiness.55 As demonstrated by the subsequent attempts of the Delaware
53 In addition to Tri-Continental, the Cavalier Oil court cited Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,
413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), as support for its holding. See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144.
The Kirby Lumber court's rejection of minority discounts, however, was implicit only, and
did not set up a formal doctrine as did the Cavalier Oil court. Moreover, the Kirby Lumber
opinion reflects deference to the trier of fact throughout-a "hands off' attitude that could just
as easily have accepted discounts as rejected them. Finally, Kirby Lumber was decided under
the Delaware block method, prior to Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-12 (Del.
1983), which substantially revised the Delaware law on fair value. See supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text. For that reason alone, the Cavalier Oil court had the opportunity to re-
evaluate its prior decisions regarding discounts.
54 DGCL section 262 does not, as one would expect from reading Cavalier Oil, direct a
court to appraise the corporation, or even to appraise the dissenting shares on the basis of the
value of the corporation. Rather, it directs the court to "appraise the shares, determining their
fair value." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991) (emphasis added). This has been true
since the DGCL was adopted in 1899. See 21 Del. Laws 273, § 56 (1899) (requiring the ap-
praisal of the "value of the stock" held by the dissenting shareholders). Throughout DGCL
section 262, the phrase "the shares" is repeated. Nowhere does DGCL section 262 make ref-
erence to the fair value of the corporation, "pro rata value," or "proportionate" value. If any-
thing, the language of DGCL section 262 supports a valuation methodology that carefully dis-
criminates among different shares, rather than ignoring those differences. Cf. 2 PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22(a) (1992) (pro-
viding expressly that an appraisal should value stock as a "proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration, without any discount for minority status"). On the other hand, the "shares" language in
DGCL section 262 may simply reflect a tacit but mistaken legislative assumption that the
value of shares and the value of the corporation are equal, namely, that discounts do not exist.
55 Beyond simply enunciating the pro rata value doctrine, the Cavalier Oil court gave
three reasons for not applying a minority discount: (1) doing so penalizes minority sharehold-
ers for lack of control, (2) doing so "unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap
a windfall ... by cashing out a dissenting shareholder," and (3) doing so risks injecting undue
"speculation" into the appraisal process. Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145. None of these rea-
sons, however, provide significant support for the pro rata value doctrine. The first two rea-
sons are conclusory and can be restated with equal force to support discounts. See infra note
257 (discussing the application of "fairness" arguments to discounts). The third reason is a
procedural rationale for rejecting discounts, and is critiqued in Part IV.F, infra. Whether or
not procedural concerns about speculation and the lack of "objective market data" provide a
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courts to apply Cavalier Oil,
56 the doctrine is indeterminate and unclear.
57
As a result of this indeterminacy, courts have erratically applied discounts in
some cases, leaving practitioners and investors with little guidance on
whether and when minority discounts will be applied.
1. Shareholder Level Discounts and Corporate Level Discounts
In Cavalier Oil, the corporate defendant noted that the appraising court
in Tri-Continental, an earlier Delaware case, had calculated the net asset
value ("NAV") of the corporation, which was a leveraged, closed-end in-
vestment company, and then discounted it by a percentage, reflecting the
historical market-to-net-asset-value discount, in order to arrive at the fair
value.58 The Cavalier Oil court distinguished the discount approved in Tri-
Continental as being a "corporate-level" discount, unlike the "shareholder-
level" discount proposed by the corporation in Cavalier Oil.59
The court held that shareholder-level discounts were unacceptable be-
cause they involve varying fair value based on the characteristics of the
good reason to accept or reject discounts, they still have no necessary link to the pro rata value
doctrine. Similar concerns could be raised about "corporate level" adjustments, which the
Delaware Supreme Court has viewed as acceptable under the pro rata value doctrine, see infra
text accompanying notes 58-69 (explaining the court's differentiation between "corporate
level" discounts in Tri-Continental and "shareholder level" discounts in Cavalier Oil), or, in-
deed, about many other elements of methodologies required by a fair value determination. In
addition, the Cavalier Oil court did not present any evidence regarding why such concerns
should be heavier in the context of "shareholder level" discounts.
56 See infra Part I.D.3.
57 In addition, the Cavalier Oil court did not address or even seem to be aware of con-
trary precedent upholding discounts based on the characteristics of the shares being valued. In
Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1960), the~court accepted the
court-appointed appraiser's reduction by 10% of an average price-earnings multiple for com-
parable companies "for certain reasons, such as the lack of marketability of the stock, etc." Id.
at 285.
58 See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144-45 (describing the Tri-Continental court's method
of calculating fair value).
59 Id. This distinction was confirmed in a subsequent Delaware Supreme Court case,
Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992). In that case, the trial court relied
on the market prices of the minority shares of comparable companies in order to establish the
value of various subsidiaries owned by Rapid-American, the company whose shares were be-
ing valued. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed that such prices "are discounted and do not
reflect a control premium," and concluded that the trial court's valuation erroneously "treated
Rapid as a minority shareholder in its wholly-owned subsidiaries" and so reversed. Id. at 804.
The court cited Tri-Continental and Cavalier Oil as authority for the distinction between
"shareholder level adjustments," which are impermissible under the pro rata value doctrine,
and "corporate level" adjustments, which are necessary to "establish[] the intrinsic value of
the enterprise." Id. at 805-06. Because Rapid-American owned 100% of its subsidiaries, the
court reasoned, it was unrealistic to value its subsidiaries at anything less than full firm value,
including a company-level control premium. See id
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shares "in the hands of a particular shareholder," rather than fixing fair
value as a pro rata share of the firm value without reference to particular
shares. Corporate level discounts, on the other hand, were acceptable be-
cause they were used to determine the value of the firm as a going concern.
As we will see, however, this distinction is highly problematic.
It is true that the discounts in Tri-Continental and Cavalier Oil are fa-
cially distinguishable. The former discount was a reduction from the
NAV, 6° the latter was a reduction from a value derived by capitalizing
earnings.61 Thus, it is fair to say that, contrary to the argument of the corpo-
ration in Cavalier Oil,62 the holding in Tri-Continental did not require the
inclusion of a "shareholder-level" minority discount.
The two principal arguments used in Tri-Continental to justify includ-
ing discounts at the "corporate level," however, also support inclusion of
discounts in general. First, the Tri-Continental court reasoned that to ex-
clude such a discount was "to fail to face the economic facts."63 Second, the
Tri-Continental court reasoned that "fair value" must equal what the share-
holder "would have received.., one way or another as long as the company
continued in business," and since a noncontrolling shareholder has no power
to force liquidation, the only way for a shareholder to obtain value is "by the
sale... on the market," which will necessarily be at a discount.64 Both ar-
guments closely resemble arguments used by courts outside Delaware to de-
fend minority discounts in general. 65 It is an "economic fact" that financial
discounts exist, and it is a legal and practical fact that some shares have
fewer rights (for example, to force liquidation) than other shares. Both ar-
60 See Tri-Continental v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 75 (Del. 1950) ("The appraiser then arrived
at the true or intrinsic value of a common share of General by applying the discount to the fair
asset value of $5.44, and arrived at a value of $4.08 per share for the common stock of Gen-
eral.").
See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145-56 ("In order to arrive at a merger date valuation,
[the expert witness] discounted back his terminal value and his projected net cash flow for the
fiveyear period.").
2 See id. at 1144-45 (arguing that the Supreme Court of Delaware "recognized the ap-
propriateness of discounting a dissenting shareholder's interest in an appraisal proceeding in
Tri-Continental").
63 Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 76.
64 Id. at 76.
65 See, e.g., Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 230-32 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(considering the fact that a plaintiff's shares represent a minority interest, that the shares lack
marketability, and that the company is nondiverse in finding the fair market value of plain-
tiff's shares), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513
N.E.2d 776, 787-91 (Ohio 1987) (taking into account the willing-buyer/willing-seller price in
addition to the stock market price in order to determine the fair value of the dissenting share-
holder's stock); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing the relative merits of different discount
rules).
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guments provide justifications for imposing a discount for lack of control,
contrary to the holding in Cavalier Oil.
66
In essence, the court in Tri-Continental equated fair value with market
value, and because the market value of a noncontrol share will reflect a fi-
nancial discount, such an equation imposes an implicit discount in arriving
at fair value. It is irrelevant that this is done in the process of determining
fair value (at the "corporate level"), and not after the value of the corpora-
tion as a "going concern" has already been determined (at the "shareholder
level"). The fair value finally determined is lower than both the reference
value from which the discount is taken and the value that would have been
obtained had no such discount been imposed, and setting fair value equal to
the lower value is only justifiable on grounds implicitly rejected in Cavalier
Oil. In other words, the fact that the discount in Tri-Continental was im-
posed at the "corporate level" did not mean (as it seems at first glance) that
all shares were valued equally, as pro rata claims on a single "going con-
cern" value, as required by Cavalier Oil.
To see why, consider a closed-end investment company incorporated in
Delaware with an NAV of $100 and five shareholders, each holding one
share of common stock. Assume that the company engages in four con-
secutive mergers; at each point, one shareholder dissents and perfects its ap-
praisal rights, and the company's NAV remains the same, except for the ef-
fect of paying for a dissenting shareholder's shares.67  After the first
shareholder dissents, each remaining shareholder holds a 25% stake; after
the second dissents, each holds a 33 1/3% stake; after the third dissents,
each holds a 50% stake; and, after the last transaction, one shareholder holds
all of the outstanding shares. If the courts, following Tri-Continental, were
to impose a "corporate-level" discount of 25% to the NAV in order to de-
66 See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145 (rejecting minority discounts because they "im-
pose[] a penalty for lack of control"). The "no-discount" rule required by the pro rata value
doctrine is also at odds with Delaware law that permits the controlling shareholders to sell
their control shares at a premium without sharing that premium with, or "taking along," other
shareholders. See, e.g., Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 844-45 (Del. 1987)
(holding that the majority shareholder has no duty to sell its holdings merely because a sale
would profit the minority shareholders).
67 This assumption is unrealistic because if the NAV remained unchanged after each
merger, then it is hard to see why mergers would be undertaken. In addition, it is unlikely that
four mergers would take place simultaneously; ordinarily, some change in the NAV would
occur from normal market fluctuations over the time necessary to complete the merger. It
seems realistic, however, to make equivalent assumptions: (1) with each merger, the share-
holders continue to hold the same indirect proportionate interest in the pre-merger NAV be-
cause the new assets obtained balance out the cash paid (or shares issued) in each merger; and
(2) the net present value of any change in the NAV from market fluctuations is either trivial or
not systematically related to the mergers.
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68termine the fair value in each appraisal, then the dissenting shareholders
would receive the payments set forth in Table 1.
Table 1. Effect of Applying "Corporate Level" Discounts in
Successive Appraisals
Fair Corporate Shareholders Pro Rata
Value of Level Discount Stake Value
Firm as a
Going
Concern
Merger 1 $100.00- 25% = $75.00 x 20% = $15.00
Merger 2 $85.00 - 25% = $63.75 x 25% = $15.94
Merger 3 $69.06- 25% = $51.80 x 33% = $17.27
Merger 4 $51.79- 25% = $38.84 x 50% = $19.42
Final NAV $32.37 x 100% = $32.37
Each successive dissenting shareholder receives an increasing payment
for shares that (in theory, according to the pro rata value doctrine) represent
identical pro rata claims on the firm's total value prior to the mergers. In
other words, each shareholder's shares are valued differently, despite the
fact that the corporation essentially remains unchanged. The final share-
holder retains 100% of a company with an NAV of $32, representing a pre-
mium of more than 100% above the $15 received by the first dissenting
shareholder. Even net of liquidation costs, the final shareholder could ex-
pect to derive a much higher value, compared to the dissenting shareholders,
for the same initial pro rata share of the fair value of the same corporation.
Yet the $75 total fair value determined in the first appraisal implies that
each share is worth $15, the value awarded to the first dissenter. Because a
controlling shareholder could obtain a higher per-share value by liquidating
than by continuing as a going concern, the total firm value is actually equal
to the NAV less the liquidation costs, something substantially above $75.
The disparate treatment embedded in the "corporate-level" discount
method used in Tri-Continental demonstrates not only that Cavalier Oil and
Tri-Continental are at odds with one another, but, more importantly, that
there is no substance to the pro rata value doctrine. If the pro rata value
doctrine requires only that no discount be imposed at the "shareholder
level," but permits a discount to be imposed at the "corporate level," then
controlling shareholders seeking to obtain more than a pro rata share of the
68 This was the discount to the NAV that was applied in Tri-Continental. See Tri-
Continental, 74 A.2d at 73.
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corporation's aggregate value only need to find some way to build in their
discount at the stage of "corporate-level" valuation, as was done in Tri-
Continental. Delaware courts since Cavalier Oil have realized belatedly
that there are many ways to do this, and if a "no-discount" rule is to be
taken seriously, then a stronger rationale is needed-one that focuses less on
the "level" at which discounts are imposed and more on the working me-
chanics of the valuation methodologies employed and the sources of dis-
counts, particularly on the existence or absence of control.
69
69 See infra Part I.D.2 (presenting methods by which to derive minority discounts and
control premiums). The emptiness of the pro rata value doctrine is also illustrated by the issue
of marketability discounts. See supra note 35 (explaining the rationale behind marketability
discounts). Cavalier Oil and subsequent Delaware cases have held such discounts to be
"shareholder level" discounts that are prohibited by the pro rata value doctrine. See Cavalier
Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144 (affirming the Vice Chancellor's rejection of a marketability discount);
see also Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., C.A. No. 11265, 1992 WL 364682, at *4-5 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 7, 1992) (rejecting a marketability discount); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., C.A. No.
7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, at *48-50 (Nov. 8, 1989) (rejecting, without comment, dis-
counted cash flow ("DCF') analyses to which both the dissenting shareholder's expert and the
corporation's expert applied marketability discounts, and adopting a different valuation meth-
odology). But cf Hintmana v. Fred Weber, Inc., C.A. No. 12839, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26, at
*9 (Feb. 17, 1998) (accepting a "small stock" premium in the calculation of the discount rate
in a DCF analysis, despite its having the same effect and rationale as marketability discounts);
Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., C.A. No. 13414, 1998 WL 44993, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 29, 1998) (same); Charlip v. Lear Siegler, Inc., C.A. No. 5178, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS
548, at * 11 (Nov. 27, 1984) (rejecting a marketability discount, not on the ground of the pro
rata value doctrine, but because the litigants stipulated to the exclusion of any consideration of
market value in determining fair value); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278,
284 (Del. Ch. 1960) (accepting a marketability discount).
By contrast, New York courts have reasoned that if all outstanding shares of a corporation
are equally unmarketable, then it is natural to say that a discount to reflect that unmarketabil-
ity is a "corporate-level" adjustment to the value of the firm itself, rather than a "shareholder-
level" adjustment to the value of the shares. Using this logic, New York courts have held that
such discounts are "corporate-level" discounts that are consistent with the pro rata value doc-
trine. See Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1995) ("[C]ourts
should determine the minority shareholder's proportionate interest in the going concern value
of the corporation as a whole .... "). The difficulty with this logic, however, is that frequently
some shares will be unrestricted and freely tradable, whereas others will be restricted and thus
less marketable. For example, minority shares may be subject to buy/sell restrictions to which
the controlling shareholder's shares are not. In such a case, it would be difficult to view mar-
ketability as a feature of the firm, rather than as a feature of the shares. Yet, it would be
equally difficult to justify accepting a marketability discount in a case where no shares were
freely transferable while rejecting such a discount where some shares were freely transferable.
Such a result would seem to reward a controlling shareholder (or punish a minority share-
holder) for a feature of the controlling shareholder's shares. In other words, the discount
would, in a sense, be an adjustment at the "shareholder level," but perversely based on the
features of shares not being valued.
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2. Minority Discounts and Control Premiums
In addition to producing an incoherent distinction between firm-level
and shareholder-level discounts, the pro rata value doctrine has also left
Delaware courts (and the practitioners reading their opinions) more than a
little confused about whether or how to distinguish minority discounts from
control premiums. 70  In the process of resisting control premiums, some
courts appear to have applied minority discounts unintentionally. As a re-
sult, Delaware courts may have underestimated fair value and unintention-
ally encouraged conflict transactions. Before reviewing the post-Cavalier
Oil cases that demonstrate this confusion, it is helpful to explore what con-
trol premiums are and how they relate to minority discounts.
a. Control Premiums
In judicial fair value determinations, premiums generally are the con-
verse of discounts-an adjustment upwards from a reference value to reflect
a feature of the shares being valued or a feature of their holder. As with mi-
nority discounts, control premiums exist in the financial markets and repre-
sent the empirical difference between (1) prices that buyers are willing to
pay for stock that will give a buyer control of a corporation ("control
shares") and (2) prices that buyers are willing to pay for stock that does not
convey control of the corporation ("minority shares"). 71 It is said, for ex-
ample, that Company X paid a "control premium" of Y% over market to ac-
quire Company Z. The existence of control premiums is well known and
well documented. Whether measured against very small blocks that trade
70 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How Courts De-
termine Fair Value, 47 DuKE L.J. 613, 648-49 (1998).
Unfortunately, the courts and litigants have confusingly phrased the issue in terms of
whether the addition of a control premium is appropriate. This is unfortunate be-
cause the real question is not whether to add a control premium but is instead
whether a market price based valuation should be adjusted upward to correct for the
inherent minority discount reflected therein.
Id.
71 See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 4, at 243 (discussing the application of control premi-
urns in appraisals). Cornell notes that
both research in finance and common sense support the proposition that a buyer is
willing to pay more than the market price for a controlling interest in a com-
pany... when the buyer believes that the fiture cash flow of the company...
can be increased once it is under his or her control.
Id.; see also PRATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 298-326 (collecting control premium data); 18A
AM. JUL 2D Corporations § 795 (1985) ("[lit is generally recognized that majority stock is
more valuable than minority stock.").
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on the public stock markets daily or against larger but noncontrol share
blocks, control shares command premium prices.72
Control premiums can be attributed to a number of sources which vary
depending on the acquiror, the target, the quality of the target's manage-
ment, the reasons for the acquisition, the financial and legal structure of the
acquisition, and general economic and legal factors.73 For discussion, three
sources of control premiums will be identified:74  (1) synergy value,"
(2) expropriation value, and (3) pure control value.7 6
72 For the period from 1981 through 1994, data from the Mergerstat Review show that the
prices paid in acquisitions by negotiated purchase or tender offer of control shares in public
companies exceeded the market prices for the targets' outstanding stock by an average of ap-
proximately 38%. During the same period, average prices paid in the same types of acquisi-
tions of large (>10%) but noncontrolling blocks of shares in public companies also exceeded
market prices for the targets' outstanding stock, but premiums for these noncontrol share
blocks averaged only 34.5%. See MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997, supra note 13 (providing a
year-by-year comparison of the average premiums offered over the market price); see also
PRATT ET AL., supra note 4, at 316-19 (noting studies showing the existence of median con-
trol premiums ranging from 28% to 35%); Gary Fodor & Edward Mazza, Business Valuation
Fundamentals for Planners, 5 J. FIN. PLAN. 170, 177 (1992) (stating that control premiums
paid for public companies averaged 30%to 40% from the late 1960s to the late 1980s).
73 See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994).
Optimists see the control premium as a reflection of the efficiency enhancing
changes that the buyer of control is planning on making to the organization. Others
tend to see it, at least sometimes, as the price that a prospective wrongdoer is willing
to pay in order to put himself in the position to exploit vulnerable others, or simply
as a function of a downward sloping demand curve demonstrating investors' hetero-
geneous beliefs about the subject stock's value.
Id. (citations omitted); see also RONALD J. GiLsoN & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPoRATE ACQUIsrIONs 255-498 (2d ed. 1995) (giving reasons for the exis-
tence of control premiums); PRATT ET AL., supra note 4, at 30 1-10 (noting the prerogatives of
control and ways in which the rights of the controlling shareholders of different corporations
may vary, causing the control premiums to vary in size); Shishido, supra note 37, at 86-90
(giving reasons for the existence of control premiums).
SThe discussion in this Article focuses on the possible sources of control premiums that
are consistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Control premi-
ums also have been attributed to market failures. See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Taking Dis-
counts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 897-98 (1988) (discussing the misinvestment hypothesis in the con-
text of market discounts); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1244-52 (1990) (arguing
that investors heterogeneously value given shares and that this explains tender offer premi-
ums .
See PRATT ET AL., supra note 4, at 300 (analyzing control premiums separately from
synergy value, and referring to the control premium plus the synergy value as an "acquisition
premium"). In my experience, control premiums more commonly are thought to include syn-
ergy value; therefore, I do not adopt that terminology, but instead identify synergy value as a
distinct element of the control premium.
76 As a negative offset to these sources of value, control persons that own less than 100%
of a company must deal with the costs associated with controlling a company with outside
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Synergy value arises when two assets are more valuable in combination
than in isolation or, put otherwise, when two assets are more valuable when
controlled by the same firm than when controlled by different firms. Syner-
gies can arise on the input and output sides of a firm: input synergies re-
duce costs associated with production without causing a proportionate re-
duction in revenues; output synergies increase revenues without causing a
proportionate increase in costs. The combination of two firms that control
synergistic assets permits the realization of synergy value.
Expropriation value arises from the ability to expropriate wealth from
minority shareholders through fraud, theft, or breach of fiduciary duties,
such as freeze-outs at a clearly unfair price or payment of excessive com-
pensation.77 Expropriation value also arises in "gray areas" where behavior
that is currently permitted, or at least tolerated, likely would be condemned
if it could be policed costlessly. Some examples of such behavior are the
excessive retention of assets;78 excessive distributions; 79 payment of above-
investors ("public company costs"). Public company costs include the significant costs im-
posed by regulation, such as SEC filings, shareholder reports, shareholder meetings, and in-
spection of records and appraisal rights. Public company costs also include the risk of litiga-
tion (such as "entire fairness" litigation), negative press relations, and "activism" (such as
proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8) from disgruntled minority shareholders. See Harry DeAn-
gelo et al., Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & ECON.
367, 371-74 (1984). Such costs do not rise proportionately with corporate assets or equity,
and thus, as a corporation grows in size, they become increasingly less important relative to
the other sources of value.
77 Expropriation value may be attributed to agency costs: the inability of the principal
(shareholders or minority shareholders) to observe perfectly the behavior of the agents (man-
agers or controlling shareholders) creates the risk that the agent will not act in the interest of
(all) shareholders. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTuRE OF BusiNESS 37, 38-39 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds., 1991) (discussing the principal-agent problem of hidden action). Professor Coffee also
has distinguished expropriation value from synergy value in the context of the sale of control
by controlling shareholders. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for
Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient
Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 412-20 (1996) (discussing "synergy gains" as distinct from
"misappropriated business opportunities").
78 See Shishido, supra note 37, at 86-90 (noting that the retention of assets may not
maximize firm value because expected discounted cash flows from those assets are less than
their liquidation value due to internal factors such as poor management or to external factors
such as high inflation). But cf id. (noting that the controlling shareholders may nevertheless
choose to retain such assets due to (1) the love of position and perquisites, (2) the reluctance
to harm the employees, or (3) the hope that the minority will seek to sell out prior to liquida-
tion, thereby increasing returns to the controlling shareholder).
79 Firm value would be lowered if the discounted value of cash in the finn's hands ex-
ceeded the expected return on cash paid out in the hands of shareholders; yet, control persons
might make such distributions to provide a control person with liquidity. Cf PRATT ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 301-02 (listing the power to pay dividends as one of the powers of control,
and noting that minority shareholders have no assurance as to liquidity).
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market, but not clearly excessive, amounts for goods or services; or freeze-
outs priced to take advantage of a "blockage" of non-material information.s
Absent perfect enforcement mechanisms, all of these items potentially work
for a controlling shareholder; control shares are worth more than minority
shares, in part, because they put controlling shareholders in a position to ex-
ploit imperfect policing mechanisms.
81
Expropriation value arises whether or not a control person intends to
engage in such behavior. For example, control person A, who is willing to
break the law, will value control shares $(X+Y) more than minority shares,
where $X is the value arising from the fact that no other control person can
80 As Victor Brudney notes, some element of expropriation value relates to the risk of
"systematic impediments to the flow of information to the market." Victor Brudney, Efficient
Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63, 71 (1978). A con-
trol person may cause blockages or distortions of information about a subsidiary in both a
lawful and an unlawful manner. Examples of simple, unlawfid informational blockages are
the nondisclosure of material information required to be disclosed in periodic reports under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or misleading disclosure in violation of Rule lOb-5. Ex-
amples of lawful blockages include the choice of accounting conventions and the failure to
provide adequate "color" to permit a full understanding of mandatory disclosures where the
failure does not rise to the level of a demonstrable omission of a material fact necessary to
make the disclosed facts not misleading. It may be argued that the latter types of informa-
tional blockages are unlawful precisely to the extent that market values would be affected by
the blockages. In practice, however, many types of informational blockages that do not rise to
the level of "materiality" nevertheless affect market prices. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 n.8 (Del. 1988) ("[WJe recognize that the majority may have in-
sight into their company's future based primarily on bits and pieces of nonmaterial informa-
tion that have value as a totality."); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 507 (1986)
(discussing the harm that occurs when information lawfully not communicated to the market
affects stock prices).
This, it should be noted, is not an argument that the efficient (capital) market hypothesis
("EMH") is incorrect (in the semi-strong or weak versions), see infra notes 177-84 and ac-
companying text (discussing the EMH), because market prices may still, arguendo, rapidly
reflect all public information. Rather, it is an argument that, in practice, the existence and en-
forcement of the securities laws do not reliably cause control persons to disclose publicly all
information that would, if disclosed publicly, influence market prices.
Accounting rules also give managers considerable discretion as to the timing and content
of accounting charges and recognitions. Studies of accounting data suggest that firms use that
discretion to "manage" earnings as a routine part of business. See Michael Kinney & Robert
Trezevant, The Use of Special Items to Manage Earnings and Perceptions, J. FIN.
STATEMENT ANALYsIs, Fall 1997, at 45, 45-48; Letter from Lynn Turner, Office of the Chief
Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to Thomas Ray, Director, Audit and
Attest Standards, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1-2 (Oct. 9, 1998) (on
file with author) (regarding auditing and financial reporting concerns, noting the "trend" to-
wards "inappropriate management of earnings," and describing in detail the "troublesome ar-
eas involving the use of inappropriate earnings management techniques").
81 As noted in Part IV, infra, few empirical studies have attempted to measure the size of
expropriation value standing alone. For one such study, see infra note 93 and accompanying
text (discussing the difference). Cf Barclay & Holdemess, supra note 36, at 371 (exploring
the relationship between expropriation value and minority discounts).
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expropriate value from the firm and $Yis the value arising from A's expec-
tation of expropriating value from the firm. But, even control person B,
who is unwilling to break the law, will value the control shares $X more
than B values the minority shares.
Pure control value is whatever residual value may attach to manage-
ment, including such things as the certainty of being able to direct opera-
tions, obtain further (potential) synergies, freeze out the minority sharehold-
ers, and choose the time for payouts through dividends, liquidation, or
recapitalization. Managerial control has value-over and above expropria-
tion value and synergy value-because it stands on reserve for a control
person as a tool.82 That quality of standing reserve has value just as an op-
tion on stock has value, and just as options can have substantial value even
when "out of the money," pure control value may be considerably higher
than intuition would suggest.
83
Every observed control premium will not reflect all of these items. For
example, some transactions may not be expected to give rise to synergies.
If the minority shareholders are eliminated entirely, then the expropriation
value will disappear and the deal price will not reflect future opportunities
(although if the deal price is based on historical minority share prices, then
it will reflect past expropriation value to that extent). Finally, observed
control premiums will-like any market price-reflect mistakes in practice.
"Buyers' hubris," the "winner's curse," and "unchecked managerialism"
have all been identified as potential sources for control premiums in merg-
ers and acquisitions.84 Nevertheless, a given control premium at least
should be analyzed initially as reflecting each of these types of value.
82 See Sugato Bhattacharyya & Rajdeep Singh, The Allocation of Residual Rights 2 (Dec.
5, 1995) <http.//www.ssm.com/papers/9812/98122613.pdf> (noting that the right to design
the procedure for the sale of a firm "has value. .. over and above the rights to cash flows
arising from the sale" (emphasis omitted)); cf. Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership
and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294-95 (1988) (stating that "[w]ith effective
control, the manager may indulge his preference for non-value-maximizing behavior," and
finding that Tobin's Q, a proxy for market valuation of the firm's assets, rises as board owner-
ship rises between 0% and 5%, falls as ownership further rises between 5% and 25%, and then
rises more slowly above 25%); Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and
Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 23-24 (1989)
(analyzing data suggesting that stock prices of publicly held firms decline as a controlling
block is assembled). See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRiNCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 589-616 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing option pricing the-
ory).
83 See Bebchuk & Kalan, supra note 43, at 5.
84 See RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER's CURSE 50-62 (1992) (explaining the concept of
the "winner's curse"); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV.
597, 624-26 (1989) (discussing managers' effects on the valuation of stock prices).
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b. Relationship Between Discounts and Premiums
The term "minority discount" is generally used to mean the difference
between the value of control shares and the value of a minority share of a
85public company. According to this usage, "minority discounts" and "con-
trol premiums" are simply the inverse of one another.86 Both legal dis-
counts and discounts in the financial markets are likely to be larger if the
public company has a control person. Ceteris paribus,87 the presence of a
control person will reduce the value of publicly held minority shares 8 be-
cause (1) control persons increase the risk of expropriation 89 and (2) control
85 See Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) ("The exclusion
of a 'control premium' artificially and unrealistically treated Rapid as a minority share-
holder."); Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 790 (Ohio 1987) (permitting the
application of a minority discount on the ground that '.[t]he purchase of stock to gain con-
trolling interests is not properly includable in determining the market value of the shares of
stock' (quoting Foglesong v. Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 55 P.2d 606, 611 (Okla. 1976)));
see also CORNELL, supra note 4, at 239 (referring to minority discounts as the "flip side" of
control premiums); Calio, supra note 33, at 23 (stating that minority shareholders are entitled
to a pro rata share of a control premium in an appraisal proceeding); Bate C. Toms, III, Com-
pensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 562
(1978) (noting that "the purchase price [that a noncontrolling shareholder] originally pays
should be at a discount relative to the price of the controlling shares, a discount reflecting the
value of control").
86 In percentages, the relationship between a control premium and a minority discount, if
each measures the same thing, is expressed as D = 1 - [1 / (I + P)], where P is the premium
and D is the related discount. Thus, a reference value of $10 would be increased by a 50%
premium ($5) to produce a control share value of $15; the control share value of $15 would be
decreased by a discount of 1- (1/ 1.5), or .33% ($5) to produce a minority share value of $10.
87 Of course, all things may not be equal. The presence of a controlling shareholder may
improve managerial monitoring and thus reduce the expropriation value relative to a firm
without a controlling shareholder. In other words, slack may be reduced even if looting is
more common. I thank Mike Fitts for this point. In addition, the incentives for controlling
shareholders to loot a subsidiary are lower than the risk of managers looting an uncontrolled
public company, holding constant the likelihood that such looting would be discovered and
punished because controlling shareholders would be looting from themselves to the extent of
their investment in the subsidiary. See Morck et al., supra note 82, at 311-14 (interpreting
empirical results to suggest that a controlling shareholder has dual effects).
8 See Lawrence Hamermesh, Analysis of Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 14
BANK & CoRp. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 862, 862 (1995) (discussing Professor Lawrence Ha-
mermesh's analysis of Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp. as a "significant step forward in
substantive valuation analysis"); Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in from the Cold: Re-
forming Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997 COLM. BUS. L.
REV. 133, 160 n.169 (1997) ("The theoretical existence of a control premium suggests that
[the] price of minority shares held in a company controlled by a majority shareholder should
be lower than the price of shares held in the same company but with a more dispersed owner-
ship structure."). For an empirical study demonstrating this effect, see Wruck, supra note 82,
at 20, discussing the effect of purchaser control on share value.
89 See Brudney, supra note 80, at 69-71 (discussing why the stock of a subsidiary with a
control person will sell at a discount relative to the price at which the stock would sell if there
were no controlling person).
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persons reduce the potential of a third-party sale of all of the shares at a
control premium ("third-party sale potential"). 90 Still, whether or not a
control person exists, if the "minority discount" is analyzed simply to be the
inverse of a "control premium," then a court will have three choices in de-
termining fair value: (1) it can include a control premium, (2) it can include
a minority discount, or (3) it can split the difference and include some of
each.
Minority discounts and control premiums may, however, be distin-
guished.91 For example, "minority discount" may be used to mean the dif-
ference between control share value and synergy value (and/or pure control
value) on the one hand, and minority share value, on the other hand.92 De-
mhe shadow cast by the overhang of the parent's control on the current market
value of the subsidiary's shares... may be a function merely of the inability of new
groups to acquire control on the market, but... may also be a function of the likeli-
hood of exploitation such as an unfair merger, which would be too costly for disar-
rayed minority stockholders to challenge.
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1974).
90 See Chazen, supra note 33, at 1466-77 (discussing the impact that a statement by a
control person concerning her unwillingness to sell control shares to a third party would have
on the value of the minority shares). Third-party sale potential, commonly referred to as
"market fluff' or "takeover speculation," has become a significant factor potentially affecting
market prices in the wake of the large number of high-premium merger and acquisition trans-
actions during the 1980s. Despite the relative fall off in M & A activity during the early
1990s, expectations that high-premium M & A activity would resume appear to have been a
factor buoying stock prices during that period. These expectations have proven to be reason-
able with the reemergence of M & A activity in the mid-1990s. See Geoffrey Colvin, The
Year of the Megamerger, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1999, at 62, 63 (noting that "1998 was the big-
gest year ever for takeovers"). Agency costs associated with the relationship between the
managers and the shareholders of a noncontrolled public company would not be expected to
reduce the third-party sale potential as much as would the agency costs associated with the
presence of a controlling shareholder, because MBOs trigger auction duties under Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). "Market forces must be
allowed to operate freely to bring.., the best price available." Id. at 184. A controlling
shareholder, however, has no obligation to sell the controlled company to a third party, even if
the controlling shareholder sells the control stake, see Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535
A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) ("Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a
corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder."), and even if the third party would pay a
higher price, see Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994) ("[The fact that [a
third party] was willing to pay more for all of the shares does not [mean the first] proposal
was not fair.").
91 See Coffee, supra note 77, at 412-20 (arguing for such a distinction in the context of
sales of control by controlling shareholders).
92 This type of discount seems to be what is referred to in the recent Delaware Chancery
opinion in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *3
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (quoting the corporation's valuation expert as stating that "'the pre-
ponderance of opinion is that there is some minority interest that's implicit in a publicly
traded company's price' in addition to the portion of the control premium that reflects 'po-
tential synergies.'). This type of discount also appears to be the usage adapted by Pratt. See
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fined this way, "minority discount" represents the depressive effect of ex-
propriation value, but excludes any synergy value attributable to a particular
transaction and/or whatever value arises from having control in itself. Such
discounts are difficult to observe directly, because determining such a dis-
count requires deducting (or adding) values that do not reflect public market
transactions93  that is, such discounts require estimating the synergy value,
pure control value, or expropriation value-none of which, in isolation, is
easy to observe directly.
3. Post-Cavalier Oil Case Law
A review of post-Cavalier Oil cases demonstrates two sets of problems
caused by Delaware's pro rata value doctrine. First, courts have failed to
recognize implicit discounts as such, and so have accepted them, even while
purporting to adhere to the pro rata value doctrine (the "implicit discount
mistake").94 Second, courts have failed to distinguish between discounts
and premiums: three courts rejected "premiums" and imposed discounts,
notwithstanding Cavalier Oil;95 one court accepted a premium to eliminate a
minority discount (the "equivalency mistake").96 Only two Delaware courts
have perceived that control premiums and minority discounts can be distin-
guished.97
PRATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 300-23 (distinguishing control premiums, which exclude syn-
ergy value, from acquisitions premiums, which include synergy value, and equating control
premiums to minority discounts).
93 A recent study attempts to estimate this sort of discount by examining the relationships
between controlled subsidiary accounting values and parent and subsidiary market values.
The study concludes that shares in such subsidiaries are valued by the minority investors rela-
tive to the parent companies at a discount ranging from 13% (based on subsidiary asset val-
ues) to 33% (based on subsidiary earnings), an analysis that should exclude the synergy values
but would include the pure control value. See generally Roger C. Graham, Jr. & Craig E. Le-
fanowicz, Valuation of Companies for the Estate and Gift Tax: Evidence of Minority Interest
Discounts, ADVANCES IN TAX'N (forthcoming) (describing a study that examines the relative
values of controlling and noncontrolling interests in parent-subsidy corporate pairs). In any
event, the existence of such discounts seems to be certain, based on the fact that policing
mechanisms for expropriation do not work perfectly.
94 See infra notes 98, 103, 108, 110 and accompanying text (noting that the implicit dis-
count reflects expropriation value, lack of synergy value, and pure control value).
95 See infra notes 100, 108-10 and accompanying text (noting that the courts rejected
premiums in Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., Smith v. Shell Petroleum Inc.,
and In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation).
96 See infira text accompanying notes 111-12 (discussing the inclusion of a 30 % "control
premium" by the court in Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc. to adjust for a minority dis-
count9 ' l'See infra note 118 and accompanying text (suggesting that in addition to minority dis-
counts, control premiums might include synergy value).
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a. Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc. and In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.
The appraisal case arising out of Royal Dutch Petroleum's freeze-out of
Shell Oil Company illustrates both of these mistakes. Shell Oil had been
70% owned by Royal Dutch Petroleum since the 1920s, with the remaining
30% held by the public. In January 1984, with Shell's public shares trading
at $44,98 Royal Dutch announced its plan to freeze out the minority share-
holders at $55. After independent Shell directors rejected the $55 price and
made a counteroffer of $75, Shell shares traded up to $58. Royal Dutch
terminated discussions with Shell, and commenced a tender offer at $55,
which it subsequently increased to $58. Shell shares traded up to $60.
In June 1984, Royal Dutch and a class of minority shareholders settled
fiduciary duty claims for an increase of $2 for all of the tendering share-
holders and all of the shareholders who waived their appraisal rights in a
second-step freeze-out. Royal Dutch obtained 95% of the outstanding Shell
shares in the tender offer, and in June 1985, after a year of further litigation,
the freeze-out was closed, and Royal Dutch obtained 100% of Shell's stock.
A number of shareholders dissented and sought to have their shares ap-
praised under DGCL section 262. In December 1990, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court delivered its appraisal opinion99 and made two findings relevant
to premiums and discounts. It first held that the dissenting shareholders
were not entitled to a control premium. The dissenters' "basic premise
that... stockholders are entitled to a premium," the Shell court wrote, was
flawed. 100 The court cited Cavalier Oil, indicating its belief that the pro rata
98 All prices are per-share amounts; all facts are from Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., Civ.
A. No. 8395, 1990 WL 84218 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1990), stating that the proposed merger mi-
nority shares would be cashed out at $55 per share, and In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., Civ
A. No. 8080, 1990 WL 201390 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990), aff'd, 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992),
stating that shareholders were cashed out at $58 per share prior to the merger.
9 See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, 1990 WL 201390, at *1. In the appraisal case, Royal
Dutch argued that the fair value of the Shell shares was $55 per share; dissenting shareholders
argued for $89 per share. After noting that all of the methodologies proposed by the parties
were flawed, the court accepted one of the shareholders' methodologies as the most reason-
able and adjusted it down by an arbitrary 20% to arrive at a fair value of $71.20, which the
court candidly noted, was "between" the parties' proposed values-in fact, it almost exactly
split the difference. See id. at *34-35 (discussing how the court arrived at a fair value of
$71.20 per share).
100 Id. at * 16. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil did not discuss at length the first post-Cavalier
Oil fair value case that applied the pro rata value doctrine-the appraisal opinion in Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990), where
the court found that DGCL section 262(h) barred valuation relating to the business plans of an
acquiror. See Technicolor, 1990 WL 161084, at *20 ("[Value added to the corporation by the
implementation.., of [the acquiror's] new business plan for the company is not value to
which, in an appraisal action, petitioner is entitled to a pro rata share .... "). The dissenting
shareholders in Technicolor argued that Weinberger v. UOP had construed the exclusion in
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value doctrine prohibited any upward adjustment at the shareholder level of
the corporation's value or any premium on the corporation's value.
In striking contrast, however, the court then approved a "limited op-
tions" discount proposed by Royal Dutch on the theory that minority share-
holders have "limited options" available for realizing value for their shares
since they lack control.101 The court reasoned that absent a merger pro-
posal, "'the trading price is a more realistic alternative for the shareholders
than a liquidation value or a merger market value." ' 10 2 Because minority-
DGCL section 262 of merger-related value to exclude only the "speculative" value arising
from a transaction, but the Technicolor court rejected this as contrary to (1) the plain language
of the statute and (2) the "'basic concept of value under [§ 262] ... that the stockholder is en-
titled to be paid for that which has been taken from him."' Id. at * 19 (quoting Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). "Future value that would not exist but for the
merger cannot... be said to have been taken from a dissenting shareholder ... , even
if. . . capable of being proven ... .. Id. Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme Court over-
turned the Chancery Court opinion in Technicolor as inconsistent with Weinberger. See Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296-301 (Del. 1996) (asserting that synergies must
be included in "fair value" if, during the period between the tender offer and the freeze-out
merger in a two-step takeover, the acquiror takes sufficient steps so that the synergies are
known and not speculative and are part of the company being valued).
Nor did In re Appraisal of Shell Oil cite earlier Delaware opinions that could be read to
support the exclusion of a control premium. In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d
107, 111 (Del. 1952) and Sporborgv. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 123 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. Ch.
1956), the courts refused to consider the market prices to be distorted by the impact of an ac-
quiror's purchases at a control premium, and the cases may be read as refusing to consider the
market prices where they may reflect the synergy value arising from the appraisal-triggering
transaction itself. In a subsequent case, In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 804-
05 (Del. Ch. 1968), the court adjusted the market prices downward to eliminate the impact of
such premium purchases, but also refused to consider post-acquisition market prices because
of the acquiror's announced intention to freeze out the remaining public shares. See Theodore
N. Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38
Bus. LAW. 485, 490-95 (1983) (discussing pre-Weinberger Delaware case law regarding
control premiums).
101 See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, 1990 WL 201390, at *31 (considering the "realistic
alternatives" available to the stockholders and noting that a sale or liquidation of Shell was
unlikely).
102 Id. (quoting an argument made on behalf of Royal Dutch). The court rejected the
trading (or unaffected market) price of $44 proposed by Royal Dutch--not as an impermissi-
ble form of discount, but on the ground that Royal Dutch's expert had begun with an artifi-
cially low $40 market price from 30 days prior to the merger announcement and did not adjust
it sufficiently to reflect the substantial rise in the price of oil stocks. See id. at *29-30 (ex-
plaining Royal Dutch's methodology, and noting that the result was "illogical" since the pro-
posed $44 price represented "a zero percent change from the $44 per share closing
price.., one day prior to the.., merger announcement ... , not withstanding a substantial
rise in the market price of oil stocks over the relevant period"). The court asserted that the use
of the stock price 30 days prior to the merger announcement was not necessarily unlawful, but
that given the circumstances of the case, it appeared to be an attempt to lower the valuation.
See id. at *29 (noting that the use of the "stock price 30 days prior to the merger announce-
ment... was not improper, as a matter of law"). The clear implication of the opinion is that if
Royal Dutch had started with a pre-announcement market price of $44 and increased it suffi-
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share market prices generally reflect an implicit minority, discount, 103 the
Court of Chancery accepted a minority discount-contrary to the decision in
Cavalier Oil.
Shell did attempt to distinguish its "limited options discount" from the
"minority discount" rejected in Cavalier Oil. The fair value proposed by
Morgan Stanley (Royal Dutch's valuation expert) and accepted in Shell was
derived "by balancing.., liquidation, merger market and trading value
analyses [in a way that recognized that] it was unlikely that there would be a
sale or liquidation of Shell."'"4 In other words, the discount was an implicit
"corporate level" adjustment, rather than an explicit "shareholder level"
adjustment, and was balanced with values that did not reflect the adjustment
so that the ultimate impact of the discount on fair value was mitigated. To
the extent that fair value reflects such a discount, however, it will be lower
than it would be without it, regardless of whether the discount is implicit or
explicit, shareholder-level or company-level. As the court asserted: "'Rec-
ognition of majority control in this manner and consideration of the way in
which in the long run the stockholder is most likely to have realized on his
investment, is [a] 'relevant factor' under Weinberger v. UOP, . . . and con-
sistent with Delaware appraisal law." '10 5 The court's attempt to distinguish
its "limited options discount" from a minority discount is unpersuasive.
106
ciently to account for the time value of money between the announcement and the merger, the
court would have accepted the resulting value in its determination of fair value.
103 Market prices for all minority shares reflect a discount arising from the expropriation
value, the lack of synergy value, and the pure control value. See supra text accompanying
notes 73-84 (discussing three sources of control premiums). In the Shell case, market prices
for the shares being valued were even lower because of the prior existence of a controlling
shareholder, Royal Dutch Petroleum, which owned over 70% of Shell prior to the appraisal-
triggering transaction. See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1215 (noting that Royal
Dutch controlled over 70% of Shell's outstanding shares).
104 In reAppraisal ofShell Oil Co., 1990 WL 201390 at "31.
105 Id. (quoting Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8395, 1990 WL 84218 (Del.
Ch. June 19, 1990)).
106 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Shell appraisal opinion on the
ground that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion in determining fair value, stating that
the "appraisal quest at the Court of Chancery level admits of a broad latitude .... We will
reverse [its] findings only when they are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires us to
do so." In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1219. In response to an appeal by the corpo-
ration, the Delaware Supreme Court did attempt to differentiate the "liquidation value analy-
sis" proposed by the plaintiffs and adopted by the Chancellor from the "liquidation analysis"
rejected in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). See In re Appraisal of
Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1219-20 (arguing that Royal Dutch was "mischaracteriz[ing] the trial
court's findings" and that "the court's final figure of $71.20 is.. . not the product of a liqui-
dation analysis alone"). It is unclear from the supreme court opinion whether or not the dis-
senting shareholders appealed the part of the Chancellor's opinion adopting the implicit "lim-
ited options" discount.
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b. Other Delaware Cases
Subsequent to Shell,10 7 several Delaware courts have made one or both
of the mistakes made by the Court of Chancery in Shell. In Salomon
Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp.,'° the court rejected an upward ad-
justment from average price-earnings multiples (which reflected an
implicit minority discount because the multiples were derived from
minority share market prices) on the ground that such a "shareholder-
level" adjustment was contrary to the pro rata value doctrine es-
tablished by Cavalier Oil.1"9 Based on the same reasoning, the court
reached a similar outcome in In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Liti-
107 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, Delaware courts have addressed premi-
ums or discounts in several other cases post-ShelL See, e.g., Grubb v. Bagley, Civ. A. No.
13882, 1998 WL 92224, at *I-2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1998) (noting the plaintiffs' expert's as-
sertion that "marketability and minority discounts [are] prohibited by Delaware law"); Hint-
mann v. Fred Weber, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12839, 1998 WL 83052, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998)
(acknowledging that "[t]his Court has accepted the addition of small stock premia" in calcu-
lating the discount rate); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aramark Corp., Civ. A. No. 16142,
1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *6-10 (Feb. 5, 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction to halt a
freeze-out based on the directors' use of a "private company discount" in determining the
freeze-out price); Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13414, 1998 WL 44993,
at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998) (accepting a "small stock premium" in the calculation of the
discount rate in a DCF analysis-despite its having the same effect and rationale as the mar-
ketability discounts rejected in Cavalier Oil-but rejecting the petitioners' and the respon-
dents' valuations on other grounds).
108 Civ. A. No. 10054, 1992 WL 94367 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).
109 See id. at *6 ("Mhe adjustment... is a stockholder level adjustment. Thus, to the
extent that it is, in whole or in part, a control premium adjustment, it is inappropriate."). The
court was also discomfited because dissenting shareholders "conceded that the... concepts
[of control premium and minority discount] are related" but did not "undertake any analysis of
the difference between market values and... 'whole company' values in order to determine
an appropriate adjustment." Id. As the court explained, their expert "simply ... decided that
15% was.., reasonable." Id. One might sympathize with the court's discomfort; however,
"acknowledging the existence of the minority discount, but setting it at zero, is more arbitrary
than endeavoring to find its true value." Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No.
11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995). Finally, the Salomon Bros. court
believed that such upward adjustments are not accepted in the financial community and thus
should not be accepted under Weinberger. See Salomon Bros., 1992 WL 94367, at *6 ("I am
not satisfied... that a market value adjustment to compensate for an implicit minority dis-
count is a valuation method that is generally accepted in the financial community.').
In fact, in my experience, investment bankers, who advise special committees that negoti-
ate conflict transactions frequently, adjust market prices upward to reflect some or all of the
elements of a control premium. It is true that valuations for purely financial purposes focus
on (minority share) market value or a full control premium and will not attempt to arrive at a
price in between the two. But, that is because the concepts of fair value and pro rata value are
legal and not financial concepts. This may suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court's at-
tempt in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983), to point courts to finan-
cial experts for valuation may be unsound, at least for some parts of a valuation.
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gation.110 In both cases, the courts viewed premiums and discounts as iden-
tical. In Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc.,"' the court also identified
control premiums and minority discounts, but reached the opposite result: it
included, without comment, a 30% "control premium" to a value based on a
price/cash flow multiple in order "to adjust for the fact that the... multiple
reflects a stock price for a single share on a public stock exchange and, thus,
includes a minority discount."
1 12
As demonstrated by these cases, because the pro rata value doctrine
permits discounts to be built in via the choice of valuation methodology, but
then prohibits adjustments to correct for such discounts, the doctrine not
only permits inconsistent outcomes, but it actually requires them! Where
available, market prices are considered by the financial community in valu-
ing firms and their stock;113 such prices are thus a "relevant factor" required
to be considered by courts under Weinberger.14 Thus, an implicit minority
discount will be reflected in every valuation in which the market prices are
available. If the pro rata value doctrine prohibits an upward adjustment to
eliminate this implicit discount, as post-Cavalier Oil cases suggest, then the
fair value will necessarily reflect a minority discount (which perhaps can be
mitigated by averaging the market prices with other values). Yet, the oppo-
site result would follow if a valuation consisted solely of a DCF analysis.1
5
Then, pro rata value could not be adjusted downward to reflect the minority
discount because of the ban on "shareholder level" adjustments. Thus, de-
pending on the choice of valuation methodology, minority discounts may be
compelled or prohibited.
110 611 A.2d 485, 494 (Del. Ch. 1991) (arguing that whether the dissenter "labels the
[adjustment sought] as a premium or recompense for a discount, the [adjustment] is inappro-
piate"),
p lCiv. A. No. 11265, 1992 WL 364682 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 1992).
112 Id. at *2.
113 See, e.g., PRATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 203 ("Actual market transaction data can
provide compelling empirical evidence ofvaue... [,and] publicly traded corporation capital
market data may provide relevant valuation guidance in many cases.").
114 See supra text accompanying notes 28-32 (describing "fair value" law after Weinber-
ger); see also Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 ("Fair prie ... requires consideration of all rele-
vant factors involving the value of a company.").
115 This would occur when a company being valued was not a public company, or had a
thin trading market for its shares. In either case, no reliable market price data would be read-
ily available.
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More recently, in Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp.,11 6 one Dela-
ware court has attempted to reconcile this conflict.117  The Silgan Corp.
court noted that all of the experts in the case agreed that minority shares
"trade below [pro rata] value" and that control premiums might include
more than a minority discount-they could also include synergy value.,
1 8
The defendant's expert, however, contended that any upward adjustment to
eliminate this implicit discount represented a control premium barred by
DGCL section 262.119 The court rejected this argument and held that the
portion of a control premium that reflects a minority discount should be
eliminated by an upwardly adjusted market value.
20
The Silgan Corp. court then turned to the question regarding how to fix
the size of the needed adjustment. Candidly acknowledging that "setting an
exact figure for the minority discount comes down to an arbitrary determi-
116 Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995). The Silgan Corp.
case is also noteworthy because it represents the first modem Delaware appraisal action in
which the court appointed a neutral expert to assist in evaluating the parties' expert valuations,
taxing the expert's costs to each litigant. See id. at * 12. The neutral expert was instructed by
the court to not arrive at a fair value, but only to provide criticism of the other experts' valua-
tions. See id. at * 1.
117 In Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., Civ. A. No. 7244, 1993 WL 208763, at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 8, 1993), the court also recognized that control premiums and minority discounts could
be distinguished, at least in theory. In Pabst Brewing, the court reviewed a back-end merger
in a two-step takeover. To arrive at fair value, it averaged the front-end tender offer price and
the back-end merger price, and then reduced that amount by an arbitrary 10% to correct for
over-optimistic assumptions. See id. at *8-10. The opinion contains little reasoning other
than the statement that blended value in a two-step takeover "necessarily does not include
much of a control premium." Id. at *9.
118 See Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *3 (citations omitted). This fact alone sufficed
for the Silgan Corp. court to distinguish Salomon Bros. in which the Vice Chancellor was
"'not satisfied' that an upward adjustment was "'generally accepted in the financial commu-
nity."' Id. (quoting Salomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., Civ. A. No. 10054, 1992
WL 94367, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992)). The fact that all of the experts agreed that market
values reflect an implicit minority discount from a pro rata share of the total furm value does
not mean, however, that they agreed that adjusting the market values upward to eliminate the
implicit discount is "generally accepted." Nor did the court recite any evidence that such an
adjustment was "generally accepted" in the financial community. As noted above, see supra
note 107 (citing other post-Shell cases in which the Delaware courts have addressed premiums
or discounts), such an adjustment is, in fact, not part of a normal financial valuation analysis,
except in the context of legal cases.
n9 See Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *2 (arguing that the analysis of the petitioner's
expert was "improper as a matter of law" because it included a "control premium").
120 See id. at *4; see also Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839, 1998 WL 83052, at
*8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998) (approving a company-level control premium that was derived
from comparable transaction data, but reducing it from 45% to 20% in order to eliminate the
estimated synergy value reflected in that data); Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d 167
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that a "controlling block usually has a per share value higher
than its proportionate interest, and a minority block, which does not possess the control ele-
ment of value, has a lower per share value").
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nation," the Silgan Corp. court reasoned that "acknowledging the existence
of the minority discount, but setting it at zero, is more arbitrary than en-
deavoring to find its true value."'121 The court then fixed an upward adjust-
ment at 12.5%, based on the corporation's expert's admission at trial that a
reasonable estimate of the minority discount was "around 10-15%.
" 122
4. Summary
So where does Delaware law stand today on discounts and premiums?
The case law is, to be blunt, a mess. The pro rata value doctrine, with its
inherent indeterminacy, has contributed to, rather than alleviated, the confu-
sion. Distinguishing between the firm value and the share value may be
useful, particularly when using a methodology (such as a DCF analysis) that
"looks through" the corporate form to the underlying cash flows. Yet, other
evidence of value-for example, minority share market prices or prices paid
in control acquisitions-necessarily reflects the attributes of the shares or
the blocks of shares. Whenever such techniques are used, either discounts
will be impounded in the fair values, or "shareholder level" adjustments will
be necessary. To that extent, at least, Cavalier Oil should be modified.
II. DELAWARE DISCOUNT LAW Is AVOIDABLE
Given that current Delaware rules on minority discounts are incoherent,
unpredictable, and inconsistent with the appraisal statute, one might think
that the only reason corporations continue to subject themselves to such
rules is that they are binding. Indeed, the general perception is that they are
binding.123 In fact, however, they are effectively avoidable (or nonbinding),
as will be demonstrated in this Part. Even though Delaware corporate law
provides for rules to determine what price the minority shareholders should
be paid in conflict transactions, in both appraisal proceedings and entire
fairness cases, those rules are not effectively binding.
121 Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *4.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945, 948 n.16 (1991) (asserting that minority appraisal rights are
"immutable"); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 571 (1990) (noting that appraisal rights are rarely the man-
datory rule, but are not given much weight by investors); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Struc-
ture of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1481 (1989) (describing appraisal rights
under DGCL section 262 as mandatory and asserting a "duty of loyalty... that cannot be sub-
stantially altered"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1553 n.16 (1989) (listing appraisal rights under DGCL section 262 as
mandatory).
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Corporations have a simple way of establishing by contract the method
by which the "fair value" will be determined. By including appropriate
provisions in the terms of its common stock set forth in its charter (or in
buy-sell agreements between a corporation and its shareholders), 124 a corpo-
ration may provide contractually for the inclusion (or exclusion) of minority
discounts in determining fair value.
A. Contracting to Exclude Discounts
The legitimacy of a charter or contractual provision requiring that mi-
nority shareholders be paid more than would otherwise be required by
background Delaware law-for example, a full control premium-would
not appear to raise any serious issues. Corporations frequently issue man-
datorily redeemable stock, the terms of which require the corporation to pay
the shareholders a set or formula price after some period of time or upon the
occurrence of some contingency. 125 Likewise, a number of companies have
adopted "fair price" charter provisions intended to ensure that in
the event of a hostile takeover, the acquiror and its affiliates will pay
minority shareholders a minimum price. For example, the charter of
Unisys Corporation generally provides that in the event any person (together
with Unisys's affiliates) acquires more than 20% of Unisys's outstanding
voting stock without obtaining prior approval from the board of directors,
the acquiring person may not engage in any transaction with Unisys
(whether it be a freeze-out, second-step merger, or other control transaction)
without paying the minority shareholders a price that is at least as great as
124 Corporations also retain the option of negotiating with shareholders directly in order
to purchase their shares in individual transactions or of conducting a self-tender for a specified
percentage of shares. Similarly, control persons have the ability to establish a new corpora-
tion to launch a 100% "any-and-air tender offer for the fir-st company's shares. Although the
duty of candor and federal securities laws would govern such transactions, the transactions
generally would not be subject to entire fairness review, nor would they trigger appraisal
rights. Thus, a company can largely (if not completely) eliminate its shareholder base without
judicial review of the price paid. Where such transactions involve paying for a substantial
number of shares, they almost always occur at prices above the current market clearing price.
See MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997, supra note 13, at 42 (reporting that the median premium to
market price for going private transactions from 1987 through 1996 varied between 8% and
35%). This would appear to support my analysis, infra, in Part IV that a rule including dis-
counts is not the optimal rule.
125 See, e.g., JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY AND
ENTREPRENEURIL TRANSACTIONS 218 (1997) (listing mandatory redemption as a "sample
term" of the common venture capital investment arrangement and discussing its tax implica-
tions); see also infra note 245 (describing buy/sell agreements which have the same effect as
mandatory redemption provisions).
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that paid by the acquiring person in order to obtain control. 126 A broader
charter provision requiring the payment of a control premium in the event of
a conflict transaction by the management or a preexisting controlling share-
holder easily fits into this mold and would be undoubtedly legitimate in
Delaware.
B. Contracting to Include Discounts
Designing charter or contractual provisions to provide for the inclusion
of minority discounts requires more ingenuity, but it, too, appears feasible.
For example, a corporation could include in its charter (or in a buy/sell
agreement) a provision that its common stock be redeemable 2 7 at the option
126 See Unisys Corp., SEC Reg. St. No. 333-08933 on Form S-3 (July 26, 1996) (on file
with author) (describing fair price provision); see also Minnesota Power & Light Co., SEC
Reg. St. No. 333-02109 on Form S-31A (June 19, 1996) (on file with author) (same); Roose-
velt Financial Group, Inc., SEC Reg. St. No. 333-04499 on Form S-4 (June 3, 1996) (on file
with author) (same).
127 To my knowledge, the only example of common stock that is redeemable at the op-
tion of the corporation is the common stock issued to former Genentech shareholders in the
1990 Roche/Genentech transaction. See In re Genentech, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11377, 1990 WL
78829, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1990) (rejecting duty of candor claims in connection with the
transaction). The court described the redeemable common stock issued in that transaction as a
"unique form of equity security that has never before been introduced' Id at * 12 n.4. The
new Genentech common stock was redeemable until June 30, 1995, at the election of Roche,
which became the 600/-owner of Genentech in the transaction. Redemption prices increased
from $38 to $60 per share in fixed increments, initially of $1 per quarter and, after June 30,
1991, of $1.25 per quarter. See id. at *12 n.5. In 1995, Roche and an independent committee
of directors representing the public Genentech shareholders negotiated (and the Genentech
shareholders approved) an extension of the redemption right. Roche was prohibited by a gov-
erance agreement with Genentech from acquiring the Genentech public shares for six years
at a price less than the stock's redemption price. See id. at *10; see also Ellingwood v. Wolf's
Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 1944) (stating that a charter "may contain any pro-
vision with respect to the stock to be issued by the corporation ... that is agreed upon by the
stockholders, provided that the provision ... is not against public policy"). While DGCL
section 151(b) was amended in 1990 to clarify that Delaware corporations could issue re-
deemable common stock, a 1969 amendment to DGCL section 151(e) permitting exchange-
able common stock effectively allowed for the same result. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 151(b) (1998), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (1998). Delaware courts have ap-
proved redeemable stock, exchangeable stock, convertible stock, stock with super-voting
rights, lesser voting rights or no voting rights, and stock with only voting rights (no dividend
or liquidation rights). See WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 25, § 151, at 243-57 (discussing
classes and series of stock, changes in the statute, rights of stockholders, preferred stock, re-
deemable shares, directors' powers, convertible securities, and controlling stockholders); see
also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.01 (1994) (permitting redeemable common stock); id
§ 6.01 cmt. 3c (justifying redeemable common stock on the ground that consensual share
transfer restrictions can create essentially the same effect); id. § 6.01 note on statutory com-
parison (Supp. 1997) (stating that 25 states expressly permit redeemable common stock while
eight others allow a limited power of redemption of common stock).
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of the corporation. 12 DGCL section 151 (b) expressly provides that
[t]he stock of any class or series may be made subject to redemption by the
corporation at its option.., provided however, that at the time of such re-
demption the corporation shall have outstanding shares of at least 1 class or se-
ries of stock with full voting powers which shall not be subject to redemp-
tion .... Any stock... may be redeemed for cash, property or rights, ... at
such time.., prices ... or rates, and with such adjustments, as shall be stated
in the [charter].
129
In essence, then, any corporation may retain the right to freeze out its
shareholders at any time for cash-at a specific price (or prices) or at a for-
mula price. 130 That formula price could provide, for example, that share-
128 Common stock redeemable at the option of the corporation should be distinguished
from common stock redeemable at the option of the holder, which is typically issued by-in-
deed, is the defining characteristic of--open-end investment companies (mutual funds). See
generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (1978 & Supp.
1998).
129 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 151(b). Prior to July 1, 1998, DGCL section 151(b) required
that a company have at least one class of nonredeemable voting stock, but this was a negligi-
ble constraint because only one share needed to be authorized, and it could have been held by
the finn's founder or some neutral bank or trustee. See id. Thus, the redeemable common
stock could have had full voting, dividend, and liquidation rights, just like ordinary common
stock. For all practical purposes, control and ownership could have resided in the hands of
holders of the redeemable common stock. In addition, a corporation could have achieved the
same end by issuing common stock exchangeable (under DGCL section 151(e)) at the option
of the corporation into immediately redeemable preferred stock issued under DGCL section
151(b). See id. § 151(b), (e). Unlike DGCL section 151(b), DGCL section 151(e) does not
contain a proviso that the corporation maintain at least one class of nonexchangeable voting
stock at all times. By issuing a single class of exchangeable common stock, a corporation
could then use a two-step process to freeze out common shares at a preset formula price: first,
common shares would be mandatorily exchanged for redeemable preferred shares; second, the
preferred shares would immediately afterwards be redeemed for cash. The corporation would
thereby continue to have at least one class of nonredeemable stock with full voting rights, as
required by DGCL section 15 1(b).
The doctrine of independent legal significance strongly supports the legitimacy of such a
class of stock. See Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899, 1985 WL 11534, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 12, 1985) (upholding a reclassification of common stock partly into common stock
and partly into redeemable preferred stock that was redeemed immediately following the re-
classification).
130 Some commentators have noted an alternative method for corporations in many juris-
dictions to effectively avoid appraisal rights through the choice of transaction structure. See,
e.g., Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1599, 1600 (1989) (noting that the ability to choose
transaction structure makes the rule that shareholders must vote on mergers "completely op-
tional"). For example, the sale of substantially all of a Delaware corporation's assets does not
trigger appraisal rights, while a merger does. Compared to "fair price" charter provisions,
buy/sell agreements, and redeemable common stock ("discount contracts"), transaction choice
is a blunt weapon. Discount contracts vary from traditional corporate structures only by
specifying how the "fair value" will be determined. In addition, transaction choice only per-
mits contracting around appraisal rights. Discount contracts permit contracting around "fair
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holders receive the market price on a recent trading day, the average bid/ask
prices over the thirty trading days prior to the redemption date, or the book
value as adjusted to reflect cash flows measured over a specified period.
Alternatively, a corporation could provide contractually for shareholders to
receive "fair value" as determined by a court (or private appraiser 131) using
specified guidelines, including, for example, the specific requirement that
the "fair value" of the minority shares be discounted to reflect their minority
status.
Whatever the specifics, a corporation effectively could, by including
such provisions, ensure that whenever it wanted to freeze out minority
shareholders (on the back end of a two-step takeover or in an MBO, for ex-
ample), it could do so pursuant to the redemption provisions in its charter,
leaving no stockholders to pursue a judicially determined or reviewed "fair
value" determination. No stockholders would remain to obtain or pursue
statutory appraisal rights. Such a result is consistent with the limited Dela-
ware precedent. In an appraisal of the Ford Holdings Company, Chancellor
Allen based his determination of the "fair value" of preferred stock on the
terms of the certificate of designations establishing the terms of the stock,
which expressly and clearly provided for a contractually determined "fair
value" in such circumstances.1
32
Further, as long as the redemption price was fixed or was determined
pursuant to a market-based formula, and as long as the corporation complied
value" determinations generally. That is to say, under the entire fairness doctrine, Delaware
courts will review the price paid in a conflict transaction, regardless of its structure. Because
conflict transactions involve the duty of loyalty, Delaware courts still will scrutinize closely
the price paid in the transaction in order to see if it is a "fair price"-even in an asset sale that
does not trigger appraisal rights. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 CoLuM. L. REv. 1618, 1648-52 (1989)
(describing the general judicial unwillingness to permit waivers of duty of loyalty claims
based on conflict transactions).
131 Cf. Wojdak v. Greater Phila. Cablevision Inc., 664 A.2d 587, 591 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (upholding the application of the minority and marketability discounts by an appraiser
of interests in a Delaware limited partnership pursuant to the terms of the limited partnership
agreement), aff'd, 684 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1996), rev'don other grounds, 707 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1998)
(reversing on the ground of ex parte communications). "[Blinding determination by a third
party appraiser selected pursuant to a private agreement is basically the equivalent of arbitra-
tion, and judicial review thereof is governed by the Delaware Arbitration Act" and must be
upheld "as long as it can rationally be derived from the parties' agreement or submission to
the arbitrators and is not completely irrational." See Wojdak, 707 A.2d at 591.
132 See In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 974 (Del.
Ch. 1997) (holding that the amount determined in a certificate of designation of preferred
stock constitutes the "fair value" of the stock); cf Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839,
1998 WL 83052, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998) (declining to address a waiver of a "fair
value" determination in an appraisal proceeding because the waiver was in the bylaws, rather
than in the charter, and was not express and clear).
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with its disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws during the
relevant measurement period, 133 it would be highly unlikely in most in-
stances for the minority shareholders to challenge successfully a redemption
in an "entire fairness" litigation. 134 Because the redemption would be pur-
suant to the express terms of the corporation's charter (or collateral agree-
\
133 Failure to disclose a material fact during a redemption measurement period based on
market prices could be viewed as a violation of Rule lob-5. Compare Jordan v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the failure of a company to dis-
close its impending merger negotiations, resulting in the buyout of an employee's stock at the
book value formula price and the forfeiture of an option on additional shares, precluded sum-
mary judgment for the corporation with respect to a violation of Rule 10b-5), and Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 44 (3d Cir. 1947) (finding that the redemption of converti-
ble preferred stock at a time when the corporation failed to disclose its intent to dissolve
breached a duty of good faith, which required the full disclosure of facts material to the deci-
sion to convert), with St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that a buyout at a preagreed formula price
based on the book value did not require the payment of a different price solely because the
company went public a few weeks later at a higher price), and Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 639, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same).
134 See Baron v. Wolf, No. 4972, 1976 WL 2444, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 1976) (up-
holding the redemption of preferred stock pursuant to a formula because a formula redemption
price is permitted by the DGCL); Corbett v. McClintic-Marshall Corp., 151 A. 218, 221 (Del.
Ch. 1930) (upholding a certificate making the preferred stock redeemable at the book value
even though the book value was disproportionately low compared to the market or fair values
because judicial intervention would improperly usurp the discretion of the directors and the
freedom of contract of the shareholders); Lewis v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 850,
852 (Mass. 1954) (upholding a redeemable common stock provision on the ground that the
buyer had voted for or purchased shares knowing of the redemption provision). Compare
Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 727-28 (Del. 1930) (holding that a corporation
has the power to purchase its own stock at the formula price with the terms of the contract of
purchase as fixed in the charter), and Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. National Bd. of Fire Underwriters
Bldg. Corp., 314 N.Y.S.2d 80, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (holding that the repurchase of shares pur-
suant to a membership agreement between a corporation and its shareholders did not consti-
tute a prohibited form of redemption under the New York Business Corporation Law and was
thus enforceable), affd, 318 N.Y.S.2d 915 (App. Div. 1971), with Greene v. E.H. Rollins &
Sons, Inc., 2 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Ch. 1938) (refusing to uphold a mandatory formula buyout
provision in a charter that was triggered by the termination of employment on the ground of
public policy because the restriction had no business purpose), and Starring v. American Hair
& Felt Co., 191 A. 887, 891 (Del. Ch. 1937) (finding that a corporation could not redeem its
common stock under the statute), affd 2 A.2d 249 (Del. Ch. 1938). Starring and Greene were
decided under a predecessor statutory provision, and so are of doubtful ongoing authority. See
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 562 F.2d at 1046-47 (noting that the DGCL was amended to elimi-
nate the need to demonstrate a "business purpose" for restrictions such as those rejected in
Greene); Kerrigan, 450 F. Supp. at 645 (same); Mitchell Assocs. v. Mitchell, Civ. A. No.
6064, 1980 Del. Ch. LEXIS 562, at *8-9, *11 (Dec. 5, 1980) (upholding a corporation's right
of first refusal under DGCL section 202(c)); WELCH & TURIEZYN, supra note 25, § 202, at
303 (noting that DGCL section 202 "may well validate even such a restriction as was invali-
dated in Greene").
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ment), the force of any shareholder claim of surprise or unfairness would be
greatly reduced, if not eliminated altogether.
135
Still, an entire fairness claim might have force in two circumstances.
First, courts might well intervene-for sound policy reasons, as discussed in
Part IV-where, after investors have committed their capital to the corpora-
tion, redemption provisions are added through a midstream charter amend-
ment, reclassification, or merger.136  Second, Delaware courts may have
some concern where redemption provisions were used to shift control to, or
prevent a shift of control from, management. In that instance, an isolated
Delaware Chancery case from the 1970s suggests that the use of redemption
provisions for the primary purpose of affecting control could be subject to
scrutiny under the entire fairness test.137  Even that case is of doubtful
authority, however. 138  More importantly, in a large number of conflict
135 See Grubb v. Bagley, No. Civ. A. No. 13882-NC, 1998 WL 92224, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 25, 1998) (noting with apparent approval that the "company had a contractual right to
buy stock for book value in specific circumstances," but holding that a contract formula was
not applicable given that the company had pursued a freeze-out merger rather than exercising
its rights under the contract).
136 Cf. B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir.
1974) (invalidating a restraint on alienation by a charter amendment made after a shareholder
purchased stock); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aramark Corp., Civ. A. No. 16142, 1998 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 70, at *6-7 (Feb. 5, 1998) (enjoining preliminarily the reclassification and cash
freeze-out of shares where the freeze-out price included a "private company discount").
137 See Petty v. Pentech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (restraining
temporarily the redemption of convertible preferred stock where the evidence suggested that
the redemption was primarily for the purpose of maintaining management's control in antici-
pation of the termination of the voting trust).
138 Penntech Papers was decided on a limited record and an expedited basis, reducing its
value as precedent. It has been cited favorably in only one Delaware Supreme Court opinion,
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 n.10 (Del. 1977), as support for the proposition
that a corporate control transaction must be predicated on a "business purpose" other than
simply to benefit the control persons. This holding was overturned in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
Subsequent to Penntech Papers, the Delaware Supreme Court in both Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and the more recent Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995), reviewed stock buybacks, which are analogous to
redemptions. In both cases, management-sponsored buybacks of common stock, concededly
designed to maintain the existing management's control of the corporation, were upheld as
legitimate uses of corporate funds. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (applying the business
judgment rule); Unocal, 491 A.2d at 955-56 (same). Unitrin, in fact, interpreted Unocal and
its progeny to permit such transactions whenever they are not "coercive" or "preclusive" and
fall within a "range of reasonableness," a standard of review considerably more deferential
than the entire fairness doctrine applied in Penntech Papers. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386-87.
The manner in which a court would interpret the concepts of "coercion" and "preclusion" in
the context of a common stock redemption is unclear. Redemption provisions, however,
could be written to make it explicit that no judicial review is desired or expected. Cf HB Ko-
renvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 257422, at *15 (Del. Ch.
July 1, 1993) (rejecting the arguments of preferred stockholders that the literal terms of a pre-
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transactions, control is already in the hands of the promoter of the transac-
tion. For example, an eighty-percent shareholder may seek to freeze out the
minority- shareholders. In those instances, Delaware case law does not indi-
cate a judicial inclination to set aside the charter terms and scrutinize a fa-
cially valid redemption.
139
Judicial review of an analogous type of charter provision buttresses the
conclusion that common stock redemptions would not be given strict judi-
cial scrutiny outside the context of midstream changes or takeover fights.
Many corporations require shareholders to enter into agreements restricting
transfer of their stock, providing the corporations the right to acquire the
shares at a formula price upon certain specified events (such as death or the
termination of employment). DGCL section 202 generally authorizes such
restrictions, and courts in and outside of Delaware have upheld such restric-
tions as valid.
140
In summary, corporations have at their disposal several means of con-
tracting around current rules regarding discounts. Contracts to exclude dis-
counts are straightforward; contracts to include them are a little less so. As
argued in Part IV, neither type of contract appears to present any serious
policy issues in the context of initial stock issuances. At least in the case of
freeze-outs of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, and
probably in anticipation of any conflict transaction, such discount contracts
could permit a corporation to freeze-out shares at a price reflecting the in-
ferred stock should be ignored on the ground that parties who contract with respect to one type
of corporate right will not be assumed to have intended their contract to affect another right
unless their contract otherwise cannot be interpreted meaningfiilly).
139 Delaware corporations expressly have been permitted to issue redeemable common
stock only since 1990, and as noted in the text, few corporations have issued redeemable
common stock. This explains why there are no Delaware cases directly on point. Preferred
stock has long been redeemable, however, and corporations have routinely issued redeemable
preferred stock since the 1920s. See Paul W. Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities, 5 S.
CAL. L. REV. 83, 83 (1931) (noting that, since the introduction of redeemable corporate secu-
rities in 1874, "it has become the accepted practice to insert some form of redemption clause
in almost every corporate bond"). Penntech Papers, as discussed in notes 137 and 138, supra,
is the only reported case in which a Delaware court intervened to regulate a redemption of
preferred stock. In addition, notwithstanding the apparent lack of authority to include re-
demption provisions in the terms of common stock of Delaware corporations prior to 1990, a
number of companies did so, although for a reason very different from the desire to contract
around fair value determinations--to provide shareholders with "put" rights as a form of take-
over defense. See Craig B. Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in
Defense Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 22-27, 34-38 (1978) (discussing the right
of redemption or "put" provisions, and including an example from the Rubbermaid Inc. Proxy
Statement (Mar. 24, 1978)).
140 See supra note 134 (noting that the courts in St. Louis Union Trust Co. and Kerrigan
upheld such restrictions).
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clusion (or exclusion) of minority discounts, notwithstanding the unpredict-
ability of Delaware's pro rata value doctrine.
III. THE PUZZLE OF DISCOUNT LAW
A. Firms Have Not ContractedAround Discount Law
Despite having the ability to contract around a judicially defined "fair
value," corporations have not done so. None of the fifty largest corpora-
tions on the New York Stock Exchange have done so. None of the first fifty
companies to undertake initial public offerings during 1996 did so. Many
examples of transfer restrictions of the sort discussed in Part II can be
found, but only a de minimis number of corporations have issued common
stock that is redeemable at the option of the corporation. 41 I have found no
companies that attempt to specify discount rules for conflict transactions. In
short, despite the fact that corporate law already provides a clear method for
avoiding a judicial determination of fair value, market participants have not
used that method and instead have (implicitly) endorsed the current practice
of fair-value determinations.
Together with the analyses in Parts I and II, the empirical fact that firms
have not contracted around rules regarding minority discounts presents a
puzzle.142 Ideally, rules of corporate law should at least be consistent. With
merger, MBO, and takeover activity remaining at high levels, a consistent,
reliable discount rule would permit better corporate and investment plan-
ning. The meaning of "fair value" necessarily influences the number and
nature of such transactions, making a predictable and complete understand-
ing of these concepts particularly important to the makers of both corporate
decisions and public policy. The meaning of "fair value" in conflict trans-
actions is particularly important because such transactions often involve
personal financial risk for participants. Failure to understand correctly and
apply the law of fair value could, in theory, lead a court to undo a conflict
transaction; to require substantially increased consideration; 143 or to impose
personal liability on the directors, officers, and agents involved.
144
141 See supra note 127 (citing the 1990 Roche/Genentech transaction as the only example
to the author's knowledge of common stock that is redeemable at the option of the corpora-
tion).
142 1 thank Jeff Gordon for this point.
143 See, e.g., Enserch Corp. v. MacLane Gas Co., No. 29, 1993 WL 541911, at *5 (Del.
Nov. 18, 1993) (denying a motion for a rehearing en banc of a decision affirming a judgment
against defendants for failure to consider inflation in fixing the fair value).
144 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding the directors
personally liable for a breach of fiduciary duties).
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Thus, parties have an incentive to contract around existing discount law.
As discussed more extensively in Part IV, whether or not discounts should
be permitted as a general matter is debatable. A clear rule barring discounts
might be expected to increase ex ante share value because investors would
pay to eliminate the risk of conflict transactions at discounted prices. Con-
versely, one could imagine that a clear rule permitting discounts might in-
crease ex ante share value by facilitating control transactions. Yet, issuing
firms have not used their ability to contract for either rule.
This Part considers three possible answers to the discount puzzle:
(1) the transaction costs associated with contracting around existing dis-
count rules may outweigh potential benefits (the "transaction costs hypothe-
sis"), (2) firms may be constrained from contracting around existing dis-
count rules as a result of the types of externalities associated with innovative
departures from contractual norms (the "externality hypothesis"), and (3)
investors may mistakenly take Delaware discount law at face value (and
think that no discounts are permitted) and "overpay" for minority shares
(the "overpayment hypothesis"). These hypotheses are not mutually exclu-
sive. Externalities associated with innovation may be understood as a form
of transaction cost or may operate as a conceptually distinct, but related,
reason for not contracting around default rules. Likewise, some investors
might mistakenly "overpay" for minority shares, producing a negative offset
to the potential benefit of a clear rule regarding discounts, thereby making
that potential benefit less than the transaction costs associated with estab-
lishing a clear rule.
B. Transaction Costs
One potential explanation of the puzzle presented by minority discounts
is that the transaction costs associated with contracting around fair value
determinations outweigh the potential benefits. Economic theory identifies
two underlying features of contracting: 145 bounded rationality146 and op-
portunism. 147 In response to these features, private and public mechanisms
145 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
146 "Bounded rationality" is the seemingly straightforward concept that humans are "lim-
ited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time" and are ultimately unable to act with perfect or
"objective" rationality. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198-99 (1957).
147 "Opportunism" captures the fact that economic actors may attempt to further their
own ends through guile, deception, or breach of promise. In particular, the risk of opportun-
ism arises from the combination of uncertainty, which may be viewed as a feature of bounded
rationality, and "asset specificity," which in general terms is the degree to which an asset can
be "redeployed" to alternative uses without loss of value. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 145,
at 59-60. Asset specificity may present special problems in the context of close corporations.
See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 37, at 3-6 (describing how the dissolution of an asset-
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(contracts, organizations, governance structures) have been developed to the
advantage of all participants. These features also imply that the capacities
of corrective mechanisms are limited. Judicial determinations of fair value,
as described in Part I, as well as potential contracts to fix prospectively rules
for fair value determinations, as described in Part II, may be seen as mecha-
nisms for coping with (and are hampered by) bounded rationality and op-
portunism.
Transaction cost theory suggests an answer to the discount puzzle:
bounded rationality and opportunism make it less costly to continue to ac-
cept inconsistent fair value determinations in a public (judicial) order than
to establish a consistent rule regarding discounts through private ordering.
The puzzle thus lies in identifying ways in which bounded rationality and
opportunism make it difficult to specify a consistent rule regarding dis-
counts, even accounting for the ways in which a clear rule would ameliorate
the problems presented by bounded rationality and opportunism. In short,
how do the costs of the current default rule compare to the costs of a private
rule?
1. Costs of the Current Rule
First, consider the costs of the current rule. Transaction cost theory
suggests two sources of costs. From a firm's perspective, the current rule
(1) makes planning and executing conflict transactions more uncertain and
more costly 148 (exacerbating bounded rationality) and (2) increases litigation
and related liability risks 149 (exacerbating opportunism by minority share-
specific close corporation creates opportunities for internal exploitation); Charles R. O'Kelley,
Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 216, 222-24 (1992) (describing how the "all-or-nothing allocation of risk" that asset
specificity brings may be unattractive to prospective investors).
148 For example, a firm may view a conflict transaction as profitable if, but only if, the
price to be paid is less than $X, where $X is based on the recent market prices for minority
shares and thus reflects an implicit minority discount. If the transaction proceeds on the as-
sumption that implicit minority discounts are permitted, only to have a court adjust the fair
value upward above $X to eliminate the implicit discount, then the firm ultimately may be
forced to abandon the transaction. Transaction related costs (for example, management time
and expense, out-of-pocket expenses, and investment banking, accounting, and legal fees) will
have been wasted. Alternatively, the firm may decide that, having incurred irretrievable sunk
costs, the second best solution is to proceed with what would have been viewed, ex ante, as an
inefficient use of corporate resources.
149 Fiduciaries under Delaware corporate law may not contractually limit their liability
for breaches of the duty of loyalty, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996) (pro-
hibiting charter provisions that eliminate or limit the directors' liability for a breach of the
duty of loyalty), and fiduciaries are therefore exposed to potential personal liability for pro-
moting a self-interested transaction that is subsequently viewed as unfair by a court. Although
the ordinary remedy in a corporate freeze-out or recapitalization is for the transaction terms to
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holders). From an investor's perspective, the current rule (1) lowers in-
vestment returns by increasing uncertainty regarding future cash flows on
investments (exacerbating bounded rationality) and (2) increases the possi-
bility of conflict transactions at unexpectedly low prices1 50 (exacerbating
opportunism by controlling shareholders).
Assuming the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, in-
vestors would pass along to the firm costs that would otherwise fall on
them. Thus, a third potential cost of the current rule for issuing firms is the
indirect cost of higher capital costs.151 If, as seems likely, investors cannot
reliably distinguish between firms that are likely to engage in future conflict
transactions and those that are not, then the latter firms would gain from
precommitting to pay undiscounted prices in conflict transactions. By doing
so, they would increase the expected future value of their stock, and thus
could command a higher initial offering price and reduce their costs of
capital.
2. Costs of a New Rule
Turning to a new rule on discounts, which would be established by pri-
vate contract, bounded rationality implies that two sorts of transaction costs
may confront firms attempting to fix their own discount rules: (1) tradi-
tional transaction costs such as developing, marketing, and enforcing such
rules and (2) a particular form of "signaling" cost that such rules may create..
Three traditional sources of transaction costs can be expected: 152 (1)
learning how to set the new rule (research costs); (2) negotiating a clear
contract, which in the case of public companies, essentially reduces to
be revised to reflect an increased price, the entire cost of the increased price will, in the case
of MBOs, reduce the equity of the target corporation, producing almost the same result as im-
posin personal liability on the individual members of management.
For a rough estimate of such costs, see infra note 236, which estimates the size and
frequency of discounts in conflict transactions.
,5' If the semi-strong EMH is correct, then all of the costs discussed in the text will be
reflected, in the end, by higher costs of capital, and thus be borne by firms. If the overpay-
ment hypothesis is true, issuing firms in Delaware are already capturing whatever value arises
as a result of mispricing, and thus would not stand to gain from an improvement made to
capital market pricing by the establishment of clear discount rules. See infra Part III.D (ex-
plaining that issuing firms may be benefiting already from the perception that they are oper-
ating under a "no-discount" regime by raising capital with a lower level of dilution, yet re-
ducing the amount of cash needed at the time of a conflict transaction to freeze out the
minority shareholders). If the overpayment hypothesis is not correct, or is only partly correct,
however, then issuing firms may be hurt by the current rule.
152 Cf Black, supra note 123, at 556-57 (listing forethought, reincorporation expenses,
and the risk of judicial or legislative reinstatement of the avoided rule as examples of rule
avoidance costs).
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learning how to effectively sell investors on the benefits of the contract
(marketing costs); and (3) ensuring that the contract will be enforceable,
both legally and practically (enforcement costs).
1 53
Research costs are not trivial. As sketched out in Part II, although set-
ting a discount rule would appear to present little difficulty as a matter of
simple drafting, a firm must also make sure that other rules (for example,
tax laws, accounting requirements, regulatory or licensing rules, and consent
requirements) do not impose unrelated, additional costs on a company that
attempts to rely on the new rule. Such rules may make a theoretically viable
discount rule useless. The tax, accounting, and legal research needed to
confirm that a new rule on discounts would work for a particular firm would
be costly.1
54
Turning to marketing costs, consider a firm that seeks to issue common
stock redeemable at the option of the company. Issuers already have an ef-
fective "call" on their own stock-they can engage in a freeze-out or buyout
(as did Levi Strauss) in which public shareholders are required to exchange
their shares for a cash payment.155 Even though this implicit call is func-
tionally no different from an explicit redemption right, adoption of an ex-
plicit redemption right would require an investor-by-investor marketing
program because investors would need to be educated on existing corporate
153 These categories loosely correspond to those adumbrated in OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS AND FNANcIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995), identifying the costs of (1) thinking of
and planning for various contingencies, (2) negotiating about such plans, and (3) writing down
the plans in such a way that an outside authority can understand and enforce them. For the
relationship between these costs and bounded rationality generally, see RONALD COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988), arguing that economics is the science of human
choice, and OLIVER F. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INsTrruTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985),
developing the theory of transaction costs, specifically the costs of planning, adopting, and
monitoring task completion in our economy.
154 By way of illustration, the legal costs reflected in the exhibits to registration state-
ments filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for unusual securities (such as
LYONS, PERCS, TOPRS, and MIPS) exceed those reflected in the registration statements for
"plain vanilla" securities (such as common stock, senior debt, and conventional preferred
stock) by 400% or more. Compare Time Warner & Co., Reg. St. No. 33-61579 on Form S-3
(Aug. 4, 1995) (offering $370 million in common stock, and listing the legal fees at $87,500),
with Time Warner Co., Reg. St. No. 33-60203 (Aug. 4, 1995) (offering $375 million in
PERCS, and listing the legal fees at $300,000). Compare Sears Roebuck & Co., Reg. St. No.
33-41485 (Aug. 1, 1991) (reporting a $1 billion debt shelf, and listing the legal fees at
$30,000), with SunAmerica Inc., Reg. St. No. 333-14201 (Oct. 31, 1996) (offering $375 mil-
lion in TOPRS, and listing the legal fees at $150,000).
155 At least this is true for companies where a single shareholder or parent company has
majority control. For companies that have no such controlling shareholder, any attempted
MBO or similar conflict transaction would trigger so-called Revlon duties, presenting the pos-
sibility that initiating such a transaction could result in an "auction" and the sale of the com-
pany to a third party. See I LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at § 1.07[2] (discussing
the Revlon case).
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law. Investors rely to a large extent on prevailing market prices for much of
their information about potential investments. 56 The more basic and gen-
eral the feature, the more likely investors will rely on existing markets to
"price" the feature, 157 and current discount law is basic and general. Thus,
existing law on discounts will need to be explained to investors in order for
them to evaluate a variation from that law, even for firms that precommit to
a "no-discount" rule.
158
Marketing costs for novel securities are often underappreciated, and can
be critical. A typical "road show" for a stock offering is structured to give
prospective investors a limited amount of "face" time with management to
understand the firm's business plan, its industry expectations, and its mana-
gerial quality.' 59 "Face" time is limited by the need to make a sales pitch to
a large number of prospective investors, many of whom may decide not to
participate, and by the opportunity costs confronting investors. Per investor,
"face" time is often limited to as little as an hour. To spend a substantial
portion of that crucial hour explaining novel discount provisions represents
a large opportunity cost for the firm. It will not suffice to have investors
read the prospectus, even if the securities law might permit that, because in-
dustry custom (and reputational constraints) demand that unusual features
(such as call provisions) be noted and justified orally.
Finally, attempts to contract for a clear discount rule are not without en-
forcement risks. As discussed in Part II, although I believe a new discount
rule should be enforceable under current Delaware law, the question is not
free from doubt, particularly where the rule would establish a call price that
is below the "fair price" that would otherwise obtain in a conflict transac-
tion. In addition, some possible discount rules (for example, a simple char-
ter provision proclaiming "discounts are (or are not) to be applied in fair
valuations") would not perform the task of reducing the uncertainty de-
156 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 574-76 (1984) (explaining the existence and logic of this 'weak' learn-
ing from prices").
157 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Freedom of Contract and the Corporation: An Essay on
the Mandatory Role of Corporate Law 56 (Aug. 1988) (Program in Law and Economics Dis-
cussion Paper No. 46, Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
158 This is true even if market pricing is perfect, because in order to price a new variation,
prospective investors would need to understand not only the new rule, but the old rule as well,
in order to separate the price effect of the old rule from the other factors that make up current
market prices.
159 See FRED LIPMAN, GOING PUBLIC 59 (1997) ("Road shows (including one-on-one
meetings with institutional investors) are usually hectic."); id. at 165 (describing Microsoft's
IPO road show as covering eight cities in ten days, including London and Edinburgh, with
"every road show meeting attract[ing] a full house").
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scribed above. Courts would be just as apt to mistakenly apply such rules as
they do current rules.
3. Signaling Effects
In addition to traditional transaction costs, a firm adopting a new dis-
count term would have to anticipate and counter any indirect "signals" that
the new rule might send to prospective (and existing) investors."6 In tradi-
tional economic theory, agents engage in "signaling" behavior to counteract
the problem of adverse selection: 161  if principals cannot distinguish be-
tween good and bad agents because of information asymmetries, good
agents may have an incentive to engage in certain activities to signal their
quality.1
62
Here, however, the signals sent by a new discount rule may be neutral
or perverse. To see this, divide firms into two categories: those who con-
tract for a discount rule ("discount firms") and those who contract for a "no-
discount" rule ("no-discount firms"). Ex ante, investors would reasonably
infer that insiders of discount firms expect to engage in a freeze-out because
they believe either that (a) the firm will earn above-market rents or (b) they
can expropriate value from outside investors by manipulating the timing of
the freeze-out. Even if investors believe that insiders expect above-market
rents, this will be a neutral and not a positive signal because investors will
expect the firm to engage in a freeze-out at a discounted price, thereby
"capping" the upside on their investment.163
160 On signaling effects under conditions of uncertainty generally, see LOUIS PHLIPS, THE
EcoNoMics OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988), and Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kra-
caw, Information Production, Market Signaling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation,
35 J. FIN. 863, 881 (1980), concluding that "there will generally not be a Rational Expecta-
tions equilibrium for the asset market and the market for information."
161 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 493-95 (1970) (discussing adverse selection and the
use of "signals" to combat its occurrence).
162 See id. at 494 (giving the example of "good quality schooling" as a method of certi-
fying natural talent).
63 Cf Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repur-
chases and Equity Issues, 15 FIN. MGMT. 27, 35 & 41-42 (1986) (describing how an increase
or decrease in dividends or an equity issue acts as a signal to the market); Jeffry M. Netter &
Mark L. Mitchell, Stock-Repurchase Announcements and Insider Transactions After the Oc-
tober 1987 Stock Market Crash, 18 FIN. MGMT. 84, 86-92 (1989) (asserting that after the
October 19, 1987 stock market crash, a firm's repurchase announcement, even when not fol-
lowed through, "generated a positive abnormal return" by signaling that the stock was under-
valued). One difference between a discount rule and a stock buyback is that a buyback sug-
gests both an expectation of above-market rents and the controlling person's inability to freeze
out all public shares, with the result that minority investors can expect to share in the above-
market rents.
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Conversely, investors would reasonably infer that insiders of "no-
discount" firms expect not to engage in a freeze-out because they believe
that either (a) the firm will not outperform the market (at best it will earn a
risk-adjusted market rate of return, and at worst it will earn a below-market
rate of return) 164 or (b) even if the firm will earn above-market returns, in-
siders will not desire or be able to freeze out minority shareholders to cap-
ture 100% of those returns. Ex ante, however, investors are unlikely to be
able to distinguish between firms in category (a) and firms in category (b),
because insiders' expectations about future returns will often be nonverifi-
able. Knowing this, firms in category (b) would likely refrain from adopt-
ing either a discount rule or a no-discount rule. This would, in turn, assure
that only category (a) firms-firms expecting market or below-market re-
turns-would adopt a no-discount rule. To avoid the predictable increase in
their capital costs, such firms would camouflage themselves as category (b)
firms by adopting no express rule on discounts. In short, silence is a pool-
ing equilibrium.
In sum, an affirmative choice of either rule (rather than acceptance of
background law) could thus reasonably be expected to send negative signals
to prospective investors. This signaling analysis produces an asymmetrical
outcome in that both rules-a discount rule and a no-discount rule-would
produce negative or neutral signals, rather than the perhaps more intuitive
result that one rule would produce a positive signal and the other a negative
signal. This signaling asymmetry results from two underlying asymmetries
that confront firms and investors who contract ex ante about freeze-outs.
First, firms and investors have (and reasonably understand the other to have)
different ("asymmetrical") and unverifiable information about the future
prospects of the firm and the likelihood of a freeze-out. Second, a freeze-
out can only have the direct effect of reducing minority shareholders' re-
turns-that is, a freeze-out functions like a call option, giving the firm the
right to force the investor to sell minority shares to the firm, but the absence
of a freeze-out does not give the investor an equivalent ("symmetrical")
"put" option that would allow the investor to force the firm to purchase mi-
164 New equity issues have been interpreted as providing a similar signal. See, e.g., Rob-
ert A. Korajczyk et al., The Effect of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Eq-
uity Issues, 4 REv. FIN. STUD. 685, 688-92 (1992) (asserting that firms with private positive
information are more inclined to issue new equity after an information release rather than to
dilute existing shareholders' value by selling at a lower price to account for market informa-
tion asymmetry, but that firms without positive private information always issue without delay
because they can only suffer a loss from information release); Ronald W. Masulis & Ashok N.
Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 99-117 (1986) (concluding that pri-
mary and combination stock offers generally cause a significant decrease in stock value).
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nority shares. 16 5 Finally, it should be noted that even if an issuing firm
could counteract the signaling effects described above, for example by giv-
ing plausible alternative explanations for its rule choice, it would incur (tra-
ditional transaction) costs in doing so.
4. Summary of Transaction Costs
To review, one possible answer to the discount puzzle is provided by
transaction cost analysis. A well-marketed enforceable rule regarding dis-
counts could be expected to reduce uncertainty and limit the ability of firms
and investors to engage in opportunistic behavior. But implementing a clear
discount rule would entail transaction costs that, in the aggregate, may out-
weigh the value of such a rule.
166
C. Externalities
A second potential answer to the discount puzzle is that firms that con-
tract around discount rules would encounter "network" and "innovation"
externalities. 167 Network externalities are positive externalities that provide
165 As discussed infra, in Part IV, freeze-outs may indirectly have positive effects on mi-
nority shares (for example, by facilitating a synergy-producing merger), but the direct effects
of a freeze-out are negative in the same way that the existence of a call option on a given
share of stock reduces its value. The issuance of options on a class of stock may increase the
value of the stock as a class by improving liquidity, but individual shares subject to the option
are generally worth less than shares not so encumbered.
The transaction cost hypothesis may be testable, at least in most respects. It would
seem possible to gather data regarding: out-of-pocket costs of drafting novel or unusual pro-
visions to corporate charters or newly issued securities, the incidence and costs of related liti-
gation (as compared to firms without the provisions), the incidence and costs of conflict trans-
actions that must be revised or abandoned as a result of unclear discount rules, and the direct,
marginal costs of marketing securities with such provisions. It may also be possible to gauge
the impact of such provisions on a firm's cost of capital and investors' long-term returns on
such securities. More subtle costs may be difficult to measure, such as costs associated with
uncertain enforceability, or the anticipation and counteraction of mistaken signals of unusual
contract terms.
167 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 353-58
(1996) (asserting that network externalities often prompt lawyers to utilize standard terms in
contracts even when they expect that the customized term would be more beneficial; because
a lawyer's reputation is based on the success of the contracts he or she drafts, the lawyer act-
ing in a risk averse manner will be inclined to use terms that courts have properly validated or
interpreted); Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 565, 598-600 (1995) (describing how the innovation externality hampers the de-
velopment of novel legal terms in bonds, and how whenever lawyers, accountants, or invest-
ment bankers create new terms to overcome existing deficiencies, other companies can fre-
ride and incorporate the new term in their bonds); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 789-825 (1995) (discussing how a sub-
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users of standard contract terms with benefits over and above those that
arise directly out of the terms themselves. Such externalities thus lead con-
tracting parties to adopt standard terms even when they may be suboptimal
for their particular purposes. 68 Innovation externalities are a type of posi-
tive externality that provides benefits to third parties by permitting them to
free-ride on the efforts of an innovating firm, and thus preventing an inno-
vating firm from capturing the full benefits of its efforts. Each type of ex-
ternality may constrain firms and prevent them from adopting innovative
charter provisions or the like in an effort to contract around default discount
rules.'
69
Network externalities depend upon future use by third parties of the
same standard terms.17  One way to look at network externalities in the
optimal market equilibrium may be achieved when network externalities cause a "disjunction
between market equilibrium and social optimality"). Kahan and Klausner sketch ideas for
why standard terms may be suboptimal, and why firms and investors perpetuate such terms
despite their suboptimality, including agency costs (particularly arising out of the attor-
ney/client relationship), risk aversion by lawyers, herd behavior caused by asymmetric effects
of innovation on firms, attorneys, and investors, and---echoing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995)--cognitive bi-
ases arising from observed systematic irrational patterns in human behavior. See generally
Kahan & Klausner, supra (discussing the factors leading to standardization of contract terms).
Although, as Kahan and Klausner note, these ideas remain in need of empirical testing, many
ring true from a practitioner's perspective. For a survey of the psychological and experimen-
tal economic research on biases and heuristics, see generally John Conlisk, Why Bounded Ra-
tionality?, 34 J. ECON. LrrERATuRE 669 (1996).
168 Kahan and Klausner identify a third type of externality-learning externalities-that
may explain the survival of suboptimal standard contract terms. Learning externalities are
essentially the past aspect of network externalities: externalities generated by past users of a
contract term and enjoyed by future users. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 167, at 351.
The difference between network externalities and learning externalities would not appear sig-
nificant in analyzing discount rules because existing discount rules provide an essentially
identical set of externalities from past and probably ongoing use.
169 In addition to the evidence collected by the articles cited supra note 167, the network
externalities hypothesis is supported by recent market experience for firms with dual-class
capitalizations. Traditionally, such capital structures resulted in a significant pricing penalty,
a result that could be explained by the comparative absence of network externalities. More
recently, as the number of companies with such structures has grown, the market for dual-
class stocks has improved markedly, consistent with the network externalities hypothesis. See
Stephen I. Glover & Doretha M. VanSlyke, Raising Capital and Retaining Control: Initial
Public Offerings by Companies with Dual Class Common Stock, 10 INSIGHTS 18 (1996),
available in WESTLAW, 10 No. 6 Insights 18; E.S. Browning, As Hot New Issues Increase
So Does Supervoting Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1996, at CI (describing the recent trend of
companies issuing dual-class stocks in an effort to raise money without sharing power).
In addition to the examples given in the text, Kahan and Klausner identify avoidance
of formulation errors and ease in drafting as additional types of learning externalities. See
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 167, at 350. For the difference between learning externalities
and network externalities, see Akerlof, supra note 161. For current discount rules, neither of
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context of discount rules is to consider an important set of marketing
costs-transaction costs that result from contracting around existing dis-
count rules. If only one firm were to issue redeemable common stock, it
would bear all of the marketing costs associated with the stock, from edu-
cating investors about current rules to anticipating and counteracting poten-
tial signals that investors might mistakenly take away from the novel secu-
rity. By contrast, if the issuing firm were part of a network of firms, all of
which issued redeemable common stock, it would benefit from all of the
firms' respective efforts to "spread the word" about the merits of the secu-
rity. This will create more investors who are familiar with the security and
who are less likely to be daunted by the fact that it varies from existing law.
Lawyers will be more familiar with the new security and will provide better
advice regarding potential securities law issues, at a lower cost, to issuing
firms and investors alike. Enforcement costs will be lower, as more courts
will produce more decisions establishing the legality of such provisions. In
short, network externalities make standard terms more attractive than novel
terms.
Network externalities run from other users to the users of a standard
term, enhancing the value of the standard term. Innovation externalities, by
contrast, run from the user of a new term to other, later users of the new
term, and so decrease the (potential) value of the new term to the first user.
Contractual terms-such as those in innovative securities-generally do not
enjoy copyright or trademark protection, nor can they be kept confidential
by public firms. Thus, innovators cannot capture the full benefits provided
by such terms. Third parties can free-ride on the costly efforts of earlier in-
novators. 171 For example, if an issuer were able to raise a greater-than-
expected amount of capital by including a commitment to pay a non-
discounted fair price in all conflict transactions, that issuer would not re-
ceive compensation from subsequent issuers that used identical commit-
ments to enhance their stock offerings. Moreover, subsequent issuers would
benefit also from the first issuer's marketing and enforcement efforts.
These two types of externalities may help explain why few firms have
attempted to contract around existing discount rules, despite their lack of
clarity and their unpredictability. Firms that attempted to issue redeemable
common stock would not enjoy the positive externalities provided to firms
that adhere to existing discount law and also yet would fail to enjoy the full
benefits of their efforts to overcome the transaction costs associated with the
these externalities would appear to be particularly important because current discount rules are
not explicitly drafted, but rather have emerged from case law.
'7F See supra note 154 (suggesting that even legal costs alone can be a significant cost for
a first-mover developing an innovative security).
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novel issuance. Although one would expect the impact of these externalities
to be marginal-after all, innovation does occur in the financial markets
with some regularity, 172 despite the presumptive effect of these external-
ities--even a marginal impact could be decisive where the transaction cost
calculus is otherwise close.
D. Overpayment by Investors
A final explanation for the discount puzzle is that firms may already
enjoy the benefits that would be associated with an express discount rule.
This result could occur because investors may mistakenly take Delaware
discount law, as enunciated in Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,173 at face
value-that is, that no discounts are permitted-without realizing that dis-
counts in fact have been permitted in a number of Delaware cases.174 How
could investors systematically overpay for minority shares? Suppose a
share of stock were worth $X under a regime in which minority discounts
were always prohibited (a "no-discount regime"). An otherwise identical
share of stock would be worth $X less $Y under a regime in which minority
discounts were always permitted (a "discount regime"), where $Yrepresents
the present value of the potential discount appropriately discounted for time
and the possibility that a transaction at a discount never occurs. If investors
believed that they were investing under a no-discount regime, but were in
fact investing in a discount regime (a "pseudo-no-discount regime"), they
would systematically overpay for minority shares. Because the leading
Delaware case on point, Cavalier Oil, holds on its face that discounts are
not required in fair value determinations, 175 investors easily could perceive
Delaware to be a no-discount regime, even though subsequent cases such as
In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co.176 and Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries
Corp.,7 7 permit discounts to be included.
If the overpayment hypothesis is true, corporate issuers and their con-
trolling persons could benefit from incorporating in a state with a pseudo-
172 See, e.g., John D. Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, 4 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 23, 23 (1992) (discussing "the rapid pace of securities innovation over
the past two decades"); Tom Pratt, Goldman Stages Comeback in Hot "Trust Mips" Sector,
INvESTMENT DEALERs' DIG., July 24, 1995, at 9 (describing rapid imitation of monthly in-
come preferred shares ("Mips"), an innovative securities product).
17 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
174 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text for Delaware cases that have permitted
discounts.
175 See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144 ("In [fair value] determination[s] the Court... is
not required to apply ... discounts.").
176 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
177 Civ. A. No. 10054, 1992 WL 94367 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).
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no-discount rule regime. Companies would benefit from the misperception
of operating under a no-discount regime when raising equity capital. To
raise requisite capital, companies in such a regime could sell shares at $X,
thereby issuing fewer shares than would be the case under a discount regime
in which they could only sell shares at $X-$Y. Reducing the number of
shares issued would reduce dilution to controlling shareholders. At the time
of a conflict transaction, however, companies and controlling shareholders
would be able to effect the transaction at a price reflecting a discount, thus
reducing the amount of cash needed to freeze out minority shareholders.
The overpayment hypothesis is in tension with the EMH. The semi-
strong EMH posits that market prices reflect all public information.178 If the
overpayment hypothesis is true, market prices of companies in pseudo-no-
discount regimes would be systematically higher than they would be if in-
vestors correctly understood relevant law on discounts. In that case, market
prices could not be said to reflect currently available information.
True, the underlying Delaware cases analyzed in Part I are available and
public. 179 What is not so clear, however, is whether the case law or the
analysis itself should be viewed as "public information" in the sense used in
the semi-strong form of the EMH-in other words, is the analysis or the
case law reflected in particular stock prices? That Delaware courts have
permitted implicit minority discounts to be applied in some cases is not a
novel observation, is° but, as discussed below, neither does it appear to be
generally known.181 One aspect of the EMH that has not been well analyzed
(at least in legal literature) is how such quasi-public facts should be under-
stood in relation to market prices.
Part of what seems to be missing is a model of how new facts are as-
similated by market participants. Conventional discourse generally seems
to assume an accretive, item-by-item informational model in which the full
implications of a new fact, for example, a new case decision, are quickly
recognized and reflected in market prices. Yet this model seems at odds not
only with intuitive understandings about how people understand the world,
but also with decision cost theory. 8 2 It is more plausible that diffusion of
178 See William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 341-42 (1986) (explaining that under the semi-strong EMH, "prices
'filly reflect' all publicly available information" (citations omitted)).
79 See cases discussed supra notes 28-34.
180 See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 88, at. 862.
181 See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of reported cases
on discounts).
182 See, e.g., Andrd De Palma et al., Rational Choice Under an Imperfect Ability to
Choose, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 419, 421-34 (1994) (discussing the details and deficiencies of
the ways in which people process information in making choices); George W. Evans & Garey
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complex information and its incorporation into stock prices are often grad-
ual processes. 8 3 As with case law generally, inconsistencies in Delaware
discount law are revealed slowly: the authoritative Delaware Supreme
Court speaks on an issue once a decade and the Chancery Courts once a
year or so. Furthermore, inconsistencies are veiled by judicial reluctance to
appear to be violating the principle of stare decisis, a reluctance anticipated
and enabled by shrewd litigants. Inconsistencies are also veiled by subop-
timal litigation strategies of less-than-shrewd litigants and by the fact-
intensive nature of valuation disputes. Given this slow revelation process, it
seems at least possible, a priori, that complex legal facts such as the exis-
tence of pseudo-no-discount regimes may fall into the former, but not the
latter, category. In that case, the overpayment hypothesis may be consistent
with a more nuanced version of the semi-strong EMH, at least as a historical
matter.
For some, the possibility that the overpayment hypothesis is at odds
with semi-strong EMH may be enough to eliminate it as a persuasive expla-
nation for the discount puzzle. 84 For others, the overpayment hypothesis
may ring true precisely because it would be another example why the semi-
strong EMH itself is unpersuasive.18 5 Without attempting to resolve the de-
Ramey, Expectation Calculation and Macroeconomic Dynamics, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 207,
207 (1992) (discussing the research and time costs of calculations).
183 Cf. SARAH FISHER ELLISON & WALLACE P. MULLIN, GRADUAL INCORPORATION OF
INFORMATION INTO STOCK PRICES: EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES, Abstract (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6218, 1997) (noting the possibility of gradual diffusion of
information as successive disclosures about the same "event" reduces uncertainty, and also
noting the possibility of the gradual incorporation into prices of information disclosed to mul-
tiple traders given liquidity constraints); Craig W. Holden & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam,
Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition, 47 J. FIN. 247 (1992) (discussing
the gradual incorporation into prices of private information disclosed to multiple traders given
heterogeneous signals or risk-aversion); Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider
Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985) (discussing the gradual incorporation into prices of
private information disclosed to a single informed trader).
184 Commentators who affirmn the semi-strong EMH include Brealey & Myers, supra
note 82, who discuss the validity of the EMH; Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1978), who discusses the growing support for the efficient capital market theory;
and Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 837-38
(1984), who acknowledges the "widely recognized validity of the semi-strong form" of the
efficient market hypothesis.
185 The semi-strong EMH is not a consensus view. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Konihauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 761, 786-97 (1985) (reviewing finance literature and suggesting that capital markets
may not be "semi-strong" efficient); Donald L. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Se-
curities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 912-20 (1992)
(concluding that the efficiency of capital markets is unresolved); Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient
Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1583 (1989) (collecting studies
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bate over the semi-strong EMH,18 6 1 will note simply that the overpayment
hypothesis is supported by two sets of evidence: (1) the lack of adequate
disclosure regarding discount law and (2) the failure of the courts or com-
mentators to analyze discount law adequately.
Disclosure regarding minority discounts--even in jurisdictions in which
discounts are or may be legal-is almost nonexistent. Many prospectuses
altogether omit discussion regarding how fair value will be determined in
appraisal and entire-fairness cases.18 7 Although the SEC appears to have
showing that market prices are frequently imperfect); Wang, supra note 178, at 375 (offering
evidence that capital markets are not efficient).
186 The overpayment hypothesis might be testable. The overpayment hypothesis would
imply that, ceteris paribus, minority shares of firms in pseudo-no-discount regimes would
underperform shares of stocks in both discount regimes and no-discount regimes. Assume a
fixed no-discount fair value at T1 of V per share, and that a minority discount (if legal)
would be DVper share (where O<D<I). In a conflict transaction at T=I, minority investors
would receive (1-D)Vin both discount and pseudo-no-discount regimes, and receive Vin no-
discount regimes. To determine the initial required payment to issuing finns at T=O, apply a
discount factor to payments at T=I by an amount equal to k (where O<k<l), which is a com-
posite of time value, firm risk, and market risk, none of which are affected by rules on dis-
counts. In a no-discount regime, total return would be R, = V - kV and return on investment
would be ROl, = R, / kVor V/kV- 1; in a discount regime, R2 = (1-D) V- (1-D)kV and ROI2 =
R2 I (I-D)kV; and in a pseudo-no-discount regime, R3 = (1-D) V- kVand ROI3 = RJ / (1-D)kV.
Substituting for R, R01 and RO2 both equal Ilk - 1, but ROI = l/k - I - Dk. In other words,
regardless of Vor D, and holding k constant across regimes, the total return on investment in a
pseudo-discount-regime will, ceterisparibus, be less than in either a discount regime or a no-
discount regime.
This result depends upon two assumptions: first, that minority discounts as applied would
be the same in both pseudo-no-discount regimes and discount regimes; and second, that the
required return on investment (but for the type of discount regime) would be unaffected by
which type of discount regime is chosen. If these two assumptions hold, the overpayment hy-
pothesis-which, as noted above, proposes that market prices do not reflect the true nature of
discount rules in a pseudo-no-discount regime-would imply that investors could achieve
excess returns by shorting the stocks of firms in such regimes and hedging those shorts with
stocks of comparable firms in discount and/or no-discount regimes. Designing a study to test
the overpayment hypothesis may be difficult, however, because of the limited number of ju-
risdictions with clear discount rules of any sort, and because there may be confounding factors
(such as other rules of corporate law) that vary with discount rules.
187 Each of the principal forms established by the SEC for the registration of securities
under the Securities Act of 1933 (Forms S-I, S-2, and S-3) requires the registration statement
and prospectus to include (or incorporate by reference) the description specified in Item 202
of Regulation S-K of the securities being registered. Item 202 of Regulation S-K requires dis-
closure of a number of specific characteristics of capital stock, including "any restriction on
alienability of the securities to be registered" and "any provision discriminating against any
existing or prospective holder of such securities as a result of such security holder owning a
substantial amount of securities." 17 C.F.R. § 229.202(a)(1) (1998). Neither provision would
appear to require a description of basic corporate law providing for (or prohibiting) discounts
in fair value determinations which could not be fairly described as a "restriction on alienabil-
ity" and do not discriminate against substantial security holders, but against small security
holders.
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included a general comment requesting disclosure of how fair value will be
determined (or how fair value might relate to the merger consideration) on
its checklist of targeted disclosure regarding fair value, even in connection
with appraisal-triggering transactions reviews of stock merger proxy state-
ments/prospectuses, l88 disclosure remains spotty and vague. Furthermore,
discussion of discounts is absent altogether.
18 9
The absence of reported cases on discounts in over a third of the
states, 190 coupled with the fact that discounts can have a major impact on
fair value, suggests that the issue remains completely unknown to a large
segment of the bar and (because the bar is an essential link between law-
Thus, prospectuses for public offerings of common stock generally omit discussions of
appraisal rights entirely. See, e.g., Keebler Foods Co., Common Stock Prospectus 1 (Jan. 29,
1998) (omitting a discussion of appraisal rights); VeriSign Inc., Common Stock Prospectus 1
(Jan. 29, 1998) (omitting a description of appraisal rights in descriptive common stock); Lu-
cent Technologies Inc., Common Stock Prospectus 89 (Apr. 4, 1996) (omitting a discussion of
appraisal rights in the description of common stock). Similarly, descriptions of common stock
filed on Form 8-K under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also omit discussions of ap-
praisal rights. See, e.g., Norwest Corp., Form 8-K 2 (Apr. 30, 1996).
188 See SEC Staff Comment Letters 1-3 (on file with author) (requesting disclosure of the
law on how fair value will be determined in appraisal in the section of a proxy state-
ment/prospectus comparing merging companies' shareholder rights); cf SEC Staff Comment
Letters 4-10 (on file with author) (falling to request a disclosure of the law on how fair value
will be determined in appraisal in the section of a proxy statement/prospectus comparing
meting companies' shareholder rights).
See, e.g., Syntellect, Inc., Proxy Statement/Prospectus 41-43 (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file
with author) (omitting a discussion of discounts in a description of appraisal rights under
Georgia law, the Georgia courts having ruled that discounts must be included in determining
fair value); Larizza Industries, Inc., Proxy Statement 23-24 (Dec. 1, 1995) (on file with
author) (omitting a discussion of discounts in the description of appraisal rights under Ohio
law, the Ohio courts having ruled that discounts must be included in determining fair value);
First Union/First Fidelity, Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus 53-54 (Sept. 5, 1995) (on file
with author) (omitting a discussion of discounts in the description of appraisal rights under
New Jersey law, the courts of New Jersey not having ruled on discounts).
190 The question of discounts is not a new one. The first reported decision in which the
issue was litigated appears to be Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278, 285 (Del.
Ch. 1960), accepting a marketability discount in the calculation of a multiplier. The issue,
however, has gone unlitigated in approximately 20 states, including Alabama, Alaska, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix A. In some of these states (such as New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Carolina), there are a significant number of appraisal and entire fairness
cases. See, e.g., Berger v. Berger, 592 A.2d 321, 327 (N.J. Super. Ct Ch. Div. 1991) (decid-
ing an appraisal case under New Jersey law); Bache & Co. v. General Instrument Corp., 180
A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (same); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 555 A.2d
129, 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (deciding an appraisal case under Pennsylvania law); In re
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 477 A.2d 527, 527 (Pa. Super. Ct 1984) (same); Defender
Properties, Inc. v. Doby, 415 S.E.2d 383, 384 (S.C. 1992) (deciding an appraisal case under
South Carolina law); Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 409 S.E.2d 340, 343-44 (S.C. 1991)
(same), overruled in part by Huntley v. Young, 462 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 1995).
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makers and the financial markets) to the investing public. Corporate practi-
tioners and academics are often unaware of the topic, and generally unaware
of specific state rules regarding minority discounts, except in the area of tax
law.19' Leading finance texts do not even address the possibility of a wedge
between the value of control shares and minority shares.19 2 Shareholder ex-
pectations can only be confused by the split among the states on the topic.
193
E. Summary-Discount Puzzle
In summary, the overpayment hypothesis, the transaction cost hypothe-
sis, and the externality hypothesis are possible answers to the discount puz-
zle. Each suggested answer is tentative and in need of empirical testing.
Collectively, however, they provide plausible reasons for why firms may
not have been spurred to contract around current discount rules, even though
they are objectionably obscure. At the minimum, they suggest that current
discount rules need a second look, and that courts and commentators should
attempt to provide a more predictable, policy-driven framework for firms
and investors. Part IV begins that task.
IV. WHAT SHOULD DISCOUNT LAW BE?
In this Part, I take up the policy questions that discounts raise: What
should the rule on discounts be? Should the rule exclude discounts in set-
ting fair value, as Delaware purports to do (a "no-discount rule"), or should
the rule include discounts, as is done in other jurisdictions (a "discount
rule")? Should the rule be a binding rule or an avoidable rule?
191 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 80, at 443-58 (omitting a discussion of discounts in rela-
tion to appraisal rights); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 145-61 (same); GILSON
& BLACK, supra note 73, at 698-702, 1268, 1305 (same).
192 See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 82, at 59-62, 113-25 (failing to discuss mi-
nority discounts in a section detailing the valuation of stocks and a section on discounting
generally).
193 See inffra Appendix A. Even courts that agree on discounts disagree on the underlying
analysis. Compare Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989) (re-
jecting minority discounts on the basis of the pro rata value doctrine), with Brown v. Allied
Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (Cal. 1979) (rejecting minority discounts on the
rationale that minority shares in closely held corporations are not necessarily worth less to a
controlling shareholder). Courts in different states that have modeled their corporate codes on
one another have disagreed on the issue of discounts. Compare Friedman v. Beway Realty
Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 977 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that discounting dissenting shareholders'
shares based on their minority status would conflict with principles of corporate governance
because it would deprive those shareholders of their interests in the going concern), with At-
lantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 248, 250-51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (con-
sidering minority discounts as a valid factor in weighing a stock's value and noting that Geor-
gia's statute is modeled on the New York Business Corporation Law).
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Legal policy questions can be answered only by reference (explicitly or
implicitly) to one or more criteria for evaluating and choosing among possi-
ble rules. I first take up the policy questions raised by discounts, primarily
by using efficiency as a criterion. In spite of claims that efficiency has tri-
umphed as a criterion in law generally or in corporate law specifically,
194
courts and commentators that have addressed discounts have most fre-
quently used (by implication) two types of criteria not directly related to ef-
ficiency: (1) rules should be fair, and (2) rules should be feasible to en-
force. 195  Although I conclude that neither of the non-efficiency based
arguments adds to the analysis, I will examine them in turn.
Throughout the discussion, I assume that whatever rule is chosen will
be mandatory and binding because, consistent with my analysis in Part II,
the costs of contracting around the rule would be less than the benefits of
contracting for an alternative rule. 196  I also assume, consistent with my
analysis in Part I.D, that the distinction between minority discounts and
control premiums can and will be made-that is, that courts in setting fair
value do not face the dilemma of, on the one hand, including (full) control
premiums or, on the other hand, including minority discounts. Throughout
this Part, I also assume that other aspects of law and practice relevant to
conflict transactions remain unchanged, such as the practical difficulties
with appraisal, the role of courts in determining fair value, the language of
the DGCL, the costs associated with varying from default rules of corporate
law, and the relative efficiency of the securities markets.
My conclusion, though tentative, is that a rule against discounts is
best.197 The theoretical analysis concludes that discounts have complicated,
offsetting effects on social welfare, and that neither a no-discount rule nor a
194 See EASTRBROOK & FISCHFL, supra note 22, at vii (noting that "corporate law has
economic structure... [and] increases the wealth of all"); RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-12 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the efficiency criterion in the economic
approach to law).
195 Others argue that fairness considerations often serve as proxies for efficiency analysis.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare Economics in Normative
Analysis of Law (Apr. 21, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that
some aggregation of individual welfare should be considered in legal policy analysis rather
than any reliance on fairness considerations).
196 This assumption is relaxed infra Part IV.G.
197 For a rule against discounts to be meaningful, the process by which shareholders ob-
tain fair value must work. At present, the appraisal remedy in Delaware presents shareholders
with a host of deterrents in addition to an unpredictable discount law, such as unpredictable
interest awards, but these problems are beyond the scope of this Article. See Barry M.
Wertheimer, The Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47
DUKE L.J. 613, 702-10 (1998) (discussing flaws in appraisal statutes and proposing various
changes in existing appraisal statutes to better achieve the purpose of protecting minority
shareholders).
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discount rule is clearly better. In the face of ambiguous theoretical argu-
ments for and against discounts, I review the empirical evidence. Although
limited, the existing evidence supports a no-discount rule. Next, I briefly
consider whether my conclusions as to what the discount rule should be
would change if the rule on discounts were a nonbinding default rule, and
conclude that such a variation would only add to the arguments in favor of a
rule excluding discounts. Finally, I consider arguments that the rule on dis-
counts should be converted from an avoidable rule (as under current law) to
a binding rule. I conclude that whatever discount rule is chosen, it should
remain a nonbinding rule.
A. What Are the Costs of Conflict Transactions?
All things equal, a discount rule will increase the number of conflict
transactions. If discounts are permitted, a given conflict transaction such as
a freeze-out will be more attractive to control shareholders, and vice versa.
Moreover, evidence cited in Part I suggests that discounts can have a large
marginal effect on the prices paid in conflict transactions-up to 35% or
more of the total price paid 9 -which in turn suggests that any rule will
have a large marginal impact on the number of conflict transactions under-
taken. As a result, policy analysis of discount law will track closely analy-
sis of the law on conflict transactions. A brief survey of the literature on
freeze-outs and MBOs, illustrated by a stylized example drawn from real-
world transactions, indicates that conflict transactions can impose signifi-
cant costs on society. I extend and update that literature with an application
of economic analysis of asymmetric information that identifies previously
unrecognized social costs of conflict transactions. Finally, I consider
whether either discount rule would have any other significant effects on ef-
ficiency.
1. Traditional Social Costs: Rent-Seeking
The traditional literature on freeze-outs and MBOs begins by focusing
on ways fiduciaries can, in anticipation of a conflict transaction, alter (1)
apparent firm value ("value distortions") and (2) actual firm value ("value-
reducing actions"). Doing so enables fiduciaries to transfer wealth from
minority shareholders to themselves. Where firm value is only apparently
reduced prior to a freeze-out, the transfer is immediate because the freeze-
out takes place at a price below the price at which investors expected ex
198 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the typical range of discount per-
centage vaues).
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ante freeze-outs could occur (and thus below the price that investors used to
determine the price at which they would invest in the firm). Where firm
value is actually reduced, fiduciaries directly share the loss with minority
shareholders, but may indirectly benefit in at least three ways: (1) by bene-
fiting in some capacity other than as shareholder from the value-reduction,
(2) by reducing firm value in a way that harms minority shareholders more
than it harms fiduciaries, or (3) by reversing the value loss after the freeze-
out. Again, minority shareholders invest ex ante on the expectation that fi-
duciaries will act so as to increase firm value and (except in ways that are
fully disclosed and understood ex ante) to share in the firm's gains and
losses. With either value distortions or value reductions, the net effect of a
freeze-out is to transfer value from minority shareholders to fiduciaries.
Fiduciaries may reduce apparent firm value by distorting the informa-
tion about the firm or its prospects that is available to minority shareholders,
to markets, or to courts. Such distortions can be legal or illegal and can in-
volve blocking the flow of positive material information or the release of
false or misleading negative material information. 99 Illegal value distor-
tions can occur because legal mechanisms to detect and punish (and thus
deter) deception by control persons are far from perfect.200 Because there is
often no public market for a target company's securities following a freeze-
out, the market will often not provide a useful measurement device for test-
ing whether a freeze-out was unfairly profitable to control persons.
201
199 See supra note 80 (discussing examples of lawful and unlawful blockages of informa-
tion).-0
200 Cf Mark Hirschey, Mergers, Buyouts and Fakeouts, 76 AM. EcON. REV. 317, 318
(1986) ("Outside detection of managerial.. self-dealing is made difficult by the fact that the
same forces that provide incentives for... fraud in the management of a firm's assets provide
incentives for self-dealing in the management of information."); Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient
Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICs 211, 215 (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1991) ("[Ilnsiders trading on such information can clearly profit prior to
making the announcement, as has been documented....").
20F In a recent article advocating setting fair value in buyouts of large companies equal to
market price, Benjamin Hermalin and Alan Schwartz assume that market price will equal pro
rata value, such that minority discounts do not exist, an assumption contradicted by empirical
evidence and common sense. See supra note 38. They also claim that value distortions and
value-reducing actions are prohibited by law and unlikely to occur because post-buyout mar-
ket prices will reflect gains by control persons in the buyout. See Benjamin Hermalin & Alan
Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STuD. 351, 366 (1996) (discussing how
the appraisal price should be established). Both claims are false. Hermalin and Schwartz also
claim that their analysis is based on the semi-strong form of EMH; however, except in rare
instances, the groups most likely to possess material nonpublic information are management
and controlling shareholders, and, if, as Hermalin and Schwartz claim, fiduciaries will dis-
close any such information, market prices should generally reflect all information known to
any market participant, which is the strong form of the EMH. See Malkiel, supra note 200, at
215.
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Because of what may be viewed as flaws in the securities disclosure
laws, control persons may have information that is "material," in the sense
that disclosure would affect price, but which nonetheless has often been
deemed not material by the courts as a matter of law, such as projections
and other "soft" information.202  Control persons may, but need not, af-
firmatively mislead the market-they can simply possess material nonpublic
information about the current value of the firm.203 An example would be
the expected benefits of advertising, something notoriously difficult to value
in many instances, yet which can reduce dramatically current period earn-
ings and cash flows. As Robert Clark pointed out almost a decade ago, in-
siders may also possess information that, on an individual item-by-item ba-
sis, is not material, yet which is collectively material.20 4 Even if discovered,
it would be difficult for law enforcers to prove that individually immaterial
items of information were intentionally withheld.
205
202 See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,858, at 94,656 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that the defendant's acceptance of
a price set by an independent investment banker was not a breach of fiduciary duty to the mi-
nority shareholder); Coyne v. MSL Indus., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,451, at 99,284 (N.D.
Il1. 1976) (noting that the SEC guidelines do not require issuers of securities to disclose their
projections); see also JAMES D. COX E" AL., SECURTES REGULAnON 75 (1991) ("IThere is
no duty to disclose soft information, even ... [if] material."). Neither the proxy rules nor
Rule 13e-3 contain line items requiring disclosure of projections. Cf. Going Private Transac-
tions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 33-6101, 17 SEC
Docket 1471 (Aug. 14, 1979) (proposing a projection disclosure requirement, a proposal that
never was adopted).
203 Although withholding material nonpublic information under Rules lOb-5, 14a-9, or
13e-3 in connection with insider trading is just as illegal as making an affirmative misrepre-
sentation ("disclose or abstain"), passive deception through nondisclosure is harder to detect
and punish.
04 See CLARK, supra note 80, at 507-08 (noting that insiders may have exposure to bits
of information that individually are not important enough to be material but which can be
valuable when aggregated).
205 Congress and the courts have altered dramatically private litigation sanctions in recent
years. Although it may be too early to say for certain, the provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
together appear to reduce the threat of shareholder suits as a means of detecting and punishing
deceptions. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Living with Securities Litigation Reform: Lessons from
the Initial Litigation (client memorandum Oct. 31, 1996) (on file with author) (explaining the
implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for the process of litigating pri-
vate claims under the federal securities laws); Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Securities Liti-
gation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (client memorandum, Nov. 17, 1998) (on file with
author) (discussing the key provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act and
the reason Congress enacted the law). Likewise, class action settlement procedures that en-
able corporate defendants to pay off class counsel in exchange for a global settlement of secu-
rities claims make detection even less likely. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsu-
shita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal
Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 247-48 (discussing the benefits of global settlement of secu-
rities claims).
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Fiduciaries may reduce actual firm value in numerous ways without
fear of legal penalty. For example, they may underinvest in net present
value projects such as information systems, research and development, or
acquisitions; they may invest in value-destroying projects; and they may
simply shirk ordinary managerial responsibilities. 20 6  Although value-
reducing actions in theory should give rise to liability under standard fiduci-
ary principles embedded in corporate law, the business judgment rule pro-
tects fiduciaries from judicial second-guessing of nearly any ordinary busi-
ness decision, short of gross negligence or apparent conflict of interest.2° 7 It
is true that value-reducing actions will also reduce the value of the fiduci-
ary's stake in the firm. Value-reducing transactions, however, may produce
both direct and indirect offsetting gains to fiduciaries.
Direct benefits result from repeated small instances of self-dealing,
perks, or above-market compensation, which although theoretically subject
to a strict fiduciary standard and close judicial scrutiny, nevertheless can be
undertaken with impunity if kept small and hidden. Further direct benefits
result from the simple shirking of managerial responsibilities, which reduce
firm value but free up fiduciaries to focus on profitable activities outside the
partially owned firm, directly for themselves or through a 100%-owned
venture.
Indirect benefits result from value-reducing actions if the profit realized
by the control person following the freeze-out is reduced by less than the
fiduciary's proportionate share of the pre-freeze-out value reduction.208 In
206 Hermalin and Schwartz claim that value-reducing actions must be reversible to bene-
fit control shareholders, but this argument is flawed because it assumes that the post-buyout
value will be affected equally by the pre-buyout value reduction, and because it assumes that
the value-reducing action cannot produce any immediate, offsetting gain to the fiduciary. See
supra note 201. Both assumptions are unwarranted, as detailed in the text. See infra text ac-
com1,anying notes 208-10.07 See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 24, at 3-4 (explaining the business judgment rule).
208 Assume the frum (a subsidiary) is worth $100; the parent company has a 50% stake
worth $50, and could earn $60 by freezing out minority shareholders for $50, for a profit of
$10. (To motivate this assumption, suppose that the parent and the subsidiary operate sepa-
rate computer systems, and eliminating the subsidiary's system will cut operating costs with a
present value of $10.) Now assume the parent can reduce subsidiary value by $10, to $90.
(Suppose the present value to the subsidiary of the subsidiary's system on a stand-alone basis
is $15, but the parent causes the subsidiary to sell it to a third party for $5, in anticipation of
combining the two finns' systems.) Finally, assume this reduction only reduces expected
earnings to the control person from the freeze-out by $4 to $56. (Suppose the parent's system
can be reconfigured to handle all operations for both the parent and the subsidiary at a cost of
$4.) Now the freeze-out would require payment to minority shareholders of $45 ($90 less the
parent's stake of 50% x $90 = $45), producing a net profit of $11.
Nonproportional effects could be expected whenever synergy value exceeds feasible an-
ticipatory value destruction. Companies with underemployed assets such as natural resources
might produce large profits relative to firm value. Suppose a subsidiary has underutilized for-
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fact, a nonlinear relationship between firm value and the value of the control
person's proportionate share of the firm may be expected whenever the as-
sets controlled by the firm are more valuable to the control person than in
the next-highest-valued use-in other words, where synergy value exists. A
parent firm and its controlled, but partially publicly held, subsidiary may
have made firm-specific investments that are most valuable in combina-
tion.209 The parent company could reduce the value of the controlled sub-
sidiary in ways that do not impact the value of the firm-specific investments
or the composite rents they create. This would reduce the value of the con-
trolled subsidiary without proportionately reducing the value of the parent's
controlling stake in the subsidiary.
Finally, some value-reducing actions may be reversible, permitting a fi-
duciary to recapture any pre-freeze-out loss after the freeze-out. For exam-
ple, a firm could retain excess cash flow and hold it in liquid, low-returning
securities; delay collection of accounts receivable; or underinvest in capital
equipment. If the market understood these actions as temporary, reversible
actions, market prices for the firm would not fall because the market would
anticipate the reversal and restoration of the firm to full value. But if the
control person's actions created the expectation that the actions would not
be reversed or would be exacerbated, market prices for the firm's stock
would fall. The control person could then engage in a freeze-out at a lower
price, reverse the value-reducing action, and realize a net gain.210
est assets worth $100; the parent can better use the forests in its lumber operations, for syner-
gies of $10; pre-freeze-out, the parent causes a subsidiary to buy vehicles to transport logs to
the parent's sawmills; the trucks destroy $10 of value at the subsidiary level, where they
mostly sit idle; but once used by the parent represent a net cost to the combined company of
only $4 (by reducing out-sourcing costs).
209 In other words, there exist "composite rents." See Armen A. Alchian, Rent, in THE
NEW PALGRAvE: THE WORLD OF ECONOMICs, supra note 200, at 591, 593. A stylized but
real-world example of such a parent/subsidiary relationship is discussed below. See infra Part
IV.A.2.
210 Even Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who generally favor control transactions
whether or not they involve a conflict of interest, acknowledge the possibility that looting oc-
curs and that insiders may use inside information to pursue conflict transactions at less than
pro rata value. They too, however, claim that the risk has been "exaggerated" and that doing
so is "hard." EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 22, at 115-16, 129-31, 138. To support
their claim, they argue that freeze-outs "almost always require the shareholders to vote." Id.
at 138. This argument is simply inaccurate: numerous freeze-outs have been accomplished
by short-form merger preceded by control acquisitions, all without a shareholder vote. See I
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.03(2), at 9-13. Fleet Financial Group's 1994 ac-
quisition of Fleet Mortgage was such a transaction. See Fleet Financial Group, Inc., Offer to
Purchase (Jan. 30, 1995), supra note 19. The largest conflict transaction in 1996-the Levi
Strauss buyout-did not require a shareholder vote. See Levi Strauss Assocs. Inc., Schedule
13E-3 (Feb. 14, 1996), supra note 1. Easterbrook and Fischel also claim that conflict transac-
tions frequently trigger competing bids and an auction, driving up prices and preventing con-
trol persons from pushing through a "sweetheart" deal. See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra
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2. Wealth Transfers: A Real-World Example
Value distortions and value-reducing actions often work in tandem, and
can be subtle and hard to discover in the real world of uncertainty and
asymmetric information, notwithstanding the federal securities laws. To il-
lustrate wealth transfers in the conflict transaction setting, a hypothetical-
stylized for exposition but based on several different, real-world transac-
tions-is useful, illustrated in Figure 1.
note 22, at 138 (commenting that the delay in effecting a freeze-out often allows any "inside"
information to be revealed, thus eliminating any advantage the insiders had and often resulting
in higher bids for the firm). Although this analysis may be true of many MBOs, it does not
apply to parent/subsidiary freeze-outs, or going private transactions sponsored by a controlling
family shareholder group (like the Levi Strauss deal), where a preexisting control block will
deter competitors from making more than nominal efforts to bust up the deal. See Chazen,
supra note 33, at 1443-59 (discussing acquisitions by controlling shareholders and how they
may eliminate competing bids by refusing to sell their shares).
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Figure 1.
Pre-Merger
51%
Old Shareholders of
Firm
Post-Merger
Old Shareholders of
Sub 2
I Y%
100%
Firm A
100% 49%
Sub 1 Sub 2
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Firm A is a large public company. Firm A owns 100% of Sub 1 and
51% of Sub 2, with the minority interest held by the public. Firms Sub 1
and Sub 2 are middle-market firms in Industry X. Sub 1 and Sub 2 might
operate in different geographic areas, or might be managed by teams en-
gaged in a parent-sponsored "tournament" for promotion designed to reduce
monitoring costs.
211
Firm A underinvests in Sub 1, which is then forced to underinvest in a
technology that is increasingly important for providing value-added services
to customers in Industry X. Sub 2 is permitted to use free cash flow to make
net present value investments in such technology. Over time, the actual
value of Sub 1 erodes relative to Sub 2 because of Sub l's underinvestment
in technology. Public investors are unable to detect the erosion of value in
Sub 1, because Sub 1 has no direct financial reporting obligations and repre-
sents an immaterial portion of Firm A's assets, so that Firm A does not (and
is not required to) break out separate information about Sub 1 in Firm A's
own financial reports.
Ongoing changes in Industry X lead Firm A to anticipate-two years in
advance-that merging Subs 1 and 2 will result in synergies, for example,
from the shared creation and use of information technologies, or from fed-
eral deregulation that can be expected to create a nationwide market in In-
dustry X. Firm A begins to take a hard look at Sub 2's financial statements
in advance of their quarterly publication. Accounting rules permit some
flexibility when certain types of revenues (and related earnings) in Industry
X are reported, and Firm A causes Sub 2's reported earnings during the pre-
merger period to erode relative to industry peers and to Sub 1, but this ero-
sion is based solely on changes in accounting policies that are not suffi-
ciently material to clearly require separate disclosure. 22 Firm A also uses
its control over Sub 2 to veto net present value projects that Sub 2 proposes,
with a view toward implementing those projects after the merger.
Firm A now causes Sub 2 to acquire Sub 1, using Sub 2 stock as consid-
eration. Firm A is able to transfer value from Sub 2 minority shareholders
to itself in the merger in two ways: (1) by setting an exchange ratio that
211 For a discussion of tournament theory, see generally HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE
EcoNoMIcs OF TE BusINEss FIRM 110-36 (1995).
212 See HowARD M. ScHILIT, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS 6 (1993) ("[U]t is surprisingly
easy for managers to use accounting gimmicks to manipulate financial state-
ments... [because] (1) [t]here is substantial flexibility in interpreting [Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP")], (2) GAAP can be applied to boost a company's reported
profits, and (3) changes to GAAP by the Financial Accounting Standards Board... often oc-
cur long after a deficiency in financial reporting becomes evident."); see also Kinney &
Trezevant, supra note 80, at 45.48 (discussing how studies of accounting data suggest that
firms use discretion afforded under accounting rules to "manage" earnings).
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overvalues Sub 1, and (2) by setting an exchange ratio that undervalues Sub
2. Under Delaware law and SEC rules, Sub 2 shareholders would be pro-
vided with historic and pro forma financial information about both Sub 1
and Sub 2 (but not necessarily projections of synergies), but Firm A can ef-
fectively overvalue Sub 1 by affirmatively overstating its historic earnings,
by presenting its historical data on an apples-to-apples basis with Sub 2's
historic data, and by omitting to disclose Sub l's past underinvestment in
technology. Because of these value distortions, outside investors would
value Sub I by applying a similar multiple to the earnings (or cash flows) as
applied to Sub 2, despite the relative actual lower quality of Sub l's pros-
pects. Firm A could also undervalue Sub 2 by failing to disclose the recent
accounting policy changes and delayed investments in net present value
projects.
After the merger, Firm A will be able to reverse the effects of Sub 2's
accounting policy changes and (most of) the effect of Sub 2's delayed in-
vestments ("reversal benefits"), and offset any residual loss with the syner-
gies of combining Sub 1 and Sub 2. In a stock merger of Sub 1 and Sub 2,
the reversal benefits and synergies would be shared, of course, with minor-
ity shareholders of Sub 2, due to their ongoing interest in Sub 2, but the mi-
nority shareholders' share of the synergies would be reduced by the other
value transfers built into the merger. Moreover, the presence of synergy
values would disguise the capture of the reversal benefits, and reduce the
already low likelihood of effective minority shareholder litigation challenge.
If the conflict transaction were a simple cash freeze-out of Sub 2 sharehold-
ers, the size of the transfers and the unlikelihood of an effective litigation
challenge would be even more pronounced, for there would be no sharing of
reversal benefits or synergies, and there would be no ongoing public re-
porting at the level of the combined Sub 1 to provide outside investors with
information to suggest that the freeze-out had occurred at an unfair price.
3. Conflict Transactions Are Nonconsensual and Largely Unconstrained
Economic theory often presumes that, absent market failure, private
transactions are socially optimal because they are consensual. In many if
not most conflict transactions, however, shareholders do not "consent" in
any sense, theoretical or practical, to the transaction. In the hypothetical
above, for example, minority shareholders of Sub 2 would have no practical
ability to veto the transaction. As a result, the standard inference drawn
about market transactions-that they are Pareto improvements because the
parties to the transaction value what they get more than what they have
given up-cannot be made. Even in those transactions in which sharehold-
ers are given the right to veto a transaction, well known free-rider problems
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undermine any inference that widely dispersed shareholders place a higher
value on the consideration received than the stock given up.
213
It is true that, as described in Part I, shareholders have a right to have a
court review a conflict transaction to make sure that minority shareholders
receive fair value in the transaction. In the hypothetical above, for example,
minority shareholders of Sub 2 would have the right to challenge the entire
fairness of the merger as a conflict transaction.2 14  The same free-rider
problems that undermine the usefulness of a shareholder vote, however, also
undermine the practicality of judicial policing of conflict transactions. Ap-
praisal rights, in particular, suffer from numerous procedural problems, per-
haps the most significant of which is that plaintiff-shareholders cannot count
on receiving a market rate of interest2 15 during the pendency of cases that
can take over ten years to litigate.216 Even when shareholders pursue judi-
cial remedies, and even when rules on discounts are clear and respected, it is
far from certain that fiduciaries will not be able to convince a court to accept
a proposed firm value that is well below true firm value, however measured.
At best, shareholders' threat of legal protection prevents wealth transfers
from exceeding fairly generous bounds.
Likewise, reputation at best will constrain controlling shareholders and
managers only from extreme forms of expropriation in conflict transactions,
and only when future participation in the capital or labor markets is ex-
pected. Reputation, too, is crucially dependent on the effectiveness of legal
remedies: to the degree those remedies fail, outside investors will anticipate
that fiduciaries will benefit more from a given wealth transfer than from
having a good reputation, which accordingly will reduce the benefit that
otherwise might have flowed from a good reputation. Finally, and ironi-
cally, in some situations a fiduciary's good reputation may have the per-
verse effect of discouraging the investigation of or legal challenge to a given
213 See Gordon, supra note 123, at 1575-77 (discussing rational apathy in the shareholder
voting context).
214 Minority shareholders would not have appraisal rights in a stock merger of Sub 1 and
Sub 2, but would have appraisal rights in a cash freeze-out of Sub 1 shareholders. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a), (b), (d) (1991 & Supp. 1996) ("Any stockholder... who holds
shares of stock on the date of the making of a demand pursuant to [a merger or consolidation
other than a stock merger pursuant to § 251(g)] ... who has neither voted in favor of the
merger or consolidation nor consented thereto ... shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court
of Chancery of the fair value of [the stockholder's] shares of stock ... ).
215 See, e.g., Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 808 (Del. 1992) (upholding
the trial court's grant of simple interest, and refusing to adopt guidelines for when trial courts
should award market rates of interest).
216 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 290-91 (Del. 1996) (re-
counting the 12-year procedural history of the litigation).
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conflict transaction, even if the transaction involves a clear wealth transfer
from minority shareholders.
4. Ex Post Social Costs of Pure Wealth Transfers
Conflict transactions allow fiduciaries to transfer wealth to themselves
from minority shareholders. From some perspectives, that may be enough
to suggest that they are not socially optimal and should be discouraged. No
conflict transaction that involves a wealth transfer of the sort described
above could be expected to be Pareto optimal, because minority sharehold-
ers were better off prior to the transaction (and prior to the value-reducing
actions that the transaction induced) than afterwards.
217
But from other perspectives, social welfare is not thought to be directly
affected by pure wealth transfers. Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition of "ef-
ficiency," social welfare is deemed improved if a transaction results in a net
increase in utility, with wealth functioning as the usual proxy for utility.218
A pure transfer from minority shareholders to fiduciaries would be irrele-
vant to social welfare from this perspective. Presumably, investors would
either reduce ex ante share prices sufficiently to compensate for the trans-
fers, or decline to invest altogether. A firm that engages in a freeze-out at
some point after it issues stock to the public will, all other things being
equal, provide a lower return to "frozen out" investors than a firm that does
not. This is because shareholders who were frozen-out cease to earn a re-
turn on their shares after a fixed period of time, whereas shareholders of
firms that do not engage in freeze-outs continue to earn above-market re-
turns.219 But in a world of perfect information and certainty, a firm that
later would engage in a freeze-out would, at the time of stock issuance, sim-
ply pay a higher price for its equity capital than other firms. The difference
exactly matches the correspondingly lower return to equity investors. Al-
ternatively, as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued, conflict
transactions are like lotteries, and wealth transfers from investors to fiduci-
217 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMIcs 12 (2d ed. 1997) (dis-
cussin, Pareto efficiency).
See POSNER, supra note 194, at 10-14 (addressing the shortcomings of the Paretian
tradition of economic analysis); cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 217, at 41-42 (contrasting
Pareto efficiency with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
219 To the extent that a publicly held finn earns below-market returns, it is a matter of
indifference to investors that the firm never engages in a freeze-out, because investors in such
firms can always sell their shares on the market, thereby obtaining the same liquidity that a
freeze-out by such a firn would provide.
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aries are of little concern because investors will gain as often as they will
lose.2
20
Given that at least some conflict transactions are socially beneficial, as
discussed in Part IV.B below, the initial implication of the Kaldor-Hicks
view of efficiency (and of the lottery analogy) is that conflict transactions
should be encouraged. Even from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, however,
conflict transactions nevertheless may reduce social welfare ex post in two
ways. First, the value taken from minority shareholders may exceed the
value received by the fiduciaries because of differences in valuation, due to
heterogeneous information or preferences. 2 1 Second, and more straight-
forwardly, the value taken from minority shareholders may exceed the value
received by the fiduciaries even where shareholders value stock equally, be-
cause conflict transactions necessarily entail transaction costs. Conflict
transactions in this traditional view are simply a costly form of rent-seeking.
For example, freeze-outs inevitably give rise to legal and investment
banker fees, printing, mailing, and other procedural expenses, and the loss
of sunk accounting and systems costs. Even for arm's-length transactions,
such costs can be significant. Moreover, fees in conflict transactions (as a
percentage of the total deal value) exceed those in arm's-length transactions,
because of the litigation and reputation risks associated with transactions
that by definition involve conflicts of interest. For a typical $1 billion
freeze-out, legal and investment banking fees alone can exceed $20 mil-
lion.222 Although not as large, mailing and printing costs associated with
proxy or information statements and shareholder notices often exceed
$100,000. 223 Freeze-outs also impose other costs directly on minority
shareholders-taxes can be a significant expense, and aggregate reinvest-
ment expenses may not be trivial.224
In addition to out-of-pocket costs, conflict transactions involve oppor-
tunity costs. In the above hypothetical, for example, management of all
three firms-Firm A, Sub 1, and Sub 2-would need to invest substantial
220 See EAsTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra note 22, at 122, 121-23 ("IThere is a strongly
negative correlation among the risks [in a conflict transaction]. An investor with a reasonably
diversified portfolio would be on the winning side of some transactions and the losing side of
others.").
21 See CLARK, supra note 80, at 505-06 (discussing the possibility of different subjective
valuations); Stout, supra note 74, at 1245, 1244-52 ("The assumption of homogeneous beliefs
is at odds with a reality in which investors and analysts differ sharply in their predictions for
particular corporations, industries, and the general economy.").
?" See, e.g., QVC Programming Holdings, Inc., Offer to Purchase, supra note 2 (noting
legal and banker fees of $20 million).
2Z See, e.g., id at 50 (noting printing and mailing fees of $200,000).
22A See Toms, supra note 85, at 569 (discussing the tax costs of freeze-outs); see also
CLARK, supra note 80, at 504-05 (discussing both taxes and reinvestment expenses).
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amounts of time to plan and implement the merger of Sub I and Sub 2. Ex-
perience reveals that directors and senior management will spend a mini-
mum of 100 hours each, and often much more, on a major conflict transac-
tion, and each such transaction will involve upwards of a dozen senior
managers and directors. Although that may not sound that large, consider
that certain senior executives in recent years have been receiving compen-
sation that would value that time in the millions of dollars for each execu-
tive. Presumably, that time otherwise could be put to socially productive
use.
In sum, because conflict transactions may involve pure wealth transfers
that do not increase social wealth and involve significant ex post transaction
costs, they may reduce social welfare, even under a Kaldor-Hicks crite-
rion.
2n
5. Ex Ante Social Costs of Conflict Transactions
In addition to the ex post social costs of conflict transactions, such
transactions can be expected to have ex ante social costs. In a world of un-
certainty and asymmetric information, the ability of controlling shareholders
to engage in conflict transactions creates a distortion in the allocation of
capital. Permitting conflict transactions to be completed with minority dis-
counts included in setting fair value will increase that distortion, and so re-
duce social welfare.
To see this, imagine that firms issuing stock in the public capital mar-
kets for the first time are of two types: firms that will engage in a freeze-out
at some future date ("freeze-out firms") and those that will not ("non-freeze-
out firms"). Assume that investors are rational and risk neutral, and that the
The focus of the text is on allocational efficiency. Pure wealth transfers might also
implicate distributional concerns. As a general matter, minority shareholders as a group will
include a greater percentage of small investors with proportionately less wealth than either of
the groups that benefit from transfers in conflict transactions (controlling shareholders and
managers). "Small investor" in this context, however, is an unclear term. High net worth in-
dividual investors, for example, comprise a significant portion of shareholders who hold the
smallest amount of assets, relative to institutional shareholders. Likewise, widows and or-
phans dependent on capital invested through trusts, traditionally thought to need the protection
of the securities laws the most, often fall into the richest one percent of the U.S. population.
By contrast, mutual funds and pension fumds are large investors in the ordinary sense of
things, yet represent indirectly (and imperfectly) the interests of individuals who lack suffi-
cient wealth to invest directly in the stock market. Even if the concept of small investor corre-
sponded in some general way with relatively impoverished individuals, small investors are
increasingly likely to hold a diversified portfolio of investments, and may to that extent bene-
fit from conflict transactions, as suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel's lottery analogy. See
supra note 220 and accompanying text. In the hypothetical above, for example, Firm A could
be expected to have a large number of shareholders who. directly or indirectly, represent small
investors as well as large investors.
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capital markets are semi-strong efficient, but that investors are unable to tell
226whether a given firm is a freeze-out firm or a non-freeze-out firm. Firms
of both types will face the same cost of capital, which will reflect the aver-
age probability of a freeze-out across all firms. Because freeze-out firms
will, ceteris paribus, provide lower returns to investors than non-freeze-out
firms, non-freeze-out firms will, in effect, subsidize freeze-out firms. Such
a cross-subsidy represents a distortion in the allocation of capital, and re-
duces social welfare.
To the extent that minority discounts are permitted in freeze-outs, they
only will increase the effect of this subsidy, for two reasons. First, minority
discounts will reduce the average returns to investors in all firms by reduc-
ing the price paid in freeze-outs; and second, minority discounts will reduce
the average returns to investors in all firms by increasing the number of
freeze-outs that occur-a minority discount increases the attractiveness of a
freeze-out to a controlling shareholder, ceteris paribus.
This cross-subsidy may be exacerbated by an adverse selection prob-
lem, depending on the relationship at any given time between the cost of
capital in the public and private capital markets. For some subset of non-
freeze-out firms, at various points in time, the cost of capital in the private
capital market may fall below the average cost of capital for all firms in the
public capital market, causing such non-freeze-out firms to exit the public
capital market altogether. This will cause the remaining firms raising capi-
tal in the public markets that are freeze-out firms to increase, thereby in-
creasing the average cost of capital for firms continuing to raise funds in the
public capital markets. It is true that the costs of capital in the public and
private equity capital markets are related; if the spread between public and
private equity capital costs sufficiently widens to cover transaction costs, an
arbitrage opportunity will be created and exploited, eventually reducing the
spread. Still, transaction costs of arbitrage between public and private
capital markets are never zero, and the persistent cyclicality of the merger
and IPO markets suggests that disparities necessary for the sort of adverse
selection problem described to exist may occur with some regularity.
Whether or not this adverse selection problem occurs, it is clear that the
cost of capital for non-freeze-out firms will increase, both as the number of
freeze-outs increases and the price paid in freeze-outs decreases. As the
226 This is a reasonable assumption given that the attractiveness of a freeze-out at any
moment in time depends upon a range of factors, many of which are in constant fluctuation,
including the relative cost of capital in the public and private capital markets. In practice,
even the firms themselves rarely will know their own type with any degree of certainty at the
time of stock issuance and so will have neither an obligation to disclose nor a likelihood of
disclosing their type to potential investors.
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cost of capital increases, fewer firms will be able to raise capital, and fewer
projects requiring capital investment will be undertaken.
The cross-subsidy effects may be viewed from the perspective of the
investor as well. If the average return to investors of all firms falls below a
certain level, a subset of investors may withdraw from the equity markets
altogether. In either case, gains from trade are lost. Without an offsetting
benefit, freeze-outs and other conflict transactions can be expected to reduce
social welfare, not only because of the ex post transaction costs associated
with pure wealth transfers, but also because of the ex ante effects such
transactions cause in a world of uncertainty and asymmetric information.
B. Why Permit Conflict Transactions at All?
Given the distortion caused by conflict transactions, why not prohibit
conflict transactions altogether? The literature on freeze-outs and MBOs
provides several answers.2 27 Conflict transactions can be expected to en-
hance social welfare by encouraging entrepreneurs to search for value-
increasing transactions, by reducing the incentives to "lock-in" minority in-
vestments, and by eliminating the risk of hold-ups by minority shareholders
that would enhance the market for corporate control. Including discounts in
fair value will, on the margin, increase the number of such transactions
without reducing the related benefits and so enhance social welfare.
The most common rationale offered for freeze-outs is that they permit
the capture of synergies that otherwise would be unavailable. As noted
above, the combination of two assets in the hands of a single owner may
create "synergistic" value 228 Freeze-outs permit a controlling shareholder
who owns 100% of one such asset but only a controlling stake in a second
asset to capture all of the synergies from the combination by first eliminat-
ing the minority owners of the second asset.229 Without freeze-outs, a con-
trolling shareholder might use the 100% owned asset without seeking such
synergies if the benefits of doing so would exceed the controlling share-
holder's proportionate share in the combined assets. Lost synergies reduce
social welfare to the extent that they exceed losses that the freeze-out would
create.
227 See CLARK, supra note 80, at 510-12 (discussing motives for freeze-outs); 1 LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 9.01, at 9-3 to 9-7 (same).
228 See discussion supra Part I.D.2.a (explaining the nature of synergy value and how it
a See example discussed supra Part IV.A.2 (illustrating how this type of deal creates a
wealth transfer).
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In a recent article, Benjamin Hermalin and Alan Schwartz advance a
second, related rationale for freeze-outs. They note that freeze-outs provide
controlling shareholders with the incentive to exert socially optimal effort in
pursuing new investment projects. 23° They note that controlling sharehold-
ers will, on the margin, refrain from exerting above-normal effort (for ex-
ample, to pursue a new project or line of business) as long as the fiduciary
must bear the entire cost of effort that could be exerted on behalf of the
firm, but be entitled to only part of the gain.23 In such situations, one way
to induce the fiduciary to exert the socially optimal effort is to permit a
freeze-out at pro rata value. Thus, conflict transactions may provide con-
trolling shareholders with an incentive to exert optimal effort.
A third rationale for permitting freeze-outs and other conflict transac-
tions is simply that such a transaction may represent the best exit strategy
for minority shareholders, even given the risks that such transactions pres-
ent. This point is clearest in the close corporation context, but has some
traction even for public companies. In a close corporation, a freeze-out or
other conflict transaction may be the only way minority shareholders can
hope to liquidate, or for firms that are not paying current dividends, to real-
ize any return on their investment. Ex ante, better exit strategies can be de-
vised for minority shareholders, such as buy-sell agreements, mandatory re-
demption provisions, and registration rights agreements. Crafting and
embodying such strategies in legal documents, however, is costly and rarely
done. In such situations, minority shareholders may well be pleased to ac-
cept a freeze-out price, even one below the nominal pro rata value of their
shares. In such a situation, the nonconsensual aspects of the freeze-out
serve to eliminate hold-ups by one or more minority shareholders seeking to
extract gains from other shareholders.
A fourth rationale for permitting freeze-outs is that they are necessary
to the functioning of the market for corporate control. Hostile takeovers,
MBOs, and related merger and acquisition activity usually provide target
shareholders with substantial premiums above market price. As noted
by Easterbrook and Fischel, second-step freeze-outs in two-step take-
overs benefit minority shareholders to the extent that they include a
230 See Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 201, at 358 ("If the majority could not freeze-
out the minority, it would invest a suboptimal level of effort.").
231 See id. at 359 ("mhe majority will not invest optimally if it has to share value with
the minority.").
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price that is a premium to pre-takeover market prices-even if the second-
step freeze-out price is less than the first-step tender offer price23
2
A final rationale against a rule banning freeze-outs is that such a rule
would be difficult to make either binding or effective. Where private bene-
fits to a control person of a freeze-out or MBO were large, the control per-
son could be expected to expend resources to avoid the rule, such as by
combining a tender offer with a merger or asset purchase or sale with a third
party and/or a liquidation. Where private benefits to a control person or
MBO were not large enough to warrant such a maneuver, the control person
would be tempted to engage in or increase the number of smaller, less visi-
ble conflict transactions to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.
Although a ban on freeze-outs might reduce total expropriation value, addi-
tional transaction costs associated with the substitute forms of self-dealing
(either one large or many small transactions) would reduce social gains
from the ban. Thus, it is not clear that a ban on freeze-outs would have
much, if any, effect on social welfare.
C. How Do the Costs and Benefits of Conflict Transactions Compare?
In sum, it is unclear at the level of theory whether the benefits of con-
flict transactions dominate their costs. David Charny is likely correct that
"predominant noninstrumental theories of contract are in large measure in-
determinate as to the question of default rules." 233 But, at least in this con-
text, instrumental theories are equally indeterminate at the level of theory.
Such a result is hardly surprising, given the inevitable complexity and intri-
cacy of the real-world effects of any rule of corporate law, potentially af-
fecting hundreds if not thousands of transactions, large and small, involving
public companies and close corporations, start-ups and venerable multi-line
businesses alike. Any attempt to weigh the costs and benefits of conflict
transactions themselves would necessarily involve at least three sets of un-
explored or disputed empirical questions.
First, it is far from clear how much more frequently freeze-outs would
occur if discounts were permitted than if they were not. The motives, de-
terminants, and effects of mergers and acquisitions generally are understood
poorly, and the sensitivity of merger and acquisition activity to stock prices
232 See EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, supra note 22, at 137-38 (arguing that "[a] freezeout
price above the current market price is no less beneficial to shareholders because the price was
once higher").
233 David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Inter-
pretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1818 (1991).
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is a poorly understood relationship.234 Even more basically, there has been
surprisingly little attention given to how often freeze-outs and other conflict
transactions occur.235 Even less studied is the effect that the possibility of a
freeze-out has on share price at the time of an IPO, and thus how significant
the effect of such a transaction may be on share price.!36 Given that inves-
tors could be expected to price shares differently for freeze-out firms and
non-freeze-out firms, the seriousness of the cross-subsidy is still specula-
tive, as is the degree to which it would be exacerbated by permitting dis-
counts.
Second, commentators have widely varying intuitions about how often
fiduciaries engage in value distortions and value-reducing transactions, and
about the significance of such behavior.237 Few have attempted to measure
such practices empirically.238 Moreover, even if value-reducing transactions
are common, some would take place regardless of whether freeze-outs were
permitted. In addition, it is possible that more might take place if freeze-
outs were barred than if they were not. Any reduction in expropriation pro-
duced by a ban on freeze-outs would thus be offset.
234 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 82, at 817-18 (arguing that the causes of mergers
and merger waves are an unsolved problem in finance theory); Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J.
White, A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (not-
ing the puzzling relationship between Tobin's Q and merger activity).
235 A review of data from MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997, supra note 13, and data from Se-
curities Data Co. (on file with author) shows that, of the companies in the Fortune 500 in
1985, about 1% (n=6) were involved in freeze-outs during the ten-year period surveyed.
When the universe of companies surveyed is expanded to include the smaller companies in the
Russell 2000 index, the percentage of companies involved in freeze-outs during the ten-year
period remains relatively small, at less than 5% (n-=80). These data do not seem to cut one
way or another on the social welfare effects of conflict transactions, because infrequent
freeze-outs produce both small costs and small benefits.
236 As a first rough cut, consider an IPO of a $1 billion company. If the company has a
.005% chance per year of engaging in a freeze-out over the next 20 years (an assumption con-
sistent with the data described supra note 235), then the expected cost to investors (and thus
the increase in the firm's cost of capital) from a 35% discount in the freeze-out price, in pres-
ent value terms (using a 10% discount rate and a terminal value of zero after 20 years for sim-
plicity), would be approximately 1.36% of the offer price, or $13.6 million-not large in pro-
portion to the offer price, but still large enough to matter to the firm's agents, who might
capture some of that cost if they could devise an effective strategy for avoiding it. Systemi-
cally, of course, 1.36% of all IPOs is a huge number. In 1997 alone there were 508 IPOs in-
volving $26 billion in new equity. See FORBES, Year in Review, Feb. 1998.
Compare Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 2, at 1354 (noting that litigation in this
area has become more active), with EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 134-39
(countering arguments that freeze-outs distort value over the long term).
238 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 759 (1997) (noting the "small number" of papers measuring the extent to which ex-
propriation occurs).
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Third, commentators also have widely varying intuitions about the sig-
nificance of merger synergies generally, and freeze-out-related synergies in
particular.239 Similarly, although Hermalin and Schwartz's model of the ef-
fects on the efforts of controlling persons is logically consistent,240 it is un-
clear whether the distortions on effort exerted by fiduciaries in the absence
of complete ownership are serious or trivial.241 The liquidity and wealth
constraints facing a typical minority shareholder (and thus her need to rely
on freeze-outs to liquidate minority investments) are also unexplored. Fi-
nally, remaining debates from the 1980s, such as those over the net social
welfare effects of takeovers242 and the importance of freeze-outs to the mar-
ket for corporate control, are far from resolved.243
Needless to say, the foregoing empirical questions are unlikely to have
clear answers in the near future. Fortunately, there is another, less compre-
hensive but more accessible, empirical question that can serve as a proxy:
What do actual bargains between market participants suggest about the
relative efficiency of including or excluding discounts?
Before turning to the evidence on actual bargains, however, it is worth
considering whether discount law is likely to have significant efficiency ef-
fects apart from its impact on the number and terms of conflict transactions.
One possibility is that discount law might affect information costs facing
investors when they value firms or securities. Initially, it might seem that a
rule allowing discounts would reduce information costs by reducing the
number of variables that actual or potential minority investors would need
to consider in valuing minority shares. By eliminating speculation about
fair value, a discount rule seems simpler and cheaper than a rule barring dis-
counts.
This would be true, however, only if fair value were determined entirely
by the market price of minority shares. One difficulty with such a rule is
that stocks of many companies do not trade in liquid markets. As a result,
different rules would be needed for widely traded public companies, on the
239 See Coffee, supra note 77, at 412-20 (considering which situations warrant allocation
of synergistic gains between management and the corporation).
240 See generally Hermalin & Schwartz, supra note 201 (offering a model and accompa-
nying commentary on freeze-outs and their investment implications).
41 Cf. Coffee, supra note 77, at 408-10 (critiquing the Hermalin and Schwartz model as
unrealistic).
242 See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds.,
1988) (providing a collection of articles on takeovers reflecting diverse views on their social
welfare effects).
243 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 134-39 (arguing that freeze-outs en-
able value-enhancing transactions, but not offering any views or evidence on the size or sig-
nificance of the enabled transactions).
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one hand, and public companies with limited or thin "public floats" and
closely held companies, on the other. Although not impossible, such a dif-
ferentiation would run roughshod over current Delaware statutory law,
which distinguishes in DGCL section 342 between ordinary business corpo-
rations and nonpublic companies with fewer than thirty record holders.
Thus, such a distinction would in all likelihood require legislative action.
A more serious theoretical difficulty derives from the discussion con-
cerning pure wealth transfers---control persons may be able to distort mar-
ket prices in anticipation of a freeze-out. Minority shareholders would thus
have a continuing need to assess (at some cost) the value of their shares
without the distortions in order to bring lawsuits under the state and federal
laws governing disclosure and manipulation. That effort would be no dif-
ferent in kind than an effort to assess fair value determined on some basis
other than minority share market prices. Thus, the information cost advan-
tage of a rule allowing discounts is much smaller than it might first appear,
if it exists at all.
D. What Do Actual Bargains Say About Discounts?
In the face of ambiguous, theoretical arguments for and against dis-
counts, I review the empirical evidence on discounts. Although this evi-
dence is limited, what does exist supports a no-discount rule, but the evi-
dence also supports continuing to permit conflict transactions generally.
Three sources of empirical evidence exist on discounts: (1) private agree-
ments that address discounts, (2) prices paid in freeze-outs, and (3) state
laws on discounts.
The bulk of publicly available charter provisions and private buy/sell
agreements do not address freeze-out pricing, and of those that do, most do
not address discounts.244 The few agreements that do address the question,
however, show that private parties generally agree to exclude discounts and
distinguish discounts from premiums, while permitting (or even requiring)
244 See infra note 245 (discussing and analyzing available data); see also PRATr ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 669-76 (lamenting the lack of detail in buy/sell agreements, and noting that
"often... the provision for valuation... [m] a buy-sell agreement... is neglected or done
hastily," that parties are often surprised to learn that minority discounts may be appropriate
depending on the language used, and that buy/sell agreements range from specifying no-
discount to a 50% discount); cf Christopher Stoneman & Willemien Dingemans Miller, Es-
tate Planning for Owners of Closely Held Business Interests, BNA Tax Management Portfolio
No. 809 (1994), at A-5 to A-6 & B-101 to B-103 (describing customary buy/sell agreement
pricing terms without addressing discounts, and giving an example of a model agreement that
fails to address discounts); PETER C. KOsTANT, BusINEss ORGANIzATiONs 141-42 (1996)
(same).
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245
freeze-outs to occur. For example, when McCaw Cellular acquired LIN
Broadcasting Corporation ("LIN"), the transaction contemplated an eventual
buyout of the remaining LIN shareholders, and the transaction agreement
dealt with the issue of how to choose a price for the buyout.246  The
McCaw/LIN agreement described the minority share buyout price as "the
private market price per Share (including a control premium) that an unre-
lated third party would pay... to acquire all outstanding [common stock of
LIN] ... in an arm's-length transaction, assuming [LIN] was being sold in a
manner designed to attract all possible participants... and to maximize
stockholder value."
247
A second source of evidence regarding actual agreements are the prices
paid in going private transactions and tender offers involving controlled tar-
gets. Such transactions almost always provide for payment of a premium to
market prices, which reflect a minority discount, and announcements of
such transactions are almost always followed by an immediate rise in the
market price of the target shares. Specifically, data from Securities Data
Co. on all conflict transactions (n=1604) during the ten-year period from
1985 to 1996 show an average premium-to-market price of 45%, shown in
Figure 2 below. In all freeze-outs248 during the same period (n=154), 90%
245 1 completed the following search in the Compny/Filing file in the LEXIS database
(which contains all filings through SEC-Online, dating back to 1986): "(buy/sell or put/call)
pre/1 agreement and minority w/5 discount." The search returned seven agreements (as well
as numerous descriptions of and references to agreements), of which five expressly prohibited
inclusion of minority discounts in determining the price at which one of the parties could pur-
chase the stock of another party upon specified events (one expressly permitted a marketabil-
ity discount), and two expressly required inclusion of discounts.
The filings that included agreements barTing discounts were: Capital Trust, Schedule
13D, Exh. 99 (Dec. 19, 1997); McCaw International Ltd., Form S-4, Exh. 10 (July 18, 1997);
United Oklahoma Bankshares Inc., Schedule 13e3, Exh. 4 (June 9, 1997); Physician Partners
Inc., Form S-4 (Nov. 6, 1996); and Minnesota Power & Light Co., Form 10-K, Exh. 10 (Mar.
30, 1996). The filings that included agreements requiring discounts were: Realnetworks Inc.,
Form S-I, Exh. 10 (Oct. 1, 1997) and Pierce Leahy Corp., Form S-4, Exh. 10 (Oct. 4, 1996).
When the search is expanded to all put/call and buy/sell agreements, i.e. "(buy/sell or
put/call) pre/l agreement," by contrast, over 350 agreements are returned, confirming that the
vast majority of agreements do not expressly specify treatment of discounts.
These findings are consistent with my own experience that private buy/sell agreements are
in the substantial majority of cases either silent on the question of discounts or specify that the
buyout price will represent a pro rata share of firm value, with no discounts applied.
246 See Wasserstein Perella Letter Setting Forth Determination of LIN Broadcasting Pri-
vate Market Value, Bus. WIRE (Mar. 6, 1995) (publishing a letter from the appraiser desig-
nated to resolve the dispute between independent directors of LIN and LIN's parent company
describing the pre-agreed upon formula for fixing the minority share buyout price).
247 Id.
248 For this purpose, I define "freeze-out" to include any cashout of minority shareholders
by another shareholder with more than 30% of the relevant shares. If the definition is ex-
panded to include management buyouts, the numbers do not change materially.
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of the transactions involved a premium-to-market of more than 5%, and the
average premium was 40%. These results are confirmed by data from
Mergerstat Review, which shows that the average premium paid in going
private transactions in each year during the ten-year period surveyed was
greater than 30%.249
Table 2.
1987-1991 1992-1996 1987-1996
Conflict Transactions in All 49% 43% 45%
Regimes (n=1604)
Freeze-outs in All Regimes 43%- 30% 40%
(n=154)
Conflict Transactions in 41% 43% 42%
Discount Regimes (n=29)
Freeze-outs in Discount Regimes 51% 47% 49%
(n=7)
Some portion of these premiums are presumably paid to deter entire
fairness litigation and appraisal cases. Even in jurisdictions that permit dis-
counts, such as Ohio, however, sponsors of conflict transactions almost al-
ways pay premiums over market price to minority shareholders. Admit-
tedly, sample sizes are small, but a t-test of means does not reject the
hypothesis that the premiums paid in all regimes and in discount regimes are
the same at a 10% significance level. Further, in discount regimes, all
freeze-outs (n=7) during the ten years from 1987 to 1996 were at premiums
of greater than 5%, and the average premium paid in conflict transactions in
discount regimes (n=29) was 43%. The uniformity of such premiums sug-
gests that an extra-legal "norm" exists and that discounts should not be im-
posed in conflict transactions such that even where a controlling shareholder
may be legally permitted to impose discounts, they refrain from doing so,
possibly out of reputation concerns. Such a norm provides further evidence
that a rule excluding discounts is efficient.
250
249 See MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1997, supra note 13, at 42 (listing the statistics showing
the average premium paid in going private transactions over the ten-year period from 1987 to
1996).
250 On occasion, reasons may exist for not enforcing extra-legal norms: secular shifts in
given markets may render a norm outmoded; strategic interests of a set of participants in a
given market may lead to the creation of norms that inefficiently favor those participants; and
distributional concerns may outweigh efficiency reasons for enforcing a given norm. See
David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144
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A final source of evidence about what the majority of contracting par-
ties would choose is that a majority of issuing firms are located in jurisdic-
tions with rules excluding discounts (at least in theory), and because such
firms can contract around such rules but choose not to it appears possible
that a rule excluding discounts is tacitly chosen by a majority of contracting
parties.
Because state corporate law comes as a package-a corporation gener-
ally cannot choose to rely on Delaware law regarding takeover defenses but
Ohio law regarding fair value determinations-one can only infer so much
from the fact that Delaware's rule regarding discounts has not deterred a
majority of public corporations from continuing to incorporate in Dela-
ware. 252 But the fact that corporations have not used their ability to contract
around the law of fair value determinations by issuing redeemable shares,253
while continuing to remain subject to the remaining provisions of Delaware
law, does provide some evidence about the merit of a rule rejecting dis-
254counts. As Roberta Romano put it, "[I]f firms routinely choose clause y
U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1854 (1996) (noting that "commentators have long argued that the
norms that ordinarily govern commercial life should not be incorporated into the legal stan-
dards for contract enforcement"); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1727 (1996) (noting that "rapid economic or technological change may
suggest that unchanged norms have become inefficient" and that "highly unequal endowments
of group members may be evidence of inefficient norms"). I am unaware of any evidence
suggesting such a counterindication exists here.
A majority ofjurisdictions, including Delaware, California, and New York, at least
purport to have rejected minority discounts. Admittedly, clear judicial rejection of minority
discounts in fair value determinations is relatively recent. Only in the last 15 years has the
issue been defined in a sufficiently sharp way for issuing corporations and investors to under-
stand how courts will resolve the issue. As shown in Part , Delaware decisions continue to
suggest that minority discounts might be accepted if valuations are cleverly framed so that the
discounts are implicit rather than explicit, and appear at the "corporate level" rather than at the
"shareholder level." See supra Part I. The lack of viable policy analysis behind Delaware's
pro rata value doctrine has caused confusion in the markets regarding the strength, certainty,
and durability of the rejection.
252 See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J.
CoRP. L. 965, 1010 (1995) (surveying new incorporations and reincorporations of companies
traded over-the-counter or listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and concluding that
"Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation").
253 See supra Part II (describing ways of contracting to include or exclude discounts
available to Delaware corporations).
254 An immediate objection to this reasoning is that there is no evidence of corporations
using redeemable shares (or some other method) in Ohio (or other states permitting discounts
to be included) to contract around the rule applicable to them that requires inclusion of dis-
counts. Hence, the evidence from observing firm behavior is inconclusive. There is some
merit to this objection--the evidence adduced in this Section is not, in fact, conclusive.
Two responses, however, can be made, which together argue that the evidence of firm be-
havior remains persuasive (if not conclusive) that a default rule rejecting discounts is optimal.
First, a far greater number of corporations that participate in the public markets incorporate in
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over clause x, then we know from their revealed preference of picking y
when they could have chosen x, that clause x is suboptimal. 25 s
E. Which Discount Rule Is Fairer?
Most courts in addressing the question of discounts have not principally
used efficiency-based rationales to decide cases. Instead, they have either
claimed that stare decisis applies, 256 or crafted rationales that appear to be
based on either fairness or feasibility criteria. Fairness-based rationales for
upholding or rejecting discounts fall into either of two categories: claims of
unfair surprise or claims of unequal treatment.257 These rationales fail to
states rejecting discounts than in states accepting discounts. Second, any rule regarding dis-
counts is a special type of rule that for convenience may be called a "conflict rule." A conflict
rule is one that regulates conflict transactions, and therefore will, ex post, benefit or harm
control persons at the expense or gain of minority investors. Evidence that corporations have
not contracted around a conflict rule that ex post benefits control persons is less suggestive
than evidence that corporations have not contracted around a conflict rule that ex post harms
control persons for the simple reason that control persons have the power to contractually
eliminate the harm. To put it differently, redeemable shares would benefit control persons in
states like Delaware, where the rule regarding discounts harms control persons, but they
would harm control persons, at least ex post, in states like Ohio. Because control persons
make the decision of whether to issue redeemable shares, one would expect to see more dis-
count contracts in states like Delaware than one would in states like Ohio.
255 Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (1989).
256 As noted supra Part I.D, Delaware's principal (and erroneous) rationale for rejecting
minority discounts when it first faced the issue in the Cavalier Oil case was that the issue had
already been decided and only applied to valuations at the corporate level. See Cavalier Oil
Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989). Courts in other states, as well as com-
mentators, have also appealed to legislative history in rejecting discounts, claiming that be-
cause appraisal procedures and entire fairness cases are meant to protect minority sharehold-
ers, minority discounts should be excluded because they would reduce recoveries by minority
shareholders. See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra 197, at 643-44 (noting that the "primary source of
the appraisal remedy today is to protect minority shareholders from wrongful conduce' and
concluding that "[i]f this purpose is to be fulfilled, the dissenting shareholder must receive a
pro rata share of the value of the corporation"). Although it is no doubt correct that such
judicial remedies were developed primarily to protect minority shareholders, see
1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 4 (1994) (discussing the history and purpose of appraisal), it is also
true that such remedies were not meant to transfer an unlimited amount of value from control
persons to minority shareholders. It is possible to accept minority discounts and still believe
that appraisal rights should protect minority shareholders-by affording them a right to re-
ceive a minority share price for their shares. The relevant question is: How should fair value
determinations protect minority shareholders? Legislative history is silent on that question.
See id.
257 Courts have articulated even less persuasive "fairness" arguments. One court argues
that rejecting discounts would afford minority shareholders an unjustifiable windfall and
would impose a penalty on control persons. See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d
776, 788 (Ohio 1987) (contending that rejecting discounts clearly should "not give dissenting
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provide any strong reason for Delaware courts to either reject or accept dis-
counts, and each is briefly described and critiqued.
1. Unfair Surprise
Fairness arguments in the discount context are often premised on loose
notions of shareholder expectations. Minority shareholders expect to be
given less than controlling shareholders, because they know minority shares
are worth less than control shares. Failing to include a minority discount
would unfairly surprise the controlling shareholder. Conversely, sharehold-
ers expect to receive an equal share of the firm, despite being minority
shareholders, because each share of stock has the same legal rights at the
time of investment. Therefore, to permit a freeze-out at a minority discount
would constitute unfair surprise, because most freeze-outs are at a premium
to market."' The "flippability" of the unfair surprise argument is an imme-
diate strike against it, from either perspective. Expectations arguments can
plausibly be made from either point of view, precisely because the parties
did not have specific expectations based on clear disclosure or express bar-
gaining. The argument is also vulnerable to the objection that if the choice
of discount rule is clearly known at the time of investment, neither rule pre-
sents any question of unfair surprise. Finally, although surprise may indi-
cate unfairness, lack of surprise does not indicate fairness. One expects
crime, for example, but that is hardly a reason to repeal laws against theft.
shareholders any element of value attributable to the transaction from which they have dis-
sented"). Delaware courts have made exactly the opposite arguments in favor of rejecting
discounts---that accepting discounts affords control persons an unjustifiable windfall and im-
poses a penalty on minority shareholders. See Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1145 ("Mo fall to
accord to a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty
for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall
from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder."); see also Wertheimer,
supra note 197, at 644 n.143 (quoting Cavalier Oil approvingly on this point). Because
whether a discount should be termed a "penalty" or a "windfall" is decided by the same court
that decides whether or not to accept or reject the discount, such terms are post hoc surplus
and provide no basis for deciding one way or the other. Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
684 A.2d 289, 299 (Del. 1996) (adopting the "penalty" and "windfall" phraseology from
Cavalier Oil).
258 This argument should be distinguished from the argument made supra Part IV.C that
the fact that premiums are routinely paid in freeze-outs, even in jurisdictions where doing so is
not required, is evidence that a no-discount rule is efficient. The argument here is based sim-
ply on shareholder expectations, regardless of whether the expectations are in line with an ef-
ficient result. The argument made supra Part IV.C does not depend on any given shareholder
expecting a premium, but only on the inference drawn from their being paid that an efficient,
consensual norm to exclude discounts exists.
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The surprise argument for including discounts is also subject to the ob-
jection that it confuses financial discounts and legal discounts. 21 The two
are conceptually distinct. Although discounts in the marketplace do consti-
tute evidence of the value of shares, courts should at least inquire as to why
those discounts exist before accepting their existence as a reason for im-
posing a discount in a fair value determination. Minority discounts in the
financial markets are caused in part by expropriation value, and, as such,
simply reflect the risk, or the absence of that risk, that control persons may
be able to successfully steal, defraud, or breach fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation. To include discounts in freeze-outs because they exist in the
markets would, as cogently stated by Victor Brudney, permit the "very ex-
istence of [a control person] and its capacity to exploit unlawfully [to] le-
gitimize the fact of such exploitation."
2 60
2. Unequal Treatment
Unequal treatment rationales for rejecting minority discounts come in
both a simple and a subtle form. The simple form is reflected in a recent
New York decision in which the court reasoned that, because all shares have
equal rights, fair value should represent an equal share of total firm value.
261
Because including minority discounts implies that minority shares are worth
less than control shares, minority discounts violate the "mandate of equal
,,262treatment. Unfortunately, this argument begs the policy question. If
shares must be treated equally in a determination of fair value, then by defi-
nition no minority discounts apply. Simply noting that minority discounts
result in unequal treatment does not provide a good policy reason for re-
jecting them. In addition, it is a general principle of Delaware law263 (and in
259 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the roles of and distinctions between legal and finan-
cial discounts).
260 Brudney, supra note 80, at 70 n.36.
261 See Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1995) ("[I]n fixing
fair value, courts should determine the minority shareholders' proportionate interest in the
going concern value of the corporation as a whole.").
262 Id. at 977. The trial court in Beway Realty distinguished marketability discounts from
minority discounts on the ground that all shares of a close corporation are equally unmarket-
able, and therefore a majority does not derive an unequal benefit from discounting minority
shares to reflect this fact. See id. This argument is weak because, as an empirical matter, it is
clear that all shares of a corporation are not equally unmarketable-at least for closely held
companies, minority shares are less liquid than control shares. See PRATT ET AL., supra note
4, at 301 (Exhibit 14-1, note) ("Control shares in a privately held company may also be sub-
ject to some discount for lack of marketability, but usually not nearly as much as minority
shares.").
263 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987) (upholding a sale of
control by a controlling shareholder under Delaware law). See generally Einer Elhauge, The
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all likelihood of New York law as well 64) that control shareholders are en-
titled to sell their control shares at a premium to market without either
sharing that premium with minority shareholders or structuring a transaction
to ensure equal treatment of minority shareholders in the sale.265 Finally,
literally applied, equal treatment would appear to require that minority
shareholders receive a control premium, including synergy value and pure
control value, something contrary to both Delaware and New York law.266
The more subtle version of the unequal treatment rationale for rejecting
discounts is found in California case law. California courts have reasoned
that fair value should represent the value of minority shares to the control
person pursuing the transaction, because in a freeze-out it is effectively the
control person that is acquiring the minority shares. 2 67 Because minority
Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465 (1992) (discussing
differing views on the duties of controlling shareholders to pay part of a premium from a sale
to minority shareholders).
264 See Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, 48 N.Y.2d 684, 685 (1979) (upholding a sale of con-
trol b a controlling shareholder under New York law).
24 See Bershad, 535 A.2d at 841-42 (rejecting the contention that a majority shareholder
owes the minority shareholders a fiduciary duty to sell its stock to the highest bidder); cf
William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505, 506 (1965) (proposing a rule requiring minority shareholders to be given
the right to "tag along" with control shareholders in a sale of control).
266See In re Fleischer, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274-75 (App. Div. 1985) (finding that the ac-
quisition premium is not appropriate to consider in determining fair value); see also supra
Part I.D.2 (discussing Delaware law on control premiums). The equal treatment rationale is
also inconsistent with the fact that conflict transactions by definition provide control persons
with aform of benefit not shared with all shareholders equally. Freeze-outs force cash on mi-
nority shareholders while control persons retain equity in the firm; minority shareholders need
not receive the same form of consideration, the same tax treatment, or literally equal value,
and no subsequent valuation is required to "settle up" if the stock obtained by a controlling
shareholder turns out to have been worth more than the cash payment to minority shareholders
in the freeze-out. See Toms, supra note 85, at 548-50 (describing disparate tax and transaction
cost impacts of freeze-outs and proposing that minority shareholders be compensated for ob-
jectively ascertainable costs caused by freeze-outs, such as tax and reinvestment transaction
costs). Yet freeze-outs are generally legal in Delaware and New York. See Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (holding that freeze-outs are not only legal, but re-
quire no business purpose); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 24 (N.Y. 1984)
(upholding a freeze-out merger).
267 See, e.g., Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (Ct. App.
1979) (asserting that the value of minority shares should reflect their value to the person
seeking to purchase them). The Brown case arose not in an appraisal proceeding per se, but in
an analogous court-supervised buyout proceeding under California law. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2000 (West 1991) (providing dissolution action procedures). Many states such as
California and New York, see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104, 1118 (McKinney 1986), pro-
vide minority shareholders in a close corporation with the right to dissolve the corporation on
various grounds, including "oppression," "waste," or, in jurisdictions such as California,
"deadlock"; and if the corporation wishes to avoid dissolution it may buy out the minority
shareholders at "fair value," which again has generally been found to be the same "fair value"
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shares cease to be minority shares in the hands of the control person, they
should no longer be valued as if they were subject to the risk of expropria-
tion-a control person will not expropriate wealth from himself. Thus, in
the hands of the control person, minority shares should be valued equally
with all other shares.
An internal difficulty with this logic is that once a control person has
obtained control, additional minority shares do not convey control. As a re-
sult, the value to a control person of additional minority shares generally
will be lower than the value of control shares. Minority shares will be
worth less to a control person than control shares for two reasons. First, mi-
nority shares do not bring with them additional pure control value, which
the controlling shareholder already has obtained.268  Second, acquisition of
minority shares eliminates expropriation value, which depends on minority
shareholders for its existence. Although there may be good reasons to ig-
nore the difference in setting fair value, it is clear that the difference ex-
ists.269 Finally, as with New York's version of the unequal rationale, Cali-
fomia's reasoning would seem to require that fair value include a full
control premium including shared merger synergies, a result that has con-
sistently been rejected in Delaware, although not in Califomia
°0
As with unfair surprise, both forms of unequal treatment rationale fail,
in the end, to offer anything more than window dressing on a conclusion al-
ready reached. New York law straightforwardly and Califomia law indi-
rectly beg the question. Why should minority shareholders always be enti-
tled to the same value as controlling shareholders? One is immediately led
that arises in appraisal proceedings. See, e.g., Brown, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 176; Beway Realty
Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 975-76.
268 See Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 123 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. Ch. 1956)
(holding that a controlling shareholder's purchase of shares at a given price is not sufficient to
establish a market price to consider in determining fair value using the Delaware block
method, and taking "judicial notice" of the fact that majority shareholders often pay a "pre-
mium" for minority shares).
269 A survey of public company acquisitions announced during 1994 and 1995, based on
data provided by Securities Data Co. Inc. (on file with author), shows that premiums paid in
cash-out transactions involving independent targets averaged 39% over the target's market
price four weeks prior to the announcement, compared to an average of only 33% for cash-out
transactions involving controlled targets (that is, where the acquiror owned a 30+% stake prior
to the transaction). When the universe of transactions is expanded to include all cash tender
offers for public companies announced during 1994 and 1995 (regardless of whether they
were 100% cash-out transactions), the average premium paid over market price four weeks
prior to the announcement increased to 53% for independent targets, compared to 35% for
controlled targets. See generally PRATT ET AL, supra note 4.
270 See supra Part I.D (discussing Delaware law's rejection of minority discounts and its
use solely of the going concern value to determine fair value); cf Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson &
Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (finding that the control shareholder must share the control
premium with minority shareholders).
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to ponder what wonderful effects equal treatment would have. How would
those effects compare to the harmful effects that the rule would produce:
reduced synergies, distorted effort effects, lock-in of minority shareholders,
and impairment of the market for corporate control? This leads back to ef-
ficiency analysis.
F. Which Discount Rule Is More Feasible?
One final category of rationales for accepting or rejecting discounts is
that one rule or the other would be easier to implement from a procedural
point of view. Indeed, this type of argument was made by both the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Cavalier Oil 271 and by the American Law Institute
in the Principles of Corporate Governance.72 Once again, however, the
identical argument can be, and has been, advanced on behalf of a rule per-
mitting discounts.273 Neither view is persuasive as a general matter because
estimating discounts is required under either rule. If fair value is based on
minority share market prices, a rule excluding discounts would require es-
timating the discount so as to exclude it, with attendant procedural difficul-
ties. If fair value is based on a DCF valuation, however, as is sometimes
necessary (as when market prices have been affected by takeover rumors), a
rule including discounts would require fixing a discount to include the DCF
valuation, thereby increasing procedural complexity.274
Using market prices as the exclusive basis for valuation would exclude
a discount for private companies, but include one for public companies
(unless they were the subject of takeover speculation, in which case the
valuation would be at a premium). Such a rule would necessarily produce
not only inconsistent rules but also perverse incentives. Private firms-pre-
cisely those companies whose synergy-driven mergers are more common
and whose freeze-outs should be encouraged to enhance minority share-
holder liquidity-would be discouraged from undertaking freeze-outs, be-
271 See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1146-47 (Del. 1989) (finding the
no-discount rule easier to implement).
272 See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE 324 (1994) ("Any ... rule [includ-
ing discounts] would require the court to undertake a complicated and ultimately speculative
inqu. ... ?)
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 788-91 (1987) (finding
that a discount rule is "a less complicated valuation proceeding"). Hermalin and Schwartz
make such an argument on behalf of using market prices as "fair value" in buyouts; however,
because their analysis assumes that minority discounts do not exist, their argument really fa-
vors using a market-price-based rule, regardless of what value that produces. See Hermalin &
Schwartz, supra note 201, at 344, 367-69.
274 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing valuation methods in entire
fairness cases).
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cause they would be required to pay nondiscounted prices. Large public
firms-precisely those companies whose incentive to take value-reducing
actions or to block the flow of valuation information to the market is great-
est because the potential gains are larger-would be encouraged to under-
take freeze-outs because they would be required to pay only discounted
prices. In addition, such a rule would allow a company to reduce its own
"fair value" by selling a modest number of shares to the public and thus cre-
ating a market for its minority shares. Finally, such a rule is very unlikely
to be adopted without legislative action because neither the DGCL nor
Delaware case law has distinguished between public and private companies
in determining fair value.
275
A final feasibility argument for including discounts is that doing other-
wise would give minority shareholders an incentive to pursue "fair value"
through litigation rather than by selling at market value in the securities
markets.276 Again, this argument only applies to public firms; minority
shareholders of private firms have no market sale option and will, by neces-
sity, bargain with controlling shareholders over a freeze-out price in the
shadow of case law on fair value. Even as applied to public companies, this
argument assumes that control shareholders will seek to set a freeze-out
price at a discounted price and thus induce litigation. But if discount law
clearly rejected discounts (both explicit and implicit), freeze-out proponents
would be more likely to set a freeze-out price in line with this law precisely
to avoid litigation. Indeed, freeze-out proponents already appear to be do-
ing so.2 77 Finally, as is recognized, appraisal and entire fairness litigation is
sufficiently unattractive to minority shareholders as a procedural matter that
without other dramatic changes in appraisal law, defining "fair value" to ex-
clude discounts is unlikely to create a large drain on judicial resources.
In sum, there is no reason to expect a no-discount rule to be more in-
tractable for courts to apply than its opposite, nor is there any reason to ex-
pect more litigation with a no-discount rule.
275 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991) (providing appraisal rights for shareholders
without differentiating between public and private corporations, and stating that the special
provisions governing closely held corporations do not affect fair value determinations); see
also Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1142-45 (discussing a fair value determination for a private
company); Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., No. CIV.A.8395, 1990 WL 84218, at *48 (Del. Ch.
June 19, 1990) (citing and following Cavalier Oil in a fair value determination for a public
company).
76 See John D. Emory, Jr., Comment, The Role of Discounts in Determining "Fair
Value" Under Wisconsin's Dissenters 'Rights Statutes: The Case for Discounts, 1995 Wis. L.
REV. 1155, 1173 (arguing that the failure to discount shares would encourage appraisal litiga-
tion and "strain limited judicial resources").
277 See supra Part IV.D (discussing the empirical evidence that reflects this trend in
freeze-out transactions).
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G. Does the Default Nature of Discount Law Affect the Choice of Rule?
The foregoing policy analysis has implicitly assumed that whatever dis-
count rule is adopted will govern all firms in a mandatory, binding fashion.
As demonstrated in Part II, however, current law allows firms to vary dis-
count law by private contract, through redeemable common stock, through
buy/sell agreements, or via other contracting mechanisms. Before address-
ing the policy question of whether discount law should remain nonbinding,
consideration should be given to whether the fact that discount law is and
perhaps should be nonbinding affects the policy choice of which discount
rule should be the default rule.
Analysis here again supports a no-discount rule. As between two po-
tential default rules, the potential costs of contracting around whichever rule
is chosen should be considered. Lucian Bebchuk has argued that where a
nonbinding default rule is to be chosen from two alternatives, neither of
which is clearly superior, preference should be given to the rule that is less
favorable to control persons, because such a rule has a better chance of be-
ing corrected over time should the rule prove inefficient. The "least cost"
approach, then, also favors a default rule excluding discounts. Corporations
are currently able to contract around rules regarding discounts by amending
their charters or reincorporating. In addition, corporate managers and con-
trolling stockholders choose the terms of the initial corporate charter and
occupy the best position to effect changes in state law. If courts accept the
conclusion of Part IV.H below and leave intact the largely nonbinding na-
ture of the rule, corporate managers and controlling shareholders will be
best positioned to avoid the effects of a poorly chosen rule. Thus, the rule
chosen should benefit the party least able to resort to mechanisms for
avoiding the rule, the minority shareholders, supporting the exclusion of
minority discounts.
H. Should Discount Law Be Nonmandatory?
Before concluding, some consideration should be given to whether dis-
count law should remain mandatory but nonbinding, whether it should be
made nonmandatory, or whether it should impose constraints on the ability
of firms to contract around whichever discount rule is chosen.
Firms compete for capital, and the price of capital generally reflects
governance structures, including rules of corporate law as well as charter
278 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 26-43 (implying that value-increasing amendments
unfavorable to managers are unlikely to be proposed by managers or shareholders).
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and bylaw provisions.2 79  Over time, structures that maximize investor
wealth reduce the cost of capital and are naturally selected from a diverse
array of structural experiments.28 Except where structural terms create ex-
ternalities or are both unpriced and systematically suboptimal, corporate law
should not impose mandatory rules that constrain this competitive process,
but instead should consist of only nonmandatory default rules and allow
firms and investors (prior to investment) to negotiate terms that vary from
default rules.281 The same logic weighs against imposing mandatory but
nonbinding rules, as with current discount law.
279 See generally R.A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM
COMMON STOcKs 25-46, 53-61 (2d ed. 1983) (describing the relationship between risk and
return for common stocks); EASTEREROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 1-39 (describing the
purpose of the corporate contract); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-92 (1984) (describing capital market mecha-
nisms that potentially explain market efficiency); Symposium, The Structure and Governance
of Enterprise, 27 J. FIN. ECoN. 1 (1990) (examining changes occurring in the structure, man-
agement, and governance of business enterprises). The EMH, which in its "strong" and
"semi-strong" forms is crucial to the view that corporate structures are priced efficiently, is
not a consensus view. See supra note 190 (questioning the efficiency of capital markets).
Few would dispute, however, the notion that capital market pricing generally reflects govern-
ance structures, particularly at the stage of initial public offerings for large companies. See
Gordon, supra note 123, at 1557-61 (arguing that initial public offering prices are generally
efficient); cf Steven L. Jones & Jeffry M. Netter, Efficient Capital Markets, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICs 569, 569-73 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993) (noting that
"initial stock price response to new information is at least in the correct direction").
280 See EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 22, at 4-7 (arguing that "self-interested
entrepreneurs and managers... are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net
profits"); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law and Science in the Corporate Field: A Cri-
tique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1534-38 (1989) (arguing in favor of the eco-
nomic or contractarian view of the function of corporate law); Ralph K. Winter, The "Race
for the Top Revisited". A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1526-29 (1989)
(rebutting Eisenberg's argument that capital markets fail to discipline management). But see
Eisenberg, supra note 123, at 1500-05 (arguing that capital markets do not sufficiently con-
strain firms to have a significant disciplinary impact on governance structures).
In addition to capital markets, other markets play a role in aligning the structure of a firm
with the interests of investors. These markets include the market for corporate charters among
the states, the market for corporate control, and the managerial labor market See ROMANO,
supra note 47, at 32-51 (describing and assessing evidence for the impact of a market for cor-
porate charters); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 290-95 (1980) (describing the market for corporate control and the managerial
labor market). But see Black, supra note 123, at 571 (arguing that small IPOs may not be
priced efficiently and that post-IPO discipline by the capital markets, labor markets, product
markets, and market for corporate control is inefficient).
281 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 35 (arguing that "[tihere is no rea-
son why [the law] should be used to impose a term that defeats actual bargains"); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395,
1404-08 (1989) (summarizing arguments against mandatory corporate governance structures
at the initial charter stage and noting exceptions for externalities and systematic mispricing);
David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA.
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If corporate structures are efficiently priced, variations are at worst
neutral from a shareholder perspective because investors will only pay for
what they receive. Innovations can thus benefit the firms and investors in-
volved in a new structure by permitting them their structure of choice. In-
novations may also benefit the public generally because efficient structural
innovations are a matter of public record and can be copied, leading to spill-
over effects if useful.
Part III.D raised the possibility of systematic mispricing of minority
share prices based on a general misunderstanding regarding the Delaware
rule on discounts as a possible answer to the discount puzzle.212 As noted,
however, such an answer conflicts with the EMH, and the hypothesis re-
mains unproven. More to the point, the simple "fix" to the possibility of
overpayment would be for Delaware courts to adopt a predictable default
rule rather than imposing an unpredictable mandatory rule. Parts III.B and
III.C provide independent, plausible answers to the discount puzzle. Nei-
ther transaction costs nor network externalities in themselves provide sepa-
rate reasons for imposing a mandatory discount rule on firms and investors,
and the possibility of innovation externalities-if anything-favors permit-
ting or encouraging greater latitude for innovation to help partially offset the
possibility of less-than-optimal innovation caused by innovation external-
ities.
Absent a compelling reason to do otherwise, and given that nothing in
DGCL section 262 or its legislative history suggests that Delaware courts
should do otherwise, Delaware courts should abandon the blanket, manda-
tory rule rejecting all "shareholder level" discounts formulated in Cavalier
Oil.284 Rather, courts should generally reject discounts for the policy rea-
sons discussed earlier in this Part, but permit discounts when clear evidence
establishes that a particular firm and its investors reasonably expected a dis-
count to be applied, on the basis of ex ante bargaining in the form of price-
setting or actual negotiations. 28 That the efficiency arguments in Part IV.A
L. REV. 701, 733-36 (1987) (arguing in favor of nonmandatory default rules); McChesney,
supra note 280, at 1534-38 (same).
282 See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text (discussing the overpayment hypothe-
sis as an explanation for the discount puzzle).
283 See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw.
U. L. REV. 565, 599-600 (1995) (discussing the phenomenon of innovation externalities).
284 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
285 This argument should be distinguished from the arguments made supra Part IV.E that
shareholder expectations should not alone be determinative of which default rule should be
chosen on discounts. In those arguments, expectations were ambiguous because both the firm
and investors were silent about freeze-out pricing. See supra Part IV.E. Here, by contrast, a
firm would be required to clearly specify an alternative rule for it to be upheld.
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are uncertain at best, and that either rule represents a trade-off between
competing efficiency interests, also suggests that whichever rule is chosen
should remain nonmandatory. Permitting the inclusion of discounts in ap-
propriate cases will continue to protect minority shareholders, but protect
them in an appropriate way by satisfying their reasonable investment ex-
pectations, and it will provide corporations and investors with the flexibility
to vary from this norm if they wish to do so. In any instance where a rule
including discounts would be applied, full disclosure of the effects of the
rule, together with appropriate charter provisions to put subsequent inves-
tors on notice, should of course be required.
To decide whether shareholder expectations are clearly evidenced, con-
sider how a firm could contract around a default rule on discounts. Rules
affecting minority discounts may arise at the time of initial issuance and in
"midstream changes" through charter or bylaw amendments. A midstream
change can occur in either a setting where no controlling shareholder exists,
so that "control" is dispersed in the public market among minority share-
holders, or where a controlling shareholder or parent company exists.
A firm-specific rule including discounts resulting from an initial issu-
ance would appear to provide the best case for applying a rule permitting
discounts.2 86 Where minority shares are issued in a public offering or pri-
vate placement, the issuing firm should have the flexibility to contract with
its shareholders in such a way that, should it pursue a transaction triggering
With respect to discounts other than minority discounts, shareholders investing in certain
types of stock, upon full disclosure, will form investment expectations regarding the value of
the stock that warrants consideration in fair value determinations. In the context of initial
share issuances, the presumption is that such investors have consented to a rule including dis-
counts (or premiums, where appropriate) that takes into account the special characteristics of
such stock:
(1) shares issued with lesser or greater voting rights (which should not be valued identi-
cally with shares having normal voting rights, despite (in theory) having the same pro rata
residual claim in liquidation);
(2) shares subject to an otherwise unobjectionable written agreement among shareholders
(or between a company and particular shareholders) restricting share transfers (for example,
buy/sell agreements, agreements granting the corporation a right of first refusal, and agree-
ments prohibiting transfer to a particular class of potential investors), or altering the rights
upon transfer of shares (for example, time-phased voting shares, which have differing voting
rights depending upon how long they have been held by the shareholder and which should not
be valued identically with freely transferable shares); and
(3) shares of privately held companies (which should not be valued identically with shares
of an identical company-in other words, marketability discounts are valid).
Where investors are aware of such unique attributes at the time of investment, discounts
or premiums to reflect the unique attributes of such shares should be included to satisfy the
reasonable investment expectations of both the issuing firm and the investors.
286 See Gordon, supra note 123, at 1556-64 (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to
IPOs generally).
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a fair value determination, fair value would include a discount to reflect the
minority status of such shares. Inclusion of discounts in such circumstances
would not appear to create any identifiable externality, nor would discounts
appear to present any special capital market pricing difficulty.87 All other
things being equal, expanding structural choices for firms and investors
seems sensible on its face,288 and permitting corporate law to include dis-
counts, if consistent with investors' reasonable expectations, would allow
the capital markets to correct for any default rule inefficiencies.
289
In a midstream change where a controlling shareholder exists, there will
be little basis for concluding that minority shareholders consented to the
change. Disclosure relating to the change and technical board and share-
holder approval requirements will not prevent a controlling shareholder
from effecting a midstream change that represents a pure wealth transfer
from minority shareholders. Absent judicial restraint, controlling share-
holders, by definition, have the ability to force approval of charter amend-
ments that transfer value from minority shareholders to controlling share-
holders. Permitting such midstream changes would, in effect, be permitting
value diversion by controlling shareholders and could be expected to reduce
ex ante share value.2 90 Even in a situation in which minority shareholders
bought their shares expecting that a controlling shareholder would exist, as
in "partial carve-outs," or IPOs of minority stakes, minority investors do not
expect that controlling shareholders will be unconstrained in their technical
ability to propose and implement midstream changes.291 A charter amend-
287 As discussed in Part IV.F, supra, where market prices are available, basing fair value
determinations on such prices, which reflect an implied minority discount, would appear to be
easier for both judges to determine and capital markets to price. Cf Hermalin & Schwartz,
supra note 201, at 366-67 (arguing for a default rule including discounts on the ground that
market prices are verifiable).
288 See Charles L Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 262
(1985) (describing the "Expanded Choice postulate"); Gordon, supra note 123, at 1553
(same).
289 A third argument for permitting firms and investors to vary default rules is that doing
so protects them from the risk that mandatory government regulation serving some end not
endorsed by firms or investors will be imposed through corporate law. See Gordon, supra
note 123, at 1553 n.15 (explaining that the "opt out" principle protects parties against legisla-
tive regulation or delay); see also ROMANO, supra note 47, at 42-44 (describing ways in
which Delaware "bonds" to firms and investors by making it difficult for the Delaware legis-
lature to "renege" on implicit promises of adopting corporate laws that maximize investor
wealth).
290 See supra Part IV.A.5 (explaining that uncertainty and asymmetric information will
increase capital cost and decrease share value).
291 The Delaware Supreme Court's recent split decision in Williams v. Geier demon-
strates that Delaware's highest court has, for the moment, decided that such coerced share-
holder votes do not present any per se problem. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376-
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ment permitting the majority to freeze out the minority at a discounted price
(less than "fair value") would appear to be a classic instance in which the
entire fairness test should apply, regardless of whether the amendment is
technically approved by the requisite majority. It is difficult to imagine
from either an ex ante or an ex post perspective how to defend a midstream
charter amendment that simply lowers the fair price that control persons
would need to pay in future conflict transactions.
That leaves one final, difficult case: midstream changes approved by
minority shareholders in situations not involving controlling shareholders.
Specifically, should a rule including discounts be permitted to be added to a
charter after a company is already a public company, whether isolated from,
or in anticipation of, a shareholder-approved control acquisition? Recent
academic commentary has suggested that approval of midstream charter
changes may be coerced by management through agenda control and "bun-
dling" a charter change with a "sweetener" such as a special dividend, even
absent a controlling shareholder.292 Moreover, collective action problems of
the sort that make tender offers potentially coercive may impair a fully con-
sensual shareholder vote.293 Because management of a public company that
lacks a controlling shareholder is often in a position to propose and imple-
ment a type of conflict transaction (an MBO) that raises precisely the same
types of issues as conflict transactions sponsored by controlling sharehold-
ers, midstream changes sponsored by management should also be suspect.
77 (Del. 1996) (upholding stockholder approval of an amendment in the absence of unilateral
board action or disenfranchisement). In Geier, however, the majority opinion acknowledged
that the "entire fairness" standard might apply to certain types of charter amendments. See id.
at 1378 (giving various reasons why shareholder-approved charter amendments might be
subject to entire fairness review and asserting that those reasons were not applicable in the
case at hand); see also id. at 1386-88 (Hartnett, J., dissenting) (arguing strenuously that "entire
fairness" review was appropriate in the instant case).
292 See Gordon, supra note 123, at 1573-80 (discussing the risk of opportunistic charter
amendments); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1820, 1823-25
(1989) (arguing for substantial limits on midstream changes in governance structures and
identifying issues which def'me those limits). But see Romano, supra note 130, at 1606-13
(disputing that risks of opportunistic charter amendments are serious).
293 See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,637, at 86,916 (June 21, 1984) (noting that share-
holders often act against their beliefs due to uncertainty and the desire to minimize the risk of
change); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Rem-
edy, 12 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 911,924 (1987) (explaining that rational shareholders may make less
efficient tender decisions because they "cannot coordinate their actions"); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1729-31 (1985) (explaining that shareholders' inability to coordinate
action is among the causes of tender decision distortion); Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender
Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 349-56 (1980) (explaining the
"prisoners' dilemma" facing shareholders in an interfirm tender offer).
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MBOs concededly face market and legal hurdles that freeze-outs do not:
the Revlon doctrine generally applies to MBOs, effectively requiring some
form of market check or auction before an MBO can be closed.294 None-
theless, a rule permitting discounts would present a paradigm case of a
charter change that poses a conflict between control persons and minority
shareholders, similar to the dual class recapitalizations that enjoyed a surge
of popularity in the mid-1980s. Although the question is not free from
doubt, and the debate over midstream changes is too lengthy to review in
detail here, concerns about midstream changes combine with concerns about
freeze-outs themselves to suggest that, on balance, companies should not be
permitted to adopt rules to include discounts at any time other than at initial
issuance.
CONCLUSION
Having concluded in Part IV that Delaware courts should continue to
reject minority discounts, it may be worthwhile to end by briefly consider-
ing how courts might go about the difficult business of attempting to differ-
entiate between minority discounts and control premiums, and consequently
how they might avoid making the same mistakes that have confused past
Delaware decisions on fair value.
As noted in Part I, control premiums and minority discounts are inti-
mately related-either they are used synonymously, or they are used to rep-
resent distinct but overlapping concepts. 9s As argued in Part I, some Dela-
ware courts have taken the pro rata value doctrine to prohibit explicit
"second-stage" adjustments of any kind, whether premiums or discounts.
As a result, those courts have produced fair value determinations that reflect
implicit discounts, notwithstanding that the pro rata value doctrine nomi-
nally prohibits discounts.296 Other Delaware courts have recognized that
control premiums and minority discounts are distinct in principle and have
attempted to exclude some portion of a control premium without imposing
what those courts viewed as a minority discount.297 Unfortunately, those
294 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1985) (announcing the Revlon doctrine); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1280-88 (Del. 1988) (applying Revlon to MBOs).
295 See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the concepts of control premiums and minority dis-
counts).
296 See supra Parts I.D.1-.2 (explaining how implicit discounts have been granted despite
the fair value doctrine); Part I.D.3 (discussing cases granting implicit discounts).
297 See supra Part I.D.2.b (explaining the distinction); Part I.D.3 (analyzing case law con-
fusion with respect to the distinction); see also Coffee, supra note 77 (making the same point
by distinguishing expropriation value from synergy value in the context of sales of control by
controlling shareholders).
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courts have provided only general guidance regarding how to calculate or
even understand what portion of the control premium must be excluded, and
what portion must be included to eliminate the implicit minority discount.
298
As an initial matter, Delaware law on fair value would be improved
simply by reformulating the pro rata value doctrine, at least as it has been
applied to date. Of course, a fair value determination should include a
valuation of the corporation as a whole (where feasible, such as through a
DCF analysis). Courts should recognize that various valuation techniques,
such as market-price-based valuations, already impound minority discounts,
whereas other techniques, such as valuations based on control acquisition
prices, impound full control premiums, including synergy value specific to
the future transactions, as well as pure control value. A more flexible ap-
proach-more in keeping with the spirit of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.299 -
would not reject the valuation methodologies which impose full control
premiums, but neither would it prohibit "adjusting" reference values
produced by such methodologies to eliminate nonincludable elements.
Nevertheless, a court making a fair value determination needs a reliable
method for choosing the appropriate adjustments. Recall what gives control
shares greater value than minority shares: expropriation value, synergy
value, and pure control value.30 0 As a doctrinal matter, DGCL section 262
appears to prohibit inclusion of synergy value because, by definition, such
value arises out of the transaction triggering the appraisal.3 °1 It is true that
in Weinberger, and more recently in Technicolor, the Delaware Supreme
Court has interpreted the statutory exclusion narrowly.3°2 Nevertheless, the
synergies included in fair value determinations in those two cases were lim-
ited to synergies that both were "known" as of the date of the merger and
were related to steps that had previously been taken by the controlling
shareholder, so that the synergies were plausibly "part of' the company be-
298 See supra Part I.D.3 (explaining case law confusion with respect to the distinction
between minority discounts and control premiums).
299 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
300 See supra Part I.D.2.a (defining these terms and illustrating their conceptual bases).
301 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991 & Supp. IV 1996) (directing courts to deter-
mine fair value "exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or ex-
pectation of the merger").
302 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-14 (Del. 1983) (interpreting DGCL
section 262 as barring only speculative elements of future value); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (interpreting DGCL
section 262 and Weinberger as barring synergy value), rev'd, 684 A.2d 289, 298-300 (Del.
1996) (instructing the lower court on remand that synergies must be included in fair value if,
during the period between tender offer and freeze-out merger in a two-step takeover, the ac-
quiror takes sufficient steps so that synergies are "known" and not "speculative" and are part
of the company being valued).
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ing valued. It is unclear how far Delaware courts will push this reasoning in
the face of the statutory exclusion-however narrow it may be said to be.
Even if Delaware courts were prepared to reject a rigid application of the
pro rata value doctrine, the inclusion of synergies that were still in the early
planning stage, and so were speculative even if probable, would appear to
be contrary to the appraisal statute.
30 3
The remaining elements of a control premium, expropriation value and
pure control value, by contrast, appear to be elements that could be consid-
ered by a court under Weinberger.30 4 For reasons discussed in Part IV, ex-
propriation value should not be included in fair value. Pure control value is
the most difficult element. It represents, so to speak, the value of pure con-
trol in a world of upright, law-abiding citizens, in which no expropriation
value existed, and where no transaction-specific synergies were foreseeable.
The efficiency arguments reviewed in Part IV suggest that, at least as a pre-
liminary matter, such value should be included, and therefore, whenever
minority share prices are adjusted upward to eliminate the impact of minor-
ity discount, the adjustment made should include all elements of a control
premium except synergy values.
As a practical matter, courts are ill-equipped to distinguish between in-
cludable and excludable elements of a control premium, regardless of the
resolution of the theoretical problems 05  Moreover, as noted by several
Delaware courts, judges generally are not empowered or well-positioned to
act as investigators and must instead depend upon litigants to brief the is-
sues and provide factual data.3 0 6 Rather than attempting the impractical,
therefore, courts might adopt the following procedural rule to guide fair
value determinations: Where an adjustment to a reference value is proposed
to eliminate elements of a control premium or minority discount in a fair
value determination, the transaction sponsor will bear the burden of ex-
plaining why the adjustment is being made and how reliably it can be meas-
ured. Failure to meet this burden will result in acceptance of upward ad-
justments and rejection of downward adjustments.
303 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (requiring consideration of "all relevant factors"
but excluding consideration of value based on the accomplishment or expectation of merger);
cf 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 13.01(3) (1997) (permitting the inclusion of increased
or decreased post-merger value where it would be inequitable not to do so).
304 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713 (excluding from fair value only "speculative ele-
ments" arising from the 'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger").
305 See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911, at
*4 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (noting the possibility of arbitrariness in adjusting for a minority
discount).
306 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. No. 8080, 1990 WL 201390, at *5
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (noting that the parties, not the judge, have the responsibility to find
and present proof).
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Such a procedural rule would be consistent with traditional Delaware
law in entire fairness litigation that places the burden of proving entire fair-
ness on the transaction sponsors.307 It would permit control persons, at a
minimum, to exclude the impact of synergy value if they could propose a
reliable estimate of such synergies, based, for example, on a comparable
transaction analysis. Such a rule also fits nicely with existing requirements
of the duty of candor.308 Temptations to exaggerate the size of estimated
synergy value would be tempered not only by the litigation process, but also
by the securities laws, at least for control persons that have their own public
shareholders who would be able to sue if the control persons knowingly dis-
closed higher than reasonably expected synergy values. Practitioners would
develop and refine techniques for arriving at appropriate adjustments, and a
body of case law would develop to assist practitioners in this process. Over
time, Delaware corporate law would begin to reflect in practice what it pur-
ports to do in theory, and what appears to be most efficient-to exclude mi-
nority discounts in conflict transactions.
307 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (agreeing with the lower court's holding that "the
ultimate burden of proof is on the majority shareholder to show... that the transaction is
See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (enunciating the
duty of candor).
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Table of Cases
Cases Applying or Rejecting Minority Discounts, Marketability
Discounts, or Control Premiums in Appraisal, Liquidation,
Statutory Buyout, and Entire Fairness Cases,
through January 1999
Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Ronald v. 4-C's Elec. Packaging, Inc., CA Rejects minority dis-
168 Cal. App. 3d 290, 214 Cal. Rptr. counts
225 (Ct. App. 1985).
Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., CA Rejects minority dis-
154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Ct. App. 1979). counts
Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co. v. CO Rejects minority dis-
Moore, 770 P.2d 1308 (Colo. App. counts
1988).
Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., 1998 DE Applies 20% control
Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (1998). premium
LeBeau v. M. G. Bancorporation Inc., DE Rejects methodology re-
1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (1998). flecting implicit minority
discount; accepts meth-
odology that includes
"control premium" aris-
ing from elements of
value other than syner-
gies
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aramark DE Rejects minority discount
Corp., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70 (1998). in entire fairness case
triggered by reverse stock
split freeze-out
Connector Serv. Corp. v. Briggs, 1998 DE An Illinois court applying
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18864 (N.D. Ill. Delaware law rejects mi-
1998). nority discount in entire
fairness case triggered by
reverse stock split freeze-
out
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 DE Holds that control pre-
A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). mium (including synergy
value) must be included if
synergies are "part of'
company on merger date;
affirms rejection of mi-
nority discount
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., DE Adjusts market value
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (1995). upward to eliminate im-
plicit minority discount;
refuses to include syn-
ergy value
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. DE Attempts to reject minor-
Ch. LEXIS 91 (1993). ity discount and to ex-
clude synergy value by
using "blended price" of
two-tier offer
Hodas v. Spectrum Technology Inc., DE Rejects minority and
1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52 (1992). marketability discounts
Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 DE Applies control premium
A.2d 796 (Del. 1992). at "corporate level"
Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bak- DE Rejects minority discount
eries Corp., 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 but also declines to adjust
(1992). market value upward to
eliminate implicit dis-
count
In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 DE Rejects upward adjust-
A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991). ment to eliminate implicit
discount; rejects control
premium
In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 1990 DE Rejects minority dis-
Del. Ch. LEXIS 199 (1990). count, but uses market
value (and thus implicit
discount) in part
Cavalier Oil Co. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d DE Rejects minority and
1137 (Del. 1989). marketability discounts
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d DE Rejects third-party sale
137 (Del. Ch. 1980). value (and thus control
premium)
In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 DE Rejects third-party sale
A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968). value (and thus control
premium); uses Delaware
block method
Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 DE Applies 10% marketabil-
A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1968). ity discount
Application of Del. Racing Assoc., 213 DE Rejects third-party sale
A.2d 203 (Del. 1965). value (and thus control
premium); uses Delaware
block method
Sporborg v. City Speciality Stores, 123 DE Rejects control premium
A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 1956). in determining market
pricing using Delaware
block method
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 DE Rejects control premium
A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). in determining market
pricing using Delaware
block method
Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d DE Applies 25% minority
71 (Del. 1950). discount at "corporate
level"
Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, GA Applies minority discount
314 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). and marketability dis-
count, but cautions
against double-counting
Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d IL Refuses to overturn lower
745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). court's application of
50% combined minority/
marketability discount;
fair value determination
vested in trier of fact
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Lab., IL Refuses to overturn lower
Inc., 972 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1992). court's rejection of mi-
nority discount; fair value
determination vested in
trier of fact
Stanton v. Republic Bank of S. Chicago, IL Refuses to overturn lower
581 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. 1991). court's acceptance of 5%
minority discount; fair
value determination
vested in trier of fact
Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. IL Rejects both 20% mar-
Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662 (2d Dist. Ill. ketability discount and
1990). 30% control premium as
a factual (not legal) mat-
ter
Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 545 IL Applies 20% minority
N.E.2d 111(1 st Dist. Ili. 1988). discount
Johnson v. Hickory Creek Nursery, 521 IL Rejects minority discount
N.E.2d 236 (3d Dist. Ill. 1988).
Stewart v. D.J. Stewart & Co., 346 IL Finds discount not inap-
N.E.2d 475 (2d Dist. Ill. 1976). propriate as a matter of
law
Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., IL Includes discount in list
192 N.E. 824 (2d Dist. Ill. 1934). of permissible valuation
factors
Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 734 IN Applies 15% minority
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983). discount
Richardson v. Palmer Broad. Co., 353 IA Rejects minority discount
N.W.2d 374 (Iowa 1984).
Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38 IA Rejects minority discount
(Iowa 1965).
Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 630 P.2d KA Applies 20% minority
167 (Kan. App. 1981). discount
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing KY Rejects minority dis-
Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. count; applies market-
1982). ability discount
In re Valuation of Common Stock of ME Rejects minority discount
McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me.
1989).
American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 190 A. MD Rejects minority discount
225 (Md. 1937).
BNE Mass. Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d MA Rejects minority dis-
14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). count; applies control
premium
Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 163 MA Rejects implicit minority
N.E.2d 9 (Mass. 1959). 1 discount
Pooley v. Makato Iron & Metal, Inc., MN Rejects minority discount
513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). _
Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. MN Rejects minority discount
1993).
Spinnaker Software Corp. v. Nicholson, MN Applies minority discount
495 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 1
MT Properties, Inc. v. CMC Real Estate MN Rejects minority discount
Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
Hernando Bank v. Huff, 796 F.2d 803 MS Applies minority discount
(5th Cir. 1985).
Hunter v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 721 F. MO Rejects minority and
Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1989). marketability discounts;
states that fair value de-
termination vested in trier
of fact
King v. FTJ, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. MO Applies 15% minority
Ct. App. 1988). discount; states that fair
value determination
vested in trier of fact
Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., Inc., 577 MO Rejects minority discount
S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
Rigel Corp. v. Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d NE Rejects minority discount
519 (Neb. 1994). 1 1 1
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp. NV Rejects explicit minority
2d 1117 (D. Nev. 1998). discount; rejects control
premium; applies implicit
discount by using market
value; applies 25% mar-
ketability discount
Lawson Mardon Wheaton v. Smith, 315 NJ Rejects marketability dis-
N.J. Super. 32 (1998). count; rejects attempt to
apply upward adjustment
to eliminate implicit mi-
I nority discount
McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, NM Applies 25% minority
Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. App. 1986). discount, states that fair
value determination vest-
ed in trier of fact
Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 NY Rejects minority dis-
N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1995). count; applies 25% mar-
, ketability discount
Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 514 NY Rejects minority discount
N.Y.S.2d 120 (2d Dept. 1987).
Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 NY Rejects minority dis-
N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dept. 1985). count; applies 10% mar-
I ketability discount
Jones v. Healy, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Spec. NY Applies minority discount
Term 1945).
Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 ND Rejects control premium
N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971). in "reconstructing" mar-
, ket price
Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 OH Applies implicit minority
N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987). discount
Woolf v. Universal Fidelity Life Ins. Co., OK Rejects minority discount
849 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, 765 OR Rejects minority dis-
P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). count; applies 33% mar-
, ketability discount
Charland v. County View Golf Club, RI Rejects minority and
Inc., 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991). marketability discounts
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Case Law Discount/Premium
Holding
In re 75,629 Shares of Common Stock of VT Applies 30% control
Trapp Family Lodge, Inc., 1999 Vt. premium
LEXIS 5 (Vt. 1999). 1 1 1
Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289 WA Rejects minority discount
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 1
* * * * * *
